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Realizing Mission Objectives
A Promising Approach to Measuring the
Social Performance of Microfinance
Institutions
Katarzyna Pawlak
Michal Matul
Print your mission statement on the back of your business card to
remind your people, your prospects, and your customers of what your
company stands for.
—Philip Kotler
Abstract: This paper proposes a new approach for measuring the social performance of microfinance institutions. The key to developing sustainable social
performance measurement (SPM) systems and practices is to consider their
design from the perspective of the organizational mission. The fact that the SPM
system is built on the organizational mission ensures its cost-effectiveness and
facilitates its institutionalization. It not only stimulates an MFI to verify the fulfilment of its social mission and to innovate in the search for optimal solutions
to address development needs in a given intervention context, but it also can
improve its financial condition through client segmentation and risk management leading to increased efficiency, better product development, and strategic
decision-making on the competitive microfinance markets.

T

his paper proposes a new approach for measuring the social
performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). The
term “social performance” refers to social and economic
impact that, together with financial performance, constitutes an
MFI’s “double bottom line” (Simanowitz 2003). Based on

Journal of Microfinance

Microfinance Centre (MFC) field experience with different partners
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it appears that the key to
developing sustainable social performance measurement (SPM)
systems and practices is to consider their design from the perspective of the organizational mission. Building the SPM into institutional mission and goals is a promising way to ensure it is
institutionalized and cost-effective. This new approach promises
to help practitioners fulfil their social mission. Just as there is a
need to have financial performance indicators to guide the effort to
achieve profitability, the same applies to the social aspect of microfinance. If there is no system in place to support improvement in
social performance, the MFI’s social mission may be lost in the sole
pursuit of financial targets. Moreover, combining social and financial measurements can potentially increase financial returns in the
long term through a better understanding of target clients and
through allocating scarce resources in a more efficient way, thus
avoiding the unnecessary costs of ineffective actions. Combining
social and financial indicators will enable managers to successfully
balance institutional and development impact trade-offs while
striving to achieve the “double bottom line” and improve overall
performance.
In order to advance the ongoing debate about developing practical methods for measuring and improving social performance of
MFIs, 1 this paper summarises ideas for the mission-driven SPM
concept—its rationale, development process, necessary elements,
use, costs, and benefits. It starts with some reflections on the inefficiencies of current practices for measuring social performance that
inspire further thinking about social measurement principles.

Current Practice
In the majority of cases, MFIs do not have a systematic process to
monitor whether their social goals are being fulfilled. Social and
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financial goals have been treated separately, the latter gaining more
attention than the former. Efforts to monitor social performance
have focused more on tracking commonly used standard lists of
social indicators. Typically these indicators have been replicated
from other institutions or imposed by donors without any attempt
to understand their relevance to a particular organization and
culture or to adapt them accordingly. A corollary of this approach
is that monitoring or assessment has not been integrated into
other organizational processes. There has thus been a missing
link between social performance indicators and organizational
mission—the driving force for the organization, reflecting the
beliefs put behind its activities.

Impact Assessment
The aim of the Impact Assessment (IA) concept is to assist microfinance practitioners in measuring their impact at the client level
and consequently to give some insights into how an MFI’s social performance could be improved. The main goal of IA methods is to
investigate the attribution of changes in target client well-being
to microfinance intervention. However, given the lack of awareness
among microfinance industry stakeholders about IA methods when
they were initially introduced, there was a clash between expectations and the methodology applied. Practitioners thought that IA
would contribute substantially to improving their services and
boosting their operations in a cost-effective and long-term way, but
the design of the IA methods was not ready to meet these expectations. Therefore, IA has unfortunately gained a bad reputation.
Most practitioners who invested in assessing the impact of their
services did so in an ad-hoc manner. The majority of those who
tried would agree that it was costly and simplistic, was not useful
for management, did not provide timely information, and did not
bring groundbreaking changes in the MFI’s operations, although
it did enable staff to see that their work was bringing positive
changes to people’s lives. The failure of IA to meet all these expectations was mainly due to the following factors:
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• In the majority of cases the design of a study has been replicated from other institutions operating in different contexts;
there has been no internal participatory process to design
appropriate IA. When impact hypotheses, pathways, and indicators are simply borrowed from other institution the level of
understanding and further use of results, even if they are positive, is very poor.
• The results of practitioner-led impact studies are very often
overestimated. Firstly, the number of people leaving the program is seldom taken into account but is very important information. If 60%–70% of clients leave the program after taking
only one or two working capital loans, this would seem to
indicate that they either did not benefit from the service or
were adversely affected by it, so it is important to include them
in the analysis.2 Showing the results of impact on the current—“strongest”—clients presents a very simplistic overview.
Secondly, the unintended outcomes of microfinance—whether
positive or negative—are rarely considered, but if an attempt is
made to track them, much can be learned about the impact of
services. Everybody knows about the spiral of debt, but hardly
anyone considers negative impact pathways and incorporates
relevant indicators in the study design.
• There is virtually no segmentation in the impact studies. It is
accepted that disaggregation by different variables (e.g., age,
sex) is key in “commercial” market research and marketing
strategy development. In the same way, it cannot be assumed
that the impact of microfinance is the same on each and every
group of clients. Furthermore, considering business and development imperatives, it would be interesting to identify those
groups which register low or negative impact and ask them
what could be improved in the services provided.
• Last but not least, the IA efforts are not institutionalised.
Unless IA is designed internally and becomes part of the institution’s ongoing operations, there will be no buy-in among
staff, and it is difficult to see how it can contribute to easy-tomanage, innovative changes.
4
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These lessons provide important insights that should guide the
development of SPM systems and practices. The Assessing Impact
of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) initiative3 led to discussions
about practical ways of measuring the impact of microfinance. It
contributed extensively to promotion and better practice in impact
assessment and, in general, in client assessments of microfinance.
Current discussions on social performance are building on cuttingedge practitioner-led and middle-range methods for IA developed
by AIMS and work undertaken through the Imp-Act program to
develop practitioner-friendly IA systems. 4

Mission-Based Approach to Measuring Social
Performance of Microfinance
To create and develop a successful institution, there is a need for
clear goals that will drive the institution forward. Clarity is needed
to direct not only the staff, management, and clients but also the
actions of other stakeholders. These goals are reflected in the organizational mission, which therefore is a good starting point for the
development of institutional performance systems.
The role of microfinance differs from one context to another:
filling the gap in the financial market, giving risk management
tools to vulnerable groups or individuals, allowing micro-entrepreneurs to benefit from economic opportunities, facilitating a return
to work for the unemployed, building social networks, etc. Based on
a needs assessment, each microfinance practitioner aims to develop
services for selected target groups and to manage its social performance successfully to address their development needs.
Consequently, when we look across the missions of different MFIs,
it can be seen that they vary considerably; some claim to focus on
serving poor clients, others talk about improving economic wellbeing of a more broadly defined target group, and some aim to
address social as well as economic issues. Each institution perceives
its role in a different way and wants to achieve different objectives within a wide development agenda of microfinance as a whole.
As a consequence, they need different systems and approaches
for measuring social performance. Such systems would reflect an
Volume 6 Number 2
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institution’s uniqueness and stimulate its effectiveness. Whatever
the design, there is a need to answer two fundamental questions:
• Verification: How successful are we in fulfilling our mission?
• Improvement: What can we do to better fulfil our mission?
Given up-to-date practice and the mission-based concept, the
SPM should have the following functions:
• Identifying target clientele
• Monitoring client status change among target clientele (both
current and exiting clients)
• Stimulating the search for new solutions to improve the fulfilment of the organizational mission through targeting tools,
new products, partnerships, delivery channels, etc.
It is important to note that SPM does not have the function of
attributing changes within target groups to the microfinance intervention. This is probably the biggest difference between IA and
SPM. SPM has predominantly an internal use. 5 In this context it is
more appropriate to refer to “monitoring client status change”
rather than “impact assessment” (IA). 6 It is widely known that
monitoring financial performance can help an institution improve
its financial condition. This is possible thanks to the measures that
help verify the current situation and provide information on where
an organization can do better. In the same way the SPM works
by looking at inefficiencies or areas for further improvement—
creating an institutional drive for ongoing learning and innovation.

Developing Sustainable SPM
The link between cost and revenue and their relationship to financial performance is relatively clear. The relationship between an
organization’s actions and its social performance is not so selfevident, however. To be able to link inputs to the social results,
there is a need to conceptualize how expected changes may occur.
This will depend on the MFI’s mission, context, and methodology,
but it should be embedded in the perceived role microfinance can

6
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play in a given setting. Such an approach makes it important for
the institution to select performance indicators that will reflect the
way expected changes within their target group occur in the context
of its operations.
To select such “valid” indicators, it is important to go through
a rigorous selection process following the suggested steps. This
process is a key to building a sustainable SPM for an MFI.
Getting Consensus on the Institutional Goals and Needs
Before starting any work related to SPM it is necessary for an MFI
to better understand what kind of information is really needed.
This clarity allows efficient allocation of resources and enhances
the usefulness of the collected information. The key element in
assessing needs for the SPM is a thorough analysis of the MFI’s
mission, taking into account the broader picture of current program
design and potential areas for future development intervention.
Identifying the Target Group
The mission reflected in the institutional goals determines specific
target groups for intervention. The target groups should be selected
in terms of both financial and social goals. They will differ
across contexts and MFIs. It is important for each microfinance
practitioner to have a tool to identify these groups. Usually, clear
indicators should be defined in order to identify the target groups.
Additionally, psychographic segmentation can be run to further
separate specific target groups into more detailed segments by their
behavior and socio-demographic profile. This disaggregation is
crucial, as MFIs should develop services based on an understanding
of the needs of potential clients in the area where the MFIs operate.
In addition, it allows an estimation of costs of serving different
target groups and managing trade-offs to achieve the double bottom
line. As shown in the Prizma example, mentioned below, the client
poverty level is one possible indicator to identify target groups.
There is a growing impetus to develop practical tools to measure the
poverty level of microfinance clients. 7 It is important to note that
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not necessarily all MFIs should claim poverty outreach and use
poverty level criteria in setting their target groups.
Conceptualizing Impact Pathways
Once an organization is clear about its goals, operational rationale,
and target group(s), the next step is to be clear about the way the
expected changes within its target group(s) will occur. As proposed in the SEEP/AIMS manual (Nelson 2000) the following
elements should be investigated: intervention inputs, effects, and
expected and unintended outcomes. When the pathways are
being investigated, it is very important to include a variety of information sources that will increase the quality of the information.
Triangulation provides a more complex picture through crosschecking different perspectives on the same issue. It may involve
techniques such as brainstorming with staff, analyzing information
from widely available country-level data, receiving clients’ feedback,
and conducting sophisticated research studies and analysis; it may
also require various informants: staff, management, board, clients,
other stakeholders, academics, and experts. The degree of rigor
required will depend on the needs of the end users of the systems.
While establishing pathways, it is important to think beyond
the MFI’s current operating model and services offered. It is essential to consider the target client’s behaviors, needs, and attitudes; to
analyze how those aspects link to development goals; and to define
what those development goals mean in the wider context of microfinance. This will result in more indicators and social performance
measures that are broadly applicable and relevant in the long-term.
Identifying Indicators and Relevant Measures
The pathways inform the selection of indicators corresponding
with the expected outcomes. Indicators should be:
• Sustainable: valid in the long-term and able to withstand
changes in services and institutional environment.
• Universal: relevant for all target clients, rather than only for a
specific group.

8
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• Sensitive to change: able to reflect the changes associated with
the MFI’s intervention over a specified period of time.
• Easy to measure: ensure low cost and ease of information collection, and provide reliable data.
Once the indicators are identified there is a need to develop
reliable, easy-to-use measures.
Identifying the Best Ways to Collect, Validate,
Analyse, Report, and Use the Information
Identified indicators should drive the selection of data collection
method and the development of tools. At this point it is very
important to assess the institutional capacities. The system needs
to be adjusted to the existing institutional resources in order to
use them effectively. Consequently, more detailed issues should be
addressed internally, such as how data is collected, who collects
and inputs data, and how data should be stored and analyzed. If
these operational aspects are well adapted and integrated with other
operational systems and processes, the SPM will be cost-effective.
Depending on capacities, some of the approaches and tools
may be beyond the reach of some smaller, less developed institutions. To allow for effective SPM usage, a well-operating management information system (MIS) is an advantage. In addition,
there is a need for appropriate data collection and analysis skills
within the institution or from outsourcing possibilities. An effective
management structure that will oversee the data collection and the
use of information is also very important, as are the human and
financial resources that will be devoted to system design, maintenance, and development.
Institutionalizing Social Performance
Indicators, methods, and tools alone will not provide an institution with useful information in a cost-effective manner. SPM must
be a part of institutional operations and use existing resources; this
will enable operational and timely use. The organization should
make continuous efforts to institutionalize social performance
measurements from the very beginning of the development
Volume 6 Number 2
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process. Therefore, special attention must be paid to senior staff
commitment, staff buy-in, incentive systems, participatory meetings,
planning and system development processes and relevant training.

Necessary Elements in the SPM System
To fulfil SPM functions and methodological aspects mentioned
in two previous sections, the following outline is suggested (see
Figure 1):
• A routine impact monitoring component tracks changes
appearing among target clientele, including current, exiting,
and rejected clients, and enables the portfolio segmentation.
This gives a picture of patterns of client change and behavior.
However, it does not explain the reasons behind those
changes.
• A periodic decision making component ensures that the
collected information is analyzed and used by management
and other internal stakeholders. SPM data combined with
ongoing monitoring of internal and external changes enables
better understanding of the institutional and client-level
impact of an organization's actions. In addition, at this stage
areas for improvement are identified and automated. This allows
them to be translated into well-defined, specific research
objectives for exploratory follow-up research.
• A follow-up systematic research component investigates further
and clarifies issues around the signals identified through the
routine component. This to some extent enables an MFI to
isolate the effect of its intervention from externalities through
providing better understanding of the factors underlying
observed phenomena. Qualitative research, in triangulation
with the existing secondary data and anecdotal information
(staff feedback), leads to an understanding of why changes
are happening. It also follows up on new ideas coming from
the routine monitoring results. Exploratory research prompted
by routine monitoring findings results in the refinement of
policies and services and the development of new products,
leading to better mission fulfilment.

10
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• Ad-hoc research can be undertaken in response to opportunities
or challenges as well as any new ideas that an MFI may have,
regardless of the signals from the routine component. This
component ensures that the institution does not limit itself to
the signals emerging from the monitoring of the “attracted,”
current clients but opens up the space for innovation and
institutional inspiration that help further improve mission fulfilment. Such ad-hoc research may involve exploratory market
research on other segments, loyalty studies, or client satisfaction studies, which might be incorporated into the routine
monitoring system and further increase institutional effectiveness
in reaching its mission.
This framework is deliberately very general to allow every
organization to adapt it to its needs, taking into consideration its
mission and, consequently, social performance monitoring needs,
operational model, and current capacities.

Figure 1. SPM system framework
Routine Monitoring
Current, exit, rejected clients

Periodic Decision Making

Follow-up
Research

Verifying
and Improving
the Mission
Fullfilment

Other Ad Hoc
Research
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Figure 2. Sample mission fulfillment report
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Figure 2 continued
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Potential Use of the SPM System
What can management get out of the SPM system? One can
imagine very simple, periodic reporting that shows not only figures
but also actions, as shown in Figure 2. 8
Figure 2 provides an example of how changes in target clientele
composition can be isolated and tracked. It shows that, although
the socioeconomic situation is stable, there is a mission drift away
from serving target clientele due to the high dropout rate of dissatisfied target clients. The client status information is even more worrying, indicating that there has been no increased security of target
households. Further exploration of these results will enable the
organization to better understand factors behind these phenomena and develop appropriate strategies to improve the double
bottom line. One can imagine an initiative addressing client
dropout in the target group. A well designed loyalty strategy
directed at this group will not only result in a social return in
terms of reducing the mission-drift, but will also affect financial
returns through the increase of client repeat purchases, referrals,
cross-selling, up-selling, client emotional connectedness, etc. 9 In
other words, such a report enables the MFI to see worrying trends
and preempt possible problems, enabling the MFI to investigate the
underlying causes. The information gathered can have implications for several institutional areas, such as product development,
human resources, credit application procedures, and loyalty strategies
and promotion—all having implications for both financial and
social performance.

Costs and Benefits
The highest costs of measuring social performance are associated
with the system development, implementation, and integration
with other institutional functions and processes. These costs are
considerable, because they are usually linked to a significant change
in the organizational culture. However, an important point is that
once the SPM systems and practices are in place, additional costs
are very minor in relation to the benefits. It can be argued that

14
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implementation of SPM should further cut organizational costs
through more efficient allocation of resources.
The SPM, which is built on the institutional mission in a
structured process, performing all the functions and taking into
account all the methodological issues, has the following potential
benefits to an MFI:
• Facilitating decision making processes: the SPM enables indepth analysis of “microfinance trade-offs” and reveals the best
solutions.
• Providing information needed to improve the service: the SPM
is not static but action-oriented, thanks to trend analysis,
periodic discussion, and follow-up.
• Increasing understanding of social performance: the SPM
is based on clear pathways and robust, contextually adapted
indicators.
• Opening up new dimensions in client segmentation and target
group identification: the SPM has a smaller number of strong
impact and well-being proxies, which enables the segmentation of the portfolio by target group variables. Combining the
use of good target variables with standard psychographic
segmentation enriches the analyses. In addition, it provides
another source of data that can later be mined.
• Verifying outcomes of programmatic changes: the SPM provides
a simple tool for trend analysis that can be used to evaluate
outcomes of internal changes made to improve performance. It
goes beyond current clients, taking exiting and rejected clients
into consideration. It points to reasons behind product adaptation failure and other inefficiencies.
• Indicating social performance to external stakeholders: the
SPM system is linked to the mission and uses carefully selected
and adapted indicators. In this way, it can provide a reliable
means to justify the MFI’s existence and intervention
to external stakeholders. Moreover, it shows them how services
are being improved to better fulfil an organizational mission
and demonstrates how their investment contributes to
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development. Consequently, it allows an MFI to better position itself in a competitive market for funding.10
It should be easier to institutionalize: the SPM is driven by
institutional goals and based on actual informational needs
and operational capacities of an institution.
It can be sustained with low additional cost: the SPM can be
integrated with existing systems and processes at low cost and
with efficient use of time and other resources.
Providing timely information: the SPM is ongoing and automated.
Having a wide range of institutional uses: collected variables
can be used for other institutional purposes, such as risk
management, staff incentives, identifying new market opportunities, etc.

Two Examples from the Field
Opportunity International, Serbia
Opportunity International Serbia (OIS) is a young microfinance
bank that works to create employment opportunities and
improve the standard of living among its clients and their families,
regardless of ethnicity, religion, or political affiliations. OIS strives
to provide stability for its clients, allowing them to help themselves in dignity, with self-confidence, and to rebuild confidence in
financial institutions. The OIS identified its key impact areas
focusing mainly at the household level as priority and in particular
was interested in driving development in the following areas:
• employment creation and opportunities
• standard of living and stability
• self-confidence
Therefore, the conceptual framework was created around
these three areas and focused on household well-being, defined
as its stability and ability to provide for various needs. Household
stability was analyzed from the perspective of the household
assets accumulation and possessions (human, social, physical, and
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financial), which determine its stability through the role they play
in protecting from and coping with crises.
In the proposed framework (see Figure 3) increased household
stability is an objective in itself but also leads to increased employment opportunities (employment opportunities usually grow along
with accumulating assets). Improving living standards is also an
objective in itself, which leads to increased self-confidence. In such
a defined framework, the role of OIS is to provide such products
and services that will build necessary assets and provide a low
stress-coping mechanism.
Necessary information is provided through MIS reports. The
required information is generated from the set of indicators chosen
in a rigorous selection process by means of application forms
registered with new, follow-up, and rejected clients as well as
monitoring forms with dropping out clients.
Such a framework provides the starting point for segmenting
the target group, based on household well-being, and for identifying the most underdeveloped areas as an indication of the need to
improve service. Based on this information from the impact
monitoring system, OIS may adjust its products or develop new
ones to have a better impact on household well-being and on other
areas of development.
The segmentation based on household stability is also very
useful from the point of view of managing institutional risks (thus
helping to link the social and financial goals). OIS is able to keep
their risks low and serve target clientele through attracting a mix of
vulnerable, nonvulnerable, poor, and nonpoor clients that will
maximize its social goals at the minimal possible level of risk,
thanks to appropriate client base diversification.
Prizma in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Prizma (www.prizma.ba) is still a relatively young institution intervening in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a great deal to learn and
the capacity to grow. Prizma’s vision is to enable people to make
choices to improve their lives; its mission is to improve the wellbeing of poor and low-income women and their families by
Volume 6 Number 2
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Figure 3. SPM indicators—Example of OI Serbia
Area

Indicator

Measure

Self-confidence

Individual satisfaction
from the quality of life

How are you satisfied with your
current quality of life?

S ELF -C ONFIDENCE

S TANDARD

OF

L IVING

AND

S TABILITY

1. Household Security
Financial Assets
Stability of household
income

Physical Assets

Monthly family income
per capita
Ownership of a
house/apartment

Ownership of a car
and its condition

Value of productive
assets
Human Assets

Individual satisfaction
from the quality of life
Experience in current
work
Skills upgrade in the
last 12 months

How many adults have no regular
source of income (cannot work,
have no job or only seasonal
job/income)?
What is your family’s average
monthly income? (in dinar)

Where does your family live?
1. sharing rented apartment/house
with other families
2. renting apartment/house
3. sharing your own apartment/
house with other family(ies)
4. own apartment/house
5. own newly built apartment/house
(last 5 years)
How old is the car(s) owned by your
family? (if you have more than one
car, please put the number of cars
under relevant categories)
We don’t have a car
_____
Less than 6 years old _____
6–15 years old
_____
Older than 15 years
_____
If you were to sell your productive
(business) assets, how much would
you get for them (cars used mainly
for business, buildings, machines,
livestock, etc.)? (in dinar)
How are you satisfied with your
current quality of life?

How many years of working
experience do you have in the area
of your current job/business?
Have you gained any new skills/
knowledge (attended any training,
language course, professional
literature, continuation of education,
computer course, etc.) in the last
12 months?
0 = No
1 = Yes

Figure 3 continued
Social Assets

Availability of help
from the family

Availability of help
from friends

2. Needs Satisfaction
Basic Needs
Family diet
Satisfaction

Luxury Needs
Satisfaction

C REATION

OF

Employment
Creation

Employment
Opportunities

Going for a holiday

E MPLOYMENT

AND

In case of family financial problems
would you be able to get help from
your relatives?
1. rather not
2. there is a chance
3. rather yes
4. almost in any situation
5. definitely yes
In case of family financial problems
could you get help from friends?
1. rather not
2. there is a chance
3. rather yes
4. almost in any situation
5. definitely yes
How would you describe your
family’s diet?
1. we can afford only basic food
2. we can afford slightly diversified
food
3. we can afford everything we need
4. we can afford everything we want
(including eating in restaurants)
Have you or any of your family
members gone for a holiday during
the last 12 months?
0 = No
1 = Yes, in ex-Yugoslavia
2 = Yes, outside ex-Yugoslavia

E MPLOYMENT O PPORTUNITIES

Jobs created
Jobs sustained

Experience in
current work

Skills upgrade in the
last 12 months

Number of current workers in the
business (including full-time, parttime, paid-in-cash, students, etc.)
How many years of working
experience do you have in the area
of your current job/business?
Have you gained any new skills/
knowledge (attended any training,
language course, professional
literature, continuation of education,
computer course, etc.) in the last
12 months?
1 = No
2 = Yes
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providing long-term access to quality financial and nonfinancial
services. Since its inception, Prizma has embraced social performance and financial sustainability as core values, which has led to
constant clarification of the essential indicators of its effectiveness
as a social enterprise. In fact, the premise of Prizma’s work under
Imp-Act has been that social and institutional performance are
mutually enforcing goals. Within this principal framework,
Prizma has focused on three critical strategies: (1) measuring and
deepening outreach in an environment of poverty and growing
inequality, (2) improving service quality and institutional performance in an environment of growing competition, and (3) measuring and improving impact. Consequently, the organization has
sought to enhance social performance by institutionalizing organizational learning and deepening poverty outreach, focusing fundamentally on leadership, organizational culture, incentives, and
systems (Kline 2003). To these ends, Prizma has worked together
with MFC over the past 18 months developing a poverty assessment and impact monitoring system intended to support the organization’s developmental and institutional imperatives.
Developed as a scorecard, this system specifically seeks to meet
the following overarching needs:
• First, it enables the organization to assess clients’ poverty
status relative to other clients and non-clients across different
segments of its clientele, to understand who is being served—
who joins, stays, and leaves—and to refine targeting strategies,
incentives, and product attributes.
• Second, it enables the organization to report on every client’s
poverty status in absolute terms in relation to the national
poverty line and the widely referenced international benchmark of $1 and $2 a day.
• Third, it enables the organization to measure discrete change
in clients’ well-being over time. 11
The scorecard is a composite measure of household poverty
level based on nonincome indicators, reflecting some of the
strongest and most robust poverty proxies in Bosnia-Herzegovina
20
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identified using 2002 Living Standards Measurement Survey
(LSMS), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) data, a
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) Poverty
Assessment, and focus group research findings. The scorecard is
composed of two sets of indicators. The first three—education
level, residence, and family size—reflect poverty risk categories.
For example, if the female household head, spouse, or partner 12
has primary level education or less, the likelihood that the household is classified as poor increases significantly. The second four
Figure 4. Prizma’s Poverty Scorecard
Prizma Poverty Scorecard
Measure
Indicator
Education
Residence
Family Size

Consumption:
meat
Consumption:
sweets
Asset:
household durables
Asset:
transport

What is the education
level of female household
head/spouse/partner?

Where does family reside?

What is household size?

On average, how often does
family consume meat each
week?
On average, how often does
family consume sweets with
main meal each week?

0

Scale
1

≤ Primary

> Primary

Rural/Peri
≤ 10,000

Urban
> 10,000

≤5

2

<5

Rarely
Sometimes Often
0–2 x/wk 3–5 x/wk 6+ x/wk
Rarely
Sometimes Often
0–2 x/wk 3–5 x/wk 6+ x/wk

Does family possess a stereo/
CD player?

No

Yes

Does family possess a transport vehicle?

No

Yes

Total score (sum): 0–9

indicators represent more or less discrete measures of household
well-being. Thus, in addition to contributing to the poverty risk
profile of each applicant’s household, these second four enable
Prizma to measure change in status over time.
Simple ranges for each of these seven indicators were defined
based on the multiple data sources indicated above. Each point in
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these ranges reflects one, two, or three points towards a score ranging from zero to nine. Within this range of nine, three ranges have
been defined that correspond to the poverty categories outlined
below:
1. Poor: Score 0–2, living below LSMS poverty line
2. Vulnerable Nonpoor: Score 3–4, living between 100–150% of
LSMS poverty line
3. Nonpoor: Score 5+, living beyond 150% of LSMS poverty
line
These ranges mirror categories of client poverty status validated using LSMS data. The scorecard thus provides a relative
measure for the organization to assess its depth of outreach in each
area of operation. For example, a household that has a composite
score of two can clearly be said to be poorer than a household that
has a score of four. Just as data sources identified above can be used
to identify indicators and determine appropriate ranges for each,
LSMS or other national datasets, or data generated from a short
survey focused on key areas of interest, can be used to define cutoff points for absolute poverty status categories.
While this system does not, on its own, capture the complex,
dynamic, multidimensional, and context-specific nature of poverty
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it does enable the organization to understand and demonstrate more clearly and on a regular basis the
extent to which it is (1) reaching who it seeks (and claims) to be
reaching and (2) fulfilling its social mission. Additionally, it stimulates further learning and, in turn, stronger strategic positioning
and development of sound operating policies and pro-poor products
and services.

Conclusion
This paper argues that microfinance can be more efficient in reaching the double bottom line if it is equipped with a mission-based
Social Performance Measurement system. The fact that the SPM
system is built on the institutional mission ensures its costeffectiveness and facilitates its institutionalisation. Successful
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SPM—an output of a thorough, bottom-up, internal, and participatory process—should be integrated with other operational
systems and processes. It is based on a mix of routine and ad-hoc
components that supports systematic monitoring, research, and
decision making. Upfront costs of the SPMs development and
implementation and the management of the associated organizational changes are considerably high. However, as the paper argues,
this investment is compensated by low usage costs, better allocation
of resources, and other multiple benefits for an MFI. It not only
stimulates an MFI to verify its social mission fulfilment and
innovate in the search for optimal solutions to address development needs in a given intervention context, but it also can improve
its financial condition through client segmentation and risk
management, leading to increased efficiency, better product development, and strategic decision-making on the competitive microfinance markets.

Notes
More information about research work conducted by the Microfinance Centre for
Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States (MFC) can be found at
www.mfc.org.pl/research. The authors are very grateful to Anton Simanowitz,
Graham A. N. Wright, Laura Foose, and Caroline Tsilikounas for their comments on
the first draft.
1. See Cohen (1999), Hulme (1999), Morduch (2000), Schreiner and Woller
(2000), Zeller et al. (2003), Brody et al. (2003) and Tulchin (2003) for more reflections on social performance of microfinance.
2. The methodological problems caused by dropouts encountered in impact
assessments — incomplete sample and attrition bias — are discussed in more detail in
Karlan (2001).
3. http://www.usaidmicro.org/pubs/aims/
4. http://www.imp-act.org/
5. However, the authors believe that if the relevant SPM is in place, an MFI is
empowered to justify its intervention to external stakeholders as well. More discussion
is included further in the text in the section “costs and benefits.”
6. See Copestake (2001) for differences between IA and client monitoring.
7.http://www.seepnetwork.org/povertyassess.html; http://www.povertytools.org/
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8. This is just an example to illustrate potential outputs from the SPM system. It
is assumed that an MFI has an SPM including all the necessary elements listed in the
previous section. It should also be integrated with other client-level monitoring
systems, for example client satisfaction, desertion, and loyalty. Moreover, the reporting
format should be extended by trend analysis over longer period of time and profitability analysis for all target groups. The report presented is simplified only for the
sake of presentation.
9. For more information on client loyalty and related social and financial benefits, see Pawlak and Szubert (2004).
10. It is difficult to come up with a set of standardized indicators applicable for
all MFIs because they have different profiles and work in different contexts. However,
if the process of developing indicators is standardized, there is a social performance
audit and some overlap of customized solutions allowing some standardization. It is
believed that investors and donors can justify social return on their actions using this
mix of information.
11. See Matul and Kline (2003) for more detailed description of Prizma’s
poverty scorecard.
12. Female-based measures turn out to be more powerful than or at least as
powerful as aggregated household measures. Prizma decided to use them as they limit
number of questions on the application form.
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Impact of Microfinance
Programs on Children’s
Education
Do the Gender of the Borrower and
the Delivery Model Matter?
Nathalie Holvoet
Abstract: This article highlights the effects particular features of microfinance
programs have on childhood education. Using data from a South India household
survey, the article examines how microfinance impacts schooling and literacy,
how credit enters the household, and who brings it in. Regression results show
that, in the case of direct bank-borrower credit delivery, it does not matter
whether credit enters the household through the mother or the father. However,
large differences occur when mothers obtain credit through women's groups.
Analysis indicates that combined financial and social-group intermediation leads
to higher educational inputs and outputs, mainly for girls. Individual interviewis
with borrowers and interviews with women's groups suggest that changes in
underlying allocative rules that are provoked by group membership could be
explanatory for the results obtained.

N

owadays, a broad-based consensus has emerged that children’s education, and in particular the education of girls,
is one of the crucial ingredients for a country’s economic
growth and its sustained human and economic development. That
the international consensus should also be considered as a
guideline for policy making may be read from the fact that two of

Journal of Microfinance

the UN Millennium Development Goals are directly linked to
children’s education. They stipulate that by the year 2015, “all boys
and girls should complete a full course of primary schooling” and
that “the gender disparity in primary and secondary education
should preferably be eliminated by 2005, and at all levels by 2015”
(IMF, OECD, UN, & World Bank, 2000). In this context, one of
the pressing issues for policy makers in the international and
national arena is to find effective ways to reach the goals set.
It is against this background that we explore the possible role
microfinance could play. In the last decade microfinance has been
extolled as a panacea for poverty alleviation and increasing human
well-being. Over the years, studies have compiled evidence regarding the effect of microfinance schemes on a variety of factors,
including household expenditures, household assets, women’s
contraceptive use, women’s empowerment, and children’s human
capital investment in health and education. Success stories such as
those of the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh, the BancoSol in
Bolivia, and Bank Raykat Indonesia’s Unit Desa in Indonesia (BRI)
have been widely reported on (see, for instance, Chaves &
Gonzalez-Vega, 1996; Hashemi & Schuler, 1994; Hulme &
Mosley, 1996; Khandker, 1998), and some of the achievements
have also been put into perspective (see e.g., Goetz & Sen Gupta,
1996; Mosley, 2001; Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, &
Rodriguez-Meza, 2000; Rahman, 1998).
Putting all the evidence together, it is clear that there is no
clear-cut or definite answer regarding the impact of microfinance
schemes. Conclusions might differ because of different methodologies used, because of diverse subjective interpretations given to
the same research findings, or because of the particular features of
the program one is studying. While studies that focus on the net,
and particularly the gross, impact of microfinance programs are
Nathalie Holvoet is a lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Development Policy and
Management, University of Antwerp. Her fields of interest are organizational and institutional
aspects of aid policy and evaluation, and in particular gender and development and microfinance. Email: nathalie.holvoet@ua.ac.be.
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many, there are few studies that compare the impact of slightly
diverging credit schemes. These kinds of exercises could, however,
provide us with highly relevant information for policy making.
They might indicate what particular features of programs are successful, and which modalities should be replicated, and which are
redundant or even counterproductive.
If the aim of policy is to promote children’s education, then it
might be interesting to explore whether it matters for children’s
schooling if credit is given in the hands of the mother or the father.
Other features of interest could be the particular delivery channel
that is used, the quantity of credit, or the type of credit provided.
Does consumptive credit produce the same effects as credit whose
use is restricted to productive activities? Are schemes that extend
higher amounts of credit more effective than those whose credit
ceilings are lower? Does channelling of credit through a financial
and social intermediary impinge differently on children’s schooling
than direct bank-borrower lending? In particular, because girls’
education is high on the agenda, policy relevance may further be
sharpened by differentiating between effects on boys and girls.
In the present study, we attempt to test the importance of the
borrower’s gender and the delivery channel for boys’ and girls’ education. More specifically, firstly, we have compared the impact of
direct bank-borrower credit in the hands of mothers and fathers on
selected indicators of children’s educational status. Secondly, we
have tested whether channelling individual credit to mothers
through women’s groups created differential effects as compared to
the case where no intermediary was used at all. In doing this, we
have used data from our 1998 survey of 300 rural South-Indian
households living below the poverty line who received credit in
slightly different ways. 1 As the validity of impact assessment results
are highly influenced by the underlying research methodology, we
have devoted considerable attention to research design. We have
mainly used quantitative methodologies for the data collection and
analysis, while data gathered through qualitative techniques has
provided us with interesting insights on possible explanatory factors. Before elaborating on this, we set out a framework that might
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help us to explore better the relationship between microfinance
and children’s education.

Microfinance and Intrahousehold Allocation
There is a growing body of literature focusing on the determinants
of children’s education and that of girls in particular (see, for
instance, King & Hill, 1993; World Bank, 2001). While influences
seem to be many and their interplay complex, it is commonly
understood that the level of investment in children’s education is
the result of a number of supply factors and an individual household’s demand for education. While a nation’s human capital efficiency may influence the level and quality of the supply, decisions
regarding children’s schooling result predominantly from an
implicit cost-benefit analysis made within the household. Costs
include direct financial costs, indirect or opportunity costs which
result from income foregone, and possibly also nonpecuniary costs
that individual parents have to put up with when their choices
deviate from the norms regarding children’s, and in particular
girls’, schooling. Benefits include returns to the family arising from
higher earnings to children that may be partly returned to parents
(King & Hill, 1993, pp. 21–34). Which costs and benefits are
entered in the calculus, as well as their relative importance, largely
depends on the perception of household decision makers. It is further not necessarily so that individual parents exhibit identical
preferences, and they may perceive costs and benefits differently.
There is for instance evidence from diverse cultural settings about
mothers preferring to allocate a higher percentage of the household
budget to children’s human capital goods as compared to fathers
(Kennedy & Peters, 1992; Mencher, 1988; Phipps & Burton,
1998; Thomas, 1997). These findings are particularly interesting
from a policy point of view. If the preferences of one of the parents
are closer to those of policy makers, it may be worthwhile investigating routes to increase this person’s leverage in the decisionmaking process.
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The possible impact of microfinance on children’s education
might be better explored when put against this framework of intrahousehold allocation. Microfinance schemes do not target children
directly, but the influence of the scheme goes through the nonneutral
intermediary of the household. Credit enters the household and
might influence several of the factors that determine children’s
education, including the overall financial budget as well as the
individual parent’s budget, the time allocation, the individual parent’s degree of participation in household decision making, and the
perceptions regarding the importance of children’s education.
Besides, it is highly hypothetical that diverging schemes will affect
the same factors in the same way. Productive and consumptive
credit will probably impinge differently on time allocation and
income generation, while credit targeted to one particular parent
might in particular influence that parent’s financial and time
budget and his/her leverage in decision making.
Notwithstanding the policy relevance of exploring the importance of particular features of microfinance programs, comparative
empirical studies remain scarce. For instance, impact assessment of
gender-specific credit is exceptional. One of the few exceptions is
the study of Pitt and Khandker (1998) that explicitly tests whether
Grameen Bank and similar group-based lending credit programs
have effects on allocative outcomes that are related to the gender of
the borrower. They found that credit allocated to mothers had a
higher impact on boys’ and girls’ (ages 5–17) schooling than credit
to fathers, but differences failed to be statistically significant.
While there is a vast literature documenting the importance of
a group’s financial and social intermediation for the lowering of
transaction costs and the increase in repayment rates (see, for
instance, Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Huppi &
Feder, 1990; Sharma & Zeller, 1997), there is no study that has
explicitly compared the impact of direct bank-borrower and groupmediated credit on intrahousehold allocative behavior. It is, however, unlikely that group membership would leave intrahousehold
behavior unchanged. Originally organized around the fulfilment of
a practical gender need, such as the easing of a credit constraint,
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groups often engage in collective action and extra-household bargaining with the community, strengthening in this way a member’s
position within the household (Agarwal, 1994, pp. 421–504;
Kabeer, 1995, pp. 223–263).
The present study also disaggregates data for boys and girls. This
enables us to test whether a borrower’s gender has differential effects on
boys and girls and similarly whether group membership has any such
effects. In her study about the empowerment potential of the Small
Enterpise Development Project in Bangladesh, Kabeer (2001, pp.
77–78) found that among male loanee households, the gross enrollment
rates were on average higher for boys than for girls, while the opposite
pattern occurred among female loanee households. Although these findings are at first sight surprising, they endorse previous research conclusions that have indicated that the preferences of mothers and fathers as
regards investment in boys and girls may differ. Thomas (1997) for
instance found evidence for Brazil on the phenomenon of gendered preferences, with mothers preferring to invest more in their daughters’ health
and education, while fathers preferred to devote more resources to
improve their sons’ nutritional status and schooling.
While our research agenda is straightforward, the validity of
our conclusions will to a large extent depend on the methodologies
used for measuring impact. As the threat of selection bias is particularly plausible in credit impact assessment, we have drawn
special attention to this issue. The next section sets out in more
detail the survey design and the data source used.

Survey Design and Data Source
Most impact studies of credit programs highlight “selection bias” as
one of the most serious threats to internal validity. Selection bias
may occur because of nonrandom program placement, through
selection by program staff, or because of self-selection by program
participants. It puts into perspective the impact of credit programs,
because one does not know whether effects may be attributed to
program participation or whether initially existing differences
among different groups, which eventually led to program participation, are responsible for the observed negative or positive effects.
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In the underlying research, the issue at stake is whether households
that received credit in different ways had initially significantly different scores on relevant background characteristics, which might
explain why they became beneficiaries of particular programs in
the first place and which might eventually also explain differences
in later scores on children’s education. Did credit programs applying different delivery models for instance operate in different kinds
of villages (the direct bank-borrower schemes in larger villages
where banks—and schools—are available)? Did credit programs
directed at women (un)deliberately target those women with a
higher schooling status who already had a higher stake in household decision making?
The only way in which to rule out completely the possibility
of selection bias is through an experimental design with random
assignment of individuals over the different credit programs. As it
was impossible to find highly similar credit schemes with the necessary differences in the borrower’s gender and delivery channel
that were in a takeoff stage, it was impossible to proceed this way.
We instead opted for a quasiexperimental design using matching
on some important characteristics during the design phase of the
research while controlling statistically for remaining differences at
the moment of analysis. 2 Matching between different credit programs at the design phase was done through the selection of credit
programs that were highly similar in outlook (except for the
needed variation in the gender of the beneficiary and the delivery
model), that targeted households with similar socio-economic
characteristics (below poverty line, less than two acres of landholdings), and that were randomly implemented over villages in
the same area. Once we had identified in this way the research population, we randomly selected from each group a sample of 50
households. We subsequently made a more detailed profile of
different subsamples of households and we tested formally how
successful our matching during the design phase had been.
Remaining statistically significant differences were controlled for
during the regression analysis. In what follows, we subsequently
describe the selection of credit programs, the research area, the
Volume 6 Number 2

33

Journal of Microfinance

study population, the sample, and the dependent variables. Table 1
at the end of this section summarizes relevant background characteristics of different subsamples and gives an overview of test
results.

Selection of Credit Programs
Microfinance programs were selected on the basis of a review of
schemes that were operational in southern India. We thereby
focused on a number of criteria, such as characteristics of the target
group, eligibility and financial criteria, delivery model, placement
strategy, and member selection processes. We finally selected the
Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Tamil
Nadu Women’s Development Programme (TNWDP), programs
that are highly similar in outlook except for the needed difference
in the borrower’s gender and in the delivery model. The Integrated
Rural Development Programme (IRDP) is a country-level poverty
alleviation program launched throughout India in 1978. It directly
targets credit and earmarks loans for productive purposes only.
Clients are both men and women below the poverty line3 and with
maximum landholdings of two acres. Although IRDP guidelines
emphasize the importance of the follow-up of beneficiaries, the
assistance provided has proved to be largely inadequate (Gaiha,
Imai, & Kaushik, 2001, pp. 314; IFAD, 1989, pp. 9; World Bank,
1991, pp. 162–168). As a consequence, IRDP in practice provides
a one-shot credit intervention, a fact that has contributed to its
failure. Different studies have highlighted the considerable misuse
of IRDP loans (on average, 20% to 40%), the extremely low repayment (on average, 24% to 40%), as well as the low percentage of
beneficiaries (on average, 28% to 35%) who manage to improve
their financial situation and to cross the poverty line (Ghosh,
1998; IFAD, 1989, pp. 9).
The IFAD-funded Tamil Nadu Women’s Development
Programme (TNWDP) has been conceptualized to remedy IRDP
deficiencies in the selection, monitoring, and enforcement
process. 4 It is operational in the southern state of Tamil Nadu since
1990 and started off in those districts where the score on social
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indicators of female status was lowest (i.e., first in Dharmapuri and
later on in South Arcot, Salem, Ramanathapuram, and Madurai).
Within districts, program placement is at random and no evidence
could be found that the program has, for instance, only started off
in more accessible and larger villages, leaving aside more remote
villages. The program targets households with a similar socioeconomic profile as the IRDP and uses similar financial conditions
regarding interest rates, subsidies, loan repayment period, and loan
use requirements. The main innovative element of the TNWDP is
the use of women’s groups, often called self-help groups, for the
channelling of the individual IRDP loans and other services, such
as information-sharing; training in technical areas, management,
and leadership; and awareness-raising activities related to gender
and social development issues. Non-governmental organisations
are heavily involved in the TNWDP. They establish women’s
groups and link them to rural bank branches after they have
functioned as savings and credit groups for a short period.
Members contribute compulsory savings to their individual savings
account and to the group fund that is used to provide small
consumption and emergency loans to its members. NGOs operational in the research area are the Mysore Resettlement
and Development Agency (Myrada) and the Rural Integrated
Development Organisation (Rido). The former has a more developed organizational and management structure and brings women
together every week, whereas Rido groups meet only every other
week. While both organizations provide social welfare services,
Myrada invests more in building up human resources of marginalized groups, transforming women’s groups into actors of local
institutional change. The TNWDP was first implemented in the
Dharmapuri District, where groups were formed from 1990 until
1994. We have selected this research area because it allowed testing
the importance of membership duration.
In summary, the following five credit program variables were used:
1. Direct credit to men extended through IRDP in 1993–1994
(IRDP Male)
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2. Direct credit to women extended through IRDP in 1993–
1994 (IRDP Female)
3. Credit extended in 1993–1994 to women member of
Myrada groups since 1993–1994 (TNWDP Myrada
Young)
4. Credit extended in 1990–1991 to women member of
Myrada groups since 1990–1991 (TNWDP Myrada Old)
5. Credit channelled in 1990–1991 to women member of Rido
groups since 1990–1991 (TNWDP Rido Old)
Comparing the impact of IRDP Male and IRDP Female (schemes
1 and 2) allows testing the importance of the borrower’s gender,
whereas a comparison of the impact of the IRDP Female and
TNWDP Myrada Young (schemes 2 and 3) highlights the importance of financial and social group intermediation. Aside from
these two issues, which are the scope of this article, comparing the
effect of Myrada Young and Myrada Old schemes provides insights
into the impact of longer group membership, while the effect of
organizing an NGO may be tested through a comparison of impact
on Myrada and Rido beneficiaries. 5

Research Site
One particular area within the Dharmapuri District, Morappur
Block, was selected where IRDP and TNWDP loans are extended
through three bank branches of the Indian Bank that use the same
standard regulations and that are partly staffed by the same persons. The research area is an exclusive agricultural area where the
1991 Household Survey identified about 42% of the overall population living below the poverty line. Morappur Block is part of the
Baramahal area, where Tamil is the dominant language. While
South India is characterized by the Dravidian culture, which in
general poses less severe limitations on girls’ and women’s behavior
than the Aryan culture of the North, any such appreciation should
be set against the general background of female discrimination.
Even within Tamil Nadu, sex ratios are below 1000 and results of
subsequent household surveys suggest a worsening over time.
Although in 1961 there were 992 women for every 1000 men, the
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ratio declined to 977 in 1981 and 972 in 1991 (Subrahmanyam &
Rao, 1995).

Study Population and Sample
In an effort to avoid the confounding (spillover) effects of credit
schemes, households were excluded that received credit through
both IRDP and TNWDP. While there is mutual exclusivity
between the different credit programs, diffusion effects may take
place in more subtle ways. Merely living in a village where women’s
groups are operational, without being a member oneself, could be
enough to undergo part of its effects (see, for instance, Hashemi &
Schuler, 1994). The study population of IRDP beneficiaries was
thus restricted to villages where women’s groups were not present
but that were highly similar in outlook. In addition, the survey
included a section on the degree of interface between nonTNWDP beneficiaries and women’s groups.
In 1990–1991, about 497 women living in the Morappur
Block received loans under the TNWDP. Of the 497, about 397
belonged to Myrada groups and 100 to Rido groups. In the period
1993–1994, about 200 women received loans through Myrada
groups (MAHAM, 1996). Bank staff estimated that in the same
period about 420 men and 180 women benefited from IRDP
loans, of which 250 men and 100 women lived in non-TNWDP
villages. Out of each group we have drawn a random sample of 50
households. Aside from the differential impact of different credit
schemes, we were also interested in their net impact. We consequently also included a comparison group of 50 below-poverty-line
households living in Morappur Block who were eligible candidates
for IRDP credit and TNWDP membership but who had so far not
received any credit. Data on school enrollment was only collected
for children in the age group four to seventeen years (a sample
of 759 children), whereas data on the kind of schooling was
collected for those children who were ever enrolled in schools (a
sample of 635 children).
Once the six subsamples of 50 households were selected, we
made a detailed profile of each subsample on the basis of in-depth
interviewing using retrospective questions on relevant household
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and individual-level characteristics. A comparison of the profile of
the different subsamples shows that the beneficiaries did not have
a significantly different profile at the moment of credit receipt.
The large majority of all households belonged to the mostbackward castes, were landless, or owned only a small piece of
land. The majority of the women were illiterate, whereas on
average about 50% of the husbands could read and write. In-depth
interviewing further revealed that the majority of the TNWDP
beneficiaries did not decide themselves to become a member of a
women’s group. Most of them had actually been “forced” by their
husbands who had been attracted themselves by the selective
incentive of future credit receipt.
As this study focuses on the differential impact of firstly IRDP
Male versus IRDP Female and secondly TNWDP Myrada Young
versus IRDP Female (and IRDP Male), we have restricted the
comparative analysis to those groups. Statistically significant differences resulting from t-tests are presented at the bottom of Table
1. Differences between the subsamples are at the level of the household landownership, the literacy status of the female respondents,
and the literacy status of their husbands. More specifically, children in IRDP Male households had a higher chance of having
literate parents (as compared to children in IRDP Female and
TNWDP Young), while female members of a women’s group
tended to belong more to landed households (as compared to
IRDP Female and Male households). If anything, our data does
not support the idea that women’s groups recruited women who
had a higher literacy status: of the 50 Myrada Young beneficiaries,
only six were literate at the outset (against 15 wives of IRDP Male
beneficiaries). They do seem to have recruited among the slightly
better off: landownership among TNWDP households was higher
than it was among IRDP beneficiaries. Statistical analysis and
qualitative information from interviews, however, suggest that
landownership has no unequivocally beneficial effect on children’s
schooling. Children are engaged at younger ages in all kinds of
agricultural labor tasks, in particular where supervision of hired
laborers is difficult or expensive, and moral hazard problems
occur. 6 Our own data suggest that a household’s landownership
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Table 1. Sampling information and scores on selected
background characteristics
IRDP IRDP TNWDP TNWDP TNWDP Control
Male Female Myrada Myrada Rido Old Group
Young
Old
Sampling Details
Number of households
Number of children
(4–17 years)
girls
boys
Number of children ever
enrolled in schools
girls
boys

50

50

50

50

50

50

50
58

56
66

67
69

72
81

63
73

49
55

30
54

38
60

56
62

61
77

51
67

32
47

16
(5.2)

15
(4.9)

18
(5.4)

17
(5.1)

12
(4.7)

82
18

94
6

86
14

84
16

84
16

46
54

66
34

58
42

62
38

46
54

1.91
(2.1)

1.98
(1)

1.75
(1.2)

1.83
(1.12)

1.97
(1.5)

12
88

12
88

20
80

30
70

28
72

56
44

46
54

54
46

50
50

54
46

Background characteristics
Mean age of children
14
(5.4)
Caste
% most backward
92
% scheduled
8
Landownership a
% yes
56
% no
44
Mean quantity of land
owned (in acres)
2.12
(1.6)
Literacy status of
female respondent b
% yes
30
% no
70
Literacy status of
husband c
% yes
66
% no
34

Note. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
a Difference between TNWDP Myrada Young and IRDP Female is statistically
significant at 5% level (t-value: 2.157).
b Difference between IRDP Female and IRDP Male is statistically significant at 1%
level (t-value: 3.028); difference between TNWDP Myrada Young and IRDP Male is
statistically significant at 1% level (t-value: 3.026).
c Difference between TNWDP Myrada Young and IRDP Male is statistically
significant at 5% level (t-value: 2.040).
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lowers school enrollment but increases the probability that when
children are sent to school it will be to a more expensive and qualitatively better private school instead of to a public one. The
abovementioned statistically significant differences among
subsamples were controlled for when analyzing impacts of different
credit schemes on children’s education through regression analysis.

Dependent Variables
The choice for particular indicators has been guided by existing
secondary literature (see, for instance, Drèze & Sen, 1995,
pp. 109–139; King & Hill, 1993, pp. 1–50) and by the financial
and time constraints of the study. Aside from a categorical variable,
“incidence of schooling,” we have included a numerical variable
“number of years of schooling” to capture the effect of differential
dropout rates of boys and girls (King & Hill, 1993, pp. 6–9). We
have further differentiated between private and public schooling,
the former being considered of higher quality by parents. Sending
children to a private school entails a number of direct costs, such
as tuition and travelling expenditures, that can be avoided if children go to public schools that are more widely available and free of
direct costs. Attention for the output of schooling was captured
through the inclusion of the “incidence of literacy” measured by
“the ability to read and write.”
Data collection was restricted to children in the age-group four
to seventeen years. Data was primarily gathered through selfreporting by the mother, complemented by on-the-spot visits in
schools and cross-checking of self-reported information with
schooling records.

Regression Analysis and Findings
Assessing the impact of different credit programs on the different
input and output indicators of children’s educational status (ages
4–17) was done through the use of logistic regression models in the
case of the categorical dependent variables (“incidence of schooling,” “kind of schooling,” and “incidence of literacy”) and through
ordinary least squares regression in the case of the numerical
dependent variable “number of years of schooling.” As the main
40
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interest of our research is testing the differential impact of different credit programs (and not so much the net impact of a program
versus a nontreatment group) on children’s educational status, we
have calculated statistics that summarize the effect of one credit
program versus another. In the case of logistic regression models,
we calculated odds ratios, while differences in coefficients were
calculated in the case of the numerical dependent variable.

Gender and Birth Order Effect in Educational
Inputs and Outputs
Although it was not the primary focus of this research, the data
collected supports earlier findings on the existence of a widespread
pro-male bias in children’s educational status (see, for example,
World Bank, 2001, pp. 31–72). Regression results furnish evidence
that there exists in our sample a severe pro-male bias in children’s
educational investments and literacy outcomes. It proves to be
about 3.9 times more likely that boys rather than girls are enrolled
in schools. On average, girls receive two years less of schooling
than boys, while, in general, no evidence was found that girls, if
being sent to school, had less chance of being in a private rather
than a public school. The sex-differential pattern of investment in
girls’ schooling results in a female literacy rate that is only onethird of that of boys.
In addition to a gender effect, a birth order effect seems to play
a role. Our data suggest that being born earlier (higher birth order)
significantly reduces the average number of years of schooling.
Interestingly, the birth order and gender effects seem to reinforce
each other: being the eldest daughter makes it the least likely to be
enrolled in school. Compared to the eldest son, the eldest daughter is about 12 times less likely to be enrolled in school. A second
born daughter is about 1.7 times more likely to be enrolled
compared to her elder sister. Observations during field research
indicated that elder daughters are strongly engaged in all kinds of
household activities, such as cleaning, sweeping, water, fuel collection, and childcare.
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Table 2. Contrasts in effects of different credit programs

Dependent Variables
Incidence of Schooling
(yes=1)
All children
Boys
Girls
Kind of Schooling
(private=1)
All children
Boys
Girls
Incidence of Literacy
(yes=1)
All children
Boys
Girls
Number of Years of
Schooling
All children
Boys
Girls

Null-hypothesis:
IRDP Female =
IRDP Male

Null-hypothesis:
TNWDP Myrada
Young = IRDP Female

Null-hypothesis:
TNWDP Myrada
Young = IRDP Male

Failure to reject

Failure
to reject

Failure
to reject

1.401
0.975
1.35

2.194
1.059

0.827
0.770
0.993

3.036

1.307
1.228
1.265

1.124

+0.612
+0.106
+0.836

+0.083

Rejection

Rejection

2.686**
1.033
3.842**

5.191***

3.923***

3.245**
2.337

5.938**

5.894*

2.656***

3.473***
1.381

7.121***

9.007***

+1.054*

+1.666***
+0.189

+2.445***

+3.281***

Note. For categorical variables (“incidence of schooling,” “kind of schooling,” “incidence of
literacy”), odds ratios are given. For numerical variables (“number of years of schooling”),
differences in coefficients are given. T-tests are used to check whether differences in effects of
credit programs are statistically significant at 10% (*), at 5% (**), or at 1% (***).

Does Direct Credit to the Mother and the Father Affect
Children’s Schooling Differently?
Results of regression analysis summarized in Table 2 indicate that
it does not matter for children’s education whether credit enters
the household through the mother or the father. For almost all
educational inputs and outputs, slightly higher scores are recorded
when the mother receives the credit (odds ratios IRDP
Female/IRDP Male >1 for the categorical dependent variables,
positive differences for the numerical dependent variables) but the
differences are minor and fail to be significant. Going back to the
original estimates of the IRDP Male and IRDP Female impact even
suggests that there are no statistically significant effects at all of
direct credit on children’s schooling or literacy. Whether the loan
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was used productively and generated additional revenues, or
whether it was considered a gift from the government that was used
for consumptive purposes (in about 42% of the cases for IRDP
Male and 60% of the cases for IRDP Female), additional resources
have not led to an increase in children’s schooling or literacy.

The Importance of the Mother’s Group Membership
Not only does using women’s groups as intermediaries seem beneficial from the point of view of the credit supplier, there are also
strong indications that it significantly increases the probability
that children are kept in school longer, are sent to private schools,
and become literate. Table 2 (third and fourth columns) shows that
compared to children whose father or mother received credit
directly, children living in households where credit entered
through women’s groups, remain on average about one to one-anda-half years longer in school. It is about 3.2 to 3.9 times more
probable that they will be enrolled in private rather than in public
schools, and about 2.7 to 3.5 times more probable that they will be
able to read and write.
Do Effects Play Out Differently for Girls and Boys?
Results of regression analysis summarized in Table 2 (third and
fourth columns) show that only girls reap the benefits of their
mother’s group membership. Contrasts of net effects show that, for
boys, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that there are no additional effects of mother’s group membership. This strongly
contrasts with our findings for girls, where we reject the nullhypotheses for all variables. Compared to their counterparts in
IRDP Female and Male households (third and fourth columns), it
is about 3.8 to 5 times more probable that girls are sent to school
rather than being kept at home, about 5.9 times more probable
that they are in private rather than in public schools, and about 7
to 9 times more likely that they will become literate. They benefit
from 2.4 to 3.3 additional years of schooling. In a context of a
severe male bias, this induces a weakening of the existing gap in
educational inputs and outputs, but fails to wash it out.
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Exploring Possible Explanatory Factors
While these research findings are not unique and are supported by
Kabeer (2001, pp. 77–78), among others, they are at least surprising. Conventional theory of income and substitution effects clearly
fails to explain the sharply contrasting results of slightly diverging
credit programs. On the contrary, as there is a close substitutability between mother’s and daughter’s labor, we would normally
expect that the positive income effect of mother’s borrowing and
resulting employment would partially be outweighed by a negative
substitution effect in the case of girls. It seems that in the case of
the mother’s group membership, other effects are at work than the
pure income and substitution effects. Information from individual
interviews combined with data from group interviews taken from
selected women’s groups suggest that at least part of the explanation may be sought in the influence of group membership on
decision-making processes in the household.
During interviews, mothers often stressed the importance of
their daughters’ education. They explicitly pointed out that they
always had thought that female education was crucial but that it
was only because of their participation in women’s groups that they
were able to increase their say in household decision making and
get their ideas implemented. According to them, women’s groups
were especially important in liberating access and control over
resources from men’s mediation. Consider the following statements
made by individual members:
While the access to credit was important at the outset, it is the
access and control over other resources that has become much
more important. Because of my membership, I was able to put
some of my own personal income on a personal savings
account. Because all administrative formalities that are linked
with this account are performed within the group, my husband
has no access to this account.
The respect I get from my mother-in-law has increased because
I’m the one who has access to money [from the group common
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fund] when there are urgent household expenditures to be
made.
Aside from the access to material resources, they also gained access
and control over intangible, nonmaterial resources. Particularly
important for most of them was the fact that group membership
had expanded the “female space” by opening access to more
heterogeneous spheres of public life, such as the village council,
the teacher-parents association, the dairy cooperative society,
or the forest committee. This participation in extrahousehold
decision-making bodies clearly has an effect on intrahousehold decision-making processes. Consider the following statement:
Because of the linkage project I have become a member of the
teacher-parents association in my son’s school. Before, my husband
would not have allowed and I would not have been bold
enough to participate. Now, he is even proud that I go to talk
with the others [women of higher castes]. He even believes that
I know more now and he listens more to me.
This evidence does not stand alone. It is supported by evidence
from earlier studies (see, for instance, Agarwal, 1994, pp.
421–504; Kabeer, 1995, pp. 223–263), which have shown that
group membership and collective action may act as powerful leverages to change underlying allocative rules, which might eventually
contribute to alterations in observed intrahousehold outcomes if
parents exhibit different preferences.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
Comparing the effects of slightly diverging credit programs that
are operational in South India leads to the conclusion that in the
case of direct bank-borrower credit it does not matter for children’s
education whether credit is in the hands of mothers or fathers.
Results from regression analysis even suggest that direct individual
bank-borrower lending does not induce any effects at all on children’s educational inputs and outputs. This conclusion is strongly
put into perspective when we focus on the impact of groupVolume 6 Number 2
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mediated credit. Data from our household survey indicates that
women’s group membership strongly affects girls’ schooling and
literacy while it leaves that of boys largely unchanged. In a context
of a severe pro-male bias, women’s group membership helps to
reduce the existing gap in children’s schooling and literacy, even if
it fails to close it completely.
Individual interviewing with borrowers and interviews with
focus groups suggest that the impact of women’s group membership could be mediated through changes provoked in underlying
decision-making processes. Women’s group membership deliberates access and control over material and nonmaterial resources
from men’s mediation, which seems to increase their leverage
within household decision making. Women’s increased participation in household decision making has enabled them to see their
preferences for their daughters’ schooling more reflected in the
final decisions regarding the allocation of educational inputs.
In a context of a growing consensus on the importance of girls’
education for overall allocative efficiency, as well as for human
development, these findings have important policy implications.
For girls’ education, it clearly matters who decides and who controls resources in the household. One of the most direct routes
towards increasing girls’ education seems to increase their mothers’
intrahousehold decision making. Our research shows that
channelling credit through well functioning women’s groups could
trigger this effect.

Notes
Thank you to Prof. Dr. R. Renard and anonymous referees of the journal for
the valuable comments and suggestions. All errors remaining are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. See Holvoet (1999) for more details about this survey.
2. Sophisticated impact assessment studies often use two-stage estimation models
(such as Heckman's econometric approach) to arrive at unbiased estimates of impact.
Crucial (and a major problem) in these models is the selection of an instrumental
variable that summarizes well the “selection effect.” In my research, it was impossible
to identify reasonable candidates, which prevented the use of a two-stage estimation
model.
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3. In 1989, households below poverty line were identified as those whose annual
household income was below Rs. 6400; from 1996 on the cut-off point was Rs. 11000.
4. While transaction costs have declined under the TNWDP both for borrowers
and banks, repayment problems remain. Bennett, Goldberg, et al. (1996) blame the
lack of group ownership of the financial service system, which partly comes from the
essential nature of donor funding in the generation of loan capital. The disproportionate role of an NGO in the financial intermediation process, leaving little responsibility for the groups, further exacerbates this problem, negatively affecting
repayment performance. Recently, however, the TNWDP has begun to shift more
responsibility for financial intermediation to the groups, limiting NGOs to the role
of social intermediary.
5. For an overview of these results, see Holvoet (1999).
6. Children of small farmers were, for instance, often engaged in animal herding.
De Janvry et al. (1992, p. 433–434) report similar findings for Morocco and blame
the imperfect substitution of the families’ own children's labor for hired labor in
animal herding.
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Foreign Exchange Risk
Management Practices
of Microfinance Institutions

Peter R. Crabb
Abstract: Foreign exchange risk remains a significant problem for microfinance
institutions (MFIs). Many sources of potential funding for MFIs remain
untapped due to the high risks of currency devaluation faced by these funding
sources. Specifically, debt capital is available for MFIs but foreign exchange risk
is a potential deterrent. This paper reviews current practices in the management
of foreign exchange risk for and by MFIs. The advantages and disadvantages of
these practices are discussed and alternative practices proposed.

M

icrofinance institutions (MFIs) generally raise capital
denominated in hard currencies (U.S. Dollars, Euros,
etc.). However, MFIs must lend these funds in their
local currency, immediately creating foreign exchange rate risk.
Furthermore, these institutions operate primarily in developing
countries where the risk of local currency devaluation is the highest.
These risks prevent access to many potential funding sources,
including debt capital. Foreign exchange risk management remains
a significant problem for any international financial institution,
but the problem is much greater for MFIs that are forced to borrow
abroad and operate in an unstable economic environment, preventing access to many potential funding sources.
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In this study, I review the existing foreign exchange risk management practices of MFIs. Information for the report was gathered through a review of existing literature, personal interviews of
practitioners, and a study of the foreign exchange volatility in the
Opportunity International Network. From the review of existing
literature and personal interviews, I found that the existing practices fall into two broad categories. First, MFIs may pass foreign
currency risks onto clients through the indexation of loans to hard
currencies. This first method of addressing foreign exchange risk is
discouraging because it transfers risk onto the party that is least
capable of bearing such risk. The second category of existing practices is a transferring of hard currency loans into local currency
loans. This practice involves the use of commercial banks and/or
government agencies that back the local currency loans. It is
reported that this practice is not more widespread because the costs
are too high—the loans to clients must be made at higher rates to
cover the commercial bank fees.
From this review, I draw three general conclusions. First, MFIs
need additional funding to meet demand, and debt capital is the
most likely source for this funding. Many reports indicate that the
demand for microlending is high and that existing equity capital is
insufficient to meet the demand. Second, foreign exchange rate
risk is significant, and though it is only one factor in a decision to
lend to an MFI, it is a strong deterrent. The currencies in which
most MFIs operate are highly susceptible to devaluation against
most major currencies such as the U.S. Dollar and the Euro. It is
in these currencies that any new debt capital would likely be
denominated. Finally, the existing foreign exchange risk management practices are prohibitively expensive, either to the client or
the institution.
Based on these conclusions, I propose three new practices
designed to encourage lending to MFIs in hard currencies: diversifying across the network both the source of debt capital and the use
Peter R. Crabb is a Professor of Finance and Economics in the School of Business and
Economics, Northwest Nazarene University. Email address: prcrabb@nnu.edu.
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of debt capital, insuring the risk of devaluation in the network, and
using currency swaps at individual institutions. Each of these three
practices has its advantages and disadvantages, and similar strategies are currently in use by many commercial organizations. What
is unknown at this point, however, is the cost of these programs.
Further study is necessary to better quantify both the advantages
and costs of each practice.

Current Practices
Following is a review of the existing foreign exchange risk management practices gathered from existing literature, both academic
and trade related, and from personal interviews of Opportunity
International personnel. The academic literature focuses on how
financial institutions can manage foreign exchange risk through
derivative and other capital markets, the trade literature discuses
how some MFIs have partnered with commercial banks to create
some operational hedges, and the personal interviews provided
details on the advantages and disadvantages of both the standard
models in the academic literature and the existing operational
hedges.
An intensive review of the academic literature on the risk management practices of small financial institutions was not successful.
In particular, a benchmark for MFI foreign exchange risk management was not found in the risk management practices of small
financial institutions. Most models of financial risk management
for financial institutions follow a standard framework that does not
distinguish between the sizes of the institutions. The standard
framework has three main components: measuring value at risk to
exchange rate fluctuations, purchasing derivatives or adjusting
portfolios to offset this risk, and continuously monitoring the risk
position.
Most academic models direct the financial institution to first
measure its exposure to foreign currency fluctuations. The most
popular methodology for this first step is to apply a value-at-risk
(VAR) measurement. VAR is a statistical measure of the largest
expected loss to a portfolio from a particular risk variable (in this
Volume 6 Number 2

53

Journal of Microfinance

case, currency fluctuations) at a given level of confidence. The
VAR measure warns managers of the potential maximum loss that
could occur. For example, a MFI could calculate the VAR of their
loan portfolio at a 90% level of confidence. This may result in an
estimated 5% loss on any given day due to fluctuation in exchange
rates. This means that the manager can be confident that on any
given day there is only a one in ten chance that the portfolio could
incur a 5% maximum loss. The higher the level of confidence
desired, the larger the maximum expected loss that could occur.
The second step in this model for the financial institution
manager is to decide if the level of risk is acceptable, and if not, to
make changes to the portfolio to reduce the risk or take offsetting
positions in the capital markets. A financial institution with exposure to fluctuations in the exchange rate value of their local currency can purchase forward contracts, options, futures, or currency
swaps. Each of these foreign exchange contracts can quickly minimize or eliminate foreign exchange risk. The MFI could also put in
place operational hedges by denominating their debt in the same
currency as their assets (loans).
The third step in the standard model of foreign exchange risk
management for financial institutions is to continuously monitor
the exchange rate risk. A drawback to this model is that applying
VAR analysis to a portfolio requires the use of historical data, both
actual changes in value or descriptive statistics such as standard
deviation. Currency markets are, however, volatile, and the level of
volatility is constantly changing. During strong economic conditions, volatility tends to be low, but geopolitical tensions and
changes in capital flows can quickly lead to higher volatility and
greater risk of loss. Therefore, it is necessary to constantly update
VAR measurements and make appropriate changes to hedge positions, raising the cost of hedging.
Extensive capital markets exist for financial institutions to
offset currency risks. These markets are large and widespread. The
Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2003) reported that
between June 2000 and June 2002, the gross notional values of
outstanding, over-the-counter (OTC) foreign exchange contracts
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rose 36%, from 94,008 billion to 127,564 billion. Thus, markets
exist for MFIs to offset their foreign exchange risk, but many do
not participate. The reason is cost, and this high cost is driven by
two factors. First, forward and futures contracts are primarily
denominated in large quantities of hard currency. One forward or
future contract could easily be larger than the entire loan portfolio
of the MFI. Forward contracts normally trade in values of $1 million or more, and the futures contracts are also traded for higher
levels of currencies. For example, Mexican pesos trade on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) for $500,000 pesos per contract. These levels of cash flow are much higher than what most
MFIs could produce in any one period. Smaller contracts are available, particularly for forwards, but this again raises the cost of the
hedge.
The second factor is that most MFIs operate in currencies that
are not actively traded. For currencies to be actively traded there
must be substantial trade between the country and the rest of the
world. This is not often true in developing countries. Since the
market is not active and the risk of devaluation is high, forward
contracts in these currencies are normally priced at substantial forward discounts. When the forward rate is lower than the spot rate,
the foreign currency is selling forward at a discount; or the
exchange rate is at a forward rate discount. In this case, the foreign
currency is expected to depreciate against the base currency, usually the U.S. dollar. Commercial banks operating in the forward
markets for developing countries generally price in heavy forward
discounts. Therefore, this derivative contract may protect the MFI
against a complete devaluation of the local currency, but it does
not eliminate much of the risk and essentially locks in a higher cost
of debt repayment.
Many MFIs have turned to operational hedges for foreign
exchange risk management. An operational hedge involves restructuring the debt so that repayments are made in the local currency
of the MFI, completely eliminating their foreign exchange risk.
This approach is consistent with the standard framework, but once
again, it is not without a cost. For example, MFIs in Colombia
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have successfully covered their foreign exchange risk by denominating all their borrowings in local currency. To do so, they arrange
for commercial banks to accept the proceeds from a dollardenominated loan as a deposit. A local bank then uses this deposit
as collateral for a loan of Colombian pesos to the MFI. The MFI
can then repay the dollar denominated loan using the proceeds
from its local currency lending; the risk has been transferred to the
banks. According to MicroRate, these transactions have been successfully used in Colombia at a reasonable cost. However, this reasonable cost may be due to the interest rate regulation in
Colombia, protecting the MFI from high bank fees and large
spreads. This protection may not exist in other markets.
Similar operating hedges have been used for other MFIs. In
one example, proceeds from a dollar-denominated loan are used as
collateral for a letter of credit issued by a U.S. commercial bank.
The letter of credit is issued to a commercial bank in the MFI’s
home country and is used as collateral for a loan denominated in
the home currency. The cost of this type of operational hedge is
explicit—the fee charged by the U.S. commercial bank for issuing
the letter of credit. Letter of credit fees generally range from 1% to
3% of value. This fee significantly raises the cost of funds to the
MFI or lowers the return to the U.S. lender. Another cost with
these types of arrangements is the spread between the collateral
loan and the local currency loan, also significantly raising the cost
of funds to the MFI. Some government-backed programs exist for
MFIs to obtain these types of agreements at subsidized rates.
Examples include programs through the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and the U.S. Agency for International
Development. It is not, however, certain that these programs
reduce the above mentioned costs.
A common foreign exchange risk management practice on the
part of MFIs is to index their client loans to a hard currency, such
as the U.S. dollar or the euro. Many Opportunity International
Implementing Partners in the East European region use this
approach. An index loan sets the rate of interest on the clients’
loans based on the exchange rate value of the local currency. When
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the local currency experiences a devaluation, the clients’ interest
payments rise, providing the additional cash flow necessary for the
MFI to repay its U.S. dollar obligations. Passing foreign exchange
risk on to the borrower in this manner is both dangerous for the
client as well as the institution. The client may be able to handle
this burden if the currency experiences a slow devaluation; a gradual rise in the client’s interest rate payments may be accompanied
by higher cash flow from his or her growing business. However, if
the currency experiences rapid devaluation, normally caused by
hyperinflation in the home country, the client will assuredly have
difficulty meeting the obligations and since this will be true for all
clients of the MFI’s, the institution is likely to fail (see Vander
Weele & Markovich, 2001).
Another common practice for managing foreign exchange risk
is to do nothing at all. At the institutional level this means that the
MFI is bearing all of the risk. This of course is dangerous given the
low capital base of most MFIs, but it does not mean it will not be
successful. There are examples of MFIs that have been able to bear
the risk of changes in currency value. They have achieved this by
earning a high return on assets. One such example is Finde of
Nicaragua, an MFI with a portfolio of only $7.3 million. This
institution has hard currency denominated obligations but
achieves such a high rate of profitability that foreign exchange rate
volatility has not caused any significant loss (MicroRate, 2002).
Essentially, a good rate of return of the portfolio can cover a multitude of problems. Therefore, if the MFI can focus its energy on
producing a strong rate of return on assets (reducing default, controlling operating expenses, monitoring its costs of funds, etc.) it is
likely to achieve a sufficient capital base that will absorb volatile
swings in the exchange rate value of its debt obligations.

Alternative Practices
In this section, I propose three new practices designed to encourage lending to MFIs in hard currencies: (1) diversifying both the
source of debt capital and the use of debt capital, (2) insuring the
risk of devaluation in the network, and (3) using currency swaps.
The first proposal is for the network to borrow substantial funds in
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hard currencies and allocate these funds across many different
MFIs operating in many different currencies. This proposal for
managing foreign exchange risk rests on the possibility that significant diversification benefits are possible across the network. If this
is so, the network could raise debt capital for all of its implementing partners and any foreign exchange risk is likely to be absorbed
in the pool of cash flows generated by these partners and used to
meet the obligations. Therefore, it is first necessary to get an idea
of the level of risk in the network portfolio.
To look at the level of foreign exchange risk in the
Opportunity International Network I measured the correlations in
the U.S. dollar value of the outstanding loan portfolio of the network for the three-year period beginning January 2000 and ending
December 2002. Table 1 contains the correlation coefficient matrix
for the U.S. dollar value of the outstanding loans in the four
regions of the network.

Table 1. Correlation coefficients for dollar value of outstanding loans by region
Latin Am.
Asia
Africa
E. Europe

Latin Am.
1
0.813916353
0.919008966
0.944411757

Asia

Africa

1
0.929036997
0.929378653

1
0.974647687

E. Europe

1

Note. From Opportunity International Network Partner Reports, 2002, Q4
(Oct–Dec).

The table shows a high level of correlation across the regions,
suggesting that there are little diversification effects in the network
portfolio. It should, however, be noted that much of the correlation is due to tremendous growth in each region’s portfolio over
this period. The strong upward trend in lending activity for each
region creates a portion of the high correlation effects. To partially
correct for this trend, an ANOVA test of the regions was
conducted and the results suggest some level of diversification
in the portfolio. The F-test for the source of variation concludes
that there is significant variation across the different regions
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(F-value = 44.86, p-value = .0001). This result suggests that diversification benefits are possible—currency volatility in one region of
the network does not imply equal volatility in another. Of course
this is only a one-factor test and many factors other than the currency changes may be driving the differences in variances across
regions. Further testing in this area is necessary to identify sources
of variation.
Despite the possible diversification from differences in currency changes across the network, substantial risk remains. Some
currencies could incur such a large devaluation in a given period
that the cost of servicing the debt for that MFI could not be
absorbed by the cash flow from the other institutions. For example,
over the period beginning January 2000 and ending December
2002, the cedis of Ghana exhibited a devaluation against the U.S.
dollar of more than 50%. The cost of servicing any debt obligations for the Partner would be substantial, and it would be
necessary for other currencies in the network to exhibit high rates
of appreciation against the U.S. dollar to cover the costs.
Given the risks across the network it would seem that the first
proposal—borrowing in hard currency by the network and allocating the funds across many different MFIs operating in many different currencies—would not reduce foreign exchange risk.
However, another source of substantial diversification effects
exists. It is possible to reduce risks by diversifying across the
sources of funds. Table 2 contains the correlation coefficient
matrix for the U.S. dollar relative to three major currencies over
the same period, January 2000 and ending December 2002.

Table 2. Correlation coefficients for the dollar relative to
major currencies
U.S./U.K.
U.S./Euro
Japan/U.S.
1
U.S./U.K.
U.S./Euro
0.920643805
1
Japan/U.S. -0.409738758 -0.175827971
1
Note. From Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release: G.5
Foreign Exchange Rates, March 2003.
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This table shows that although the pound sterling and the euro
are highly correlated, there exists a strong negative correlation
between the yen and the pound sterling, and the yen and the euro,
relative to the U.S. dollar. Therefore, if the network incurs debt in
three major currencies such as the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the
yen, and then distributes these funds across many different currencies, a reduction in the risk of exchange rate changes is possible.
Although it is possible that each of the developing market currencies would move against all three hard currencies in the same
manner, any higher debt service costs in one hard currency can be
offset against lower costs in another.
The second proposal combines the diversification benefits just
described with insurance products designed to protect against
catastrophic loss. As was mentioned above, one currency could
incur such a large devaluation in a given period that the cost of servicing the debt for that MFI could not be absorbed by the cash
flow from the other institutions. Insurance products exist to assist
multinational firms operating in countries with high levels of
geopolitical and economic risks. These products are primarily public agency guarantees, but some private insurance companies are
now offering many different types of catastrophic loss policies. In
this case, the insurance company bears the risk that a major devaluation occurs in one of the countries. The public agency products
of this type generally cover war and political turmoil, two events
likely to lead to currency devaluations, but other economic risks
could be negotiated with under private insurance contracts.
Potential companies for this type of insurance product include AIG
and National Indemnity.
The possibility of self-insurance also exists. For example,
Oikocredit raised six million euros to create a fund that will cover
the risk of currency losses on loans to three MFIs in the Asia
region. The fund reimburses Oikocredit whenever exchange rate
changes lower the value of the local currency debt payments
needed to meet hard currency debt obligations. In this program,
interest rates on the local currency loans are higher than the hard
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currency program, covering some of the exchange rate risk, but
passing some of the cost of this protection onto the client.
A third possibility for reducing foreign exchange risk in MFIs
exists at the institutional level. MFIs in the network could begin
using currency swaps. A currency swap is a financial contract where
a borrower swaps their debt obligations in one currency for the
obligations of another borrower in a different currency. Currency
swaps immediately remove currency risk since the institution’s
assets and liabilities are as a result denominated in the same currency. For example, a MFI operating in Colombia could borrow in
U.S. dollars and then swap their debt obligations with an organization that has debt obligations in the local pesos but is receiving
cash flow denominated in U.S. dollars. One such organization
might be an exporting firm that has debt and other expenses in
Colombian Pesos but sells its goods in the U.S. for dollars. Most
commercial banks operate in the swap market and could act
as intermediaries. The cost of these swaps may be prohibitive as
the commercial bank may view the MFI as a greater risk than the
exporting firm. This greater risk implies that the bank spread
would be as high as that in the case of the collateralized loans discussed earlier. A possible means of reducing these costs is a government agency guarantee. The World Bank currently provides
currency swaps for many of its programs, but there is no report of
these contracts being used by MFIs. It is possible that the opportunities for such swap agreements are minimal for the currencies
where MFIs operate. Many developing countries do not have the
high level of foreign trade necessary for sufficient counterparties to
exist.

Conclusions and Plans for Further Study
Three general conclusions can be drawn from this study of foreign
exchange risk and MFIs. First, MFIs need additional funding to
meet demand, and debt capital is the most likely source for this
funding. Second, foreign exchange rate risk is significant, and
though it is only one factor in a decision to lend to an MFI, it is
a strong deterrent. The risk of devaluation against most major
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currencies such as the U.S. dollar and the euro is high, and it is in
these currencies that any new debt capital is likely to be denominated. Finally, the existing foreign exchange risk management
practices are prohibitively expensive, either to the client or the
institution.
Further research on this issue is necessary. Case studies can
expand on this research by providing numerical analysis of different foreign exchange risk management practices. For example, a
numerical analysis of an individual MFI in the network would look
at existing portfolio structures and estimate how varying denominations of loans would benefit the institution under different
currency exchange rate values. It would be of further benefit if
many institutions could be studied so as to look at any correlations
across different regions and currencies. These types of analytical
studies serve to both measure the extent of risk and address the
best practices in risk management.
Additional research is necessary to identify potential intermediaries and/or counterparties to any potential currency swap agreements. As described, the World Bank provides currency swaps for
its programs but no such program exists for MFIs. Money center
banks and other international lending organizations may be able to
find counterparties for currency swaps in the developing countries
where MFIs operate.
The results of this study are not conclusive but do lay some
groundwork for further study that may lead to an effective
exchange rate risk management tool or pooling mechanism. Your
comments and suggestions are most welcome.

Notes
I am grateful to Ken Vander Weele, Clay O’Brien, Roy Pratt, Rick
John, Tim Head, and Desiree Green of the World Bank for their
valuable contributions and suggestions. All errors and omissions
are my own and any comments are welcome.
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Scoring Arrears at a Microlender
in Bolivia
Mark Schreiner
Abstract: Can scoring models help microlenders in poor countries as much as
they have helped credit-card lenders in rich countries? This paper presents a
scorecard that predicts the probability that loans from a microlender in Bolivia
will have arrears of 15 days or more. Although arrears in microfinance depend
on many factors difficult to include in scorecards, the paper shows that inexpensive, simple-to-collect data does have some predictive power. In microfinance, scoring will not replace loan officers, but it can flag high-risk cases and
act as a cross-check on loan officers’ judgment.

M

icrolenders make small, short, unsecured loans to the
self-employed poor. Few of these borrowers have standard collateral, credit-bureau records, or formal wage
jobs. Historically, lenders lacked low-cost ways to judge the risk of
lending to these borrowers. If lenders set interest rates to cover the
high per-dollar costs of small loans, then they were accused of
usury, but if they set lower rates, then they lost money.
Microfinance has been defined by new ways to cut the cost of
judging the credit risk of the self-employed poor. For example,
group lenders tap the knowledge of risk held as a sunk cost by
neighbors of a potential borrower. Likewise, individual lenders
control risk through detailed evaluations of the borrowers and their
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businesses, frequent repayments, stepped loan sizes, and chattel
collateral (Bond & Rai, 2002).
Scoring is new to microfinance, but it may help reduce the
costs of making loans to the self-employed poor. Scoring compares
simple-to-observe quantified data about the borrower, loan, and
lender with similar past cases. The share of similar past cases that
had repayment problems is an estimate of the risk that a current
case will also have repayment problems.
Credit-card lenders in rich countries make massive numbers of
small, short, unsecured loans each year at very low costs because
data-based scorecards inexpensively and accurately forecast the risk
of potential borrowers (Lewis, 1990). In high-income countries,
the microloan is often the credit card, and most home loans and
car loans are made based almost entirely on scoring. Of course,
microlenders also use a type of implicit, subjective “scoring” in that
they evaluate borrowers based on their own historical experiences and prejudices. Data-based scoring differs only in that it
is explicit and consistent (Longhofer, 2002). Most careful research
(Berger, Frame, & Miller, 2002; Frame, Padhi, & Woosely, 2001;
Martell, Panichelli, Strauch, & Taylor-Shoff, 1999) suggests that
scoring—combined with credit bureaux—has improved the depth
and breadth of formal loans in high-income countries. With better
knowledge of risk, lenders can approve more poor-but-safe borrowers and reject more non-poor-but-risky borrowers. In this way,
lenders save time that they would have spent dunning delinquent
borrowers and can use the newfound time to find new borrowers
(Schreiner, 2002). Can microlenders in poor countries also take
advantage of scoring?
Scoring can help microlenders to judge risk, but it is unlikely
to replace human loan officers anytime soon. For example, the
most important factors in credit-card scorecards—employment
and credit record—are often unavailable in low-income countries
Mark Schreiner is a Senior Scholar in the Center for Social Development at Washington
University in Saint Louis and a consultant with Microfinance Risk Management. He
works to help the poor build assets via improved financial services. Email address:
schreiner@gwbmail.wustl.edu Website: http://www.microfinance.com
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because credit bureaux are absent and potential borrowers are
self-employed.
This paper tests whether a simple scorecard can predict the risk
of costly arrears—spells of 15 days or more—for borrowers from a
microlender in Bolivia. The scorecard shows how characteristics are
linked with risk. In historical tests, the scorecard predicts better
than naïve models but worse than credit-card models. Thus, scoring
may help cut the costs of individual microloans (but probably not
group joint-liability loans; see Schreiner, 2002), not as a replacement for loan officers’ judgment, but rather as an additional filter
for high-risk cases that would otherwise slip by.
The next section gives the background for the scorecard. The
section after that reports how characteristics of the borrower,
the loan, and the lender are linked with arrears, and the section
following that tests the scorecard’s predictive power.

Scoring for a Bolivian Microlender
This section discusses the market for microfinance in Bolivia,
reviews past work on scoring for microfinance, and presents the
data and scorecard used in this paper.
Microfinance in Bolivia
Bolivia is microfinance’s showcase in Latin America. In spite of its
sparse population and deep poverty, microfinance has a high rate
of penetration. Most Latin American countries have, at most,
one microfinance lender with more than 10,000 borrowers; Bolivia
has a dozen such lenders. Several microlenders have converted
from unregulated not-for-profits to regulated for-profits. Most
borrowers are near the poverty line but are not among the poorest (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, & RodriguezMeza, 2000).
As recounted in Rhyne (2001) and Mosley (2003), profits in
microfinance attracted competition from Bolivian banks and
Chilean consumer-finance companies, and, by 1996, the market
started to saturate. Arrears skyrocketed, in part because the new
entrants tolerated high arrears and weakened the culture of
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repayment for all borrowers, and in part because microlenders, in
the battle for market share, made loans to people already indebted
elsewhere. The crisis in Brazil in 1999 also hurt repayment from
the women traders who make up the bulk of microfinance portfolios. As arrears rose to more than double their historical levels,
interest in scoring heightened as microlenders sought to find new
ways to control risk.
Past Work on Scoring for Microfinance
Many statistical models have linked arrears to characteristics of the
microlender, borrower, and loan (Nannyonga, 2000; Reinke, 1998;
Zeller, 1998; Sharma and Zeller, 1997). In broad terms, these
models have not been very useful as scorecards (nor were they
intended for this purpose) for three reasons. First, most models use
small samples and so may lack robustness. Second, some models
use characteristics that most microlenders do not already collect or
that are expensive to collect. Third and most importantly, these
models do not check predictive power. A historical test is needed
to confirm that the scorecard truly can predict risk and—just as
importantly—helps to convince loan officers and credit managers
that the scorecard works. Most past academic statistical models aim
to detect characteristics linked with risk, not to help lenders to
score potential borrowers.
Viganò (1993) is the best scorecard for microfinance in the
literature. It links default with 53 characteristics at a rural development bank in Burkina Faso. With a small sample (n = 100),
prediction was checked with the jack-knife (Efron & Tibshirani,
1993). Unfortunately, the small sample also required that the 53
characteristics be condensed into 13 factors, obscuring the links
between risk and specific characteristics. The scorecard also has
the technical drawbacks common to discriminant analysis
(Eisenbeis, 1981).
The scorecard in this paper is an improvement in three ways.
First, the sample is large (39,956 loans repaid in 1988 – 1996).
Second, the focus is less on the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients and more on the power to predict arrears for
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10,555 loans repaid in 1997. Statistical significance need not
imply predictive power (Hand, 1994). Third, the scorecard uses
only characteristics that most microlenders already collect.
Data and Scorecard
The Bolivian microlender makes loans to urban individuals in
trade and manufacturing. It bases risk evaluations almost exclusively on the personal judgment of loan officers; few loans are
collateralized, and a credit committee discusses only very large or
unusual loans. From August 1988 until the end of 1996, 1,987
loans out of 39,956 (5%) had costly arrears, defined as a spell of
15 days or more. Such long spells are costly to the lender because
they require extra collection efforts. In the first nine months of
1997, 8.6% of loans went “bad” (913 of 10,555 loans).
The following characteristics are known for all loans disbursed
and paid:
• Date of disbursement
• Amount disbursed
• Type of guarantee
• Branch
• Loan officer
• Gender of the borrower
• Sector of the firm
• Number of spells of arrears
• Length of the longest spell of arrears
This is an unusually short list; most scorecards for microlenders would also use the age, marital status, education, and length
of residence of the borrower; ownership of a phone, house, or car;
and measures of the size and financial strength of the household
and firm. Thus, the test in this paper is conservative: if a scorecard
with few characteristics works, then a scorecard with a full complement of characteristics on the borrower, loan, and lender would
work even better.
Scorecard construction uses knowledge of the characteristics of
past cases at the time of disbursement and of their subsequent
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repayment performance to infer future repayment risk for similar
current cases. Because data exist only for cases that were approved
under the lender’s standard evaluation process, the scorecard
applies only to current cases that also have been approved under
this process. Otherwise, sample-selection bias can degrade scorecard performance (Crook & Banasik, 2004).
The scorecard predicts “costly arrears,” defined as a dichotomous dependent variable that is 1 for “bad” loans with a spell of at
least 15 days and 0 for all other “good” loans. The scorecard is
derived from a logit model.
The characteristics linked with risk were chosen based on theory and experience. At the point that a loan has been provisionally
approved under the standard evaluation process, these characteristics can be taken as given. Of course, the terms of the loan
contract—such as the amount disbursed, the term to maturity,
and the guarantee requirements—do depend on the evaluation of
risk by the lender. For loans provisionally approved under the
lender’s standard evaluation, however, the loan terms are fixed.
Thus, the scorecard applies only to cases that, in the absence of
scoring, would have been approved.
The test below thus checks how well the scorecard flags highrisk cases that the loan officers and the credit committee nevertheless believed to be low-risk.

Links between Risk and Characteristics
Microlenders want to predict the risk of arrears, and they also want
to know which characteristics are linked with risk. This section discusses these linkages, and the next section discusses predictive
power.
The scorecard is derived from a logit regression based on
39,956 loans repaid by the end of 1996. The Χ 2 statistic for the
scorecard as a whole had a p value of 0.01, and 56 of 109 estimated
coefficients had p values of 0.10 or less.
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Experience as a Borrower
The experience of the borrower is measured as the number of previous loans and also as the number of months since the first disbursement. Table 1 shows scorecard weights (derived from
estimated logit coefficients) that show how risk changes with the
borrower’s experience. Positive weights mark increased risk, and
negative weights mark decreased risk. Table 1 also shows p values
and the means of the characteristics.
Table 1. Scorecard weights for borrower experience
Mean

Weight

p value

0.460
0.247
0.131
0.070
0.039
0.022
0.013
0.008
0.005
0.006

0.000
–0.012
–0.023
–0.028
–0.032
–0.040
–0.034
–0.054
–0.026
–0.025

N/A
0.50
0.21
0.12
0.09
0.05
0.10
0.04
0.28
0.31

0.466
0.170
0.233
0.125
0.007

0.000
0.015
0.021
0.033
0.031

N/A
0.40
0.23
0.07
0.11

Experience of Borrower
Previous Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 or more

Months since First Loan
0-6
7–19
20–53
54–147
148 or more

Number of previous loans
When we examine weights with p values below 0.10, we see
that the risk of a loan’s going bad decreases with the number of past
loans. For example, risk is 5.4 percentage points less for a borrower
with 7 previous loans than for a first-time borrower. All else constant, first-time borrowers (46% of cases) are the worst risks.
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Months since the first loan
Experience in months since the first loan is a different measure
than the number of previous loans because, for example, a borrower could get three one-month loans or three one-year loans.
Ranges of numbers of months are defined as a set of dummy variables (Table 1).
Although not all the weights have low p values, the broad pattern suggests that risk increases with time as a borrower. The effect
is large; a borrower whose first disbursement took place 54–147
months ago is 3.3 percentage points more likely to go bad than a
new borrower.
This may reflect regression to the mean. Borrowers tend to ask
for their first loan during uncommonly good times when their ability to repay is at a peak. If the first loan is repaid on time, then the
lender may encourage the borrower to take larger and longer loans,
even if the borrower is less able to repay such a loan than the first,
smaller, shorter loan.
In any case, this is a new result. While it is common wisdom
that risk decreases with more experience seen as numbers of loans,
no one has discussed that risk increases with experience seen as
months as a borrower.
Arrears in the Previous Loan
Experience with scoring for microfinance suggests that repayment
history is the best predictor of future repayment performance.
Most microlenders cannot check borrowers’ histories in credit
bureaux, but they use knowledge of past repayment performance
for their own repeat borrowers. Table 2 shows how risk is linked
with arrears in the previous loan. Spells of arrears were common,
but most were short.
Length of spells of arrears in days
The weights on arrears seen as the longest spell in days in the previous loan are large; compared with no arrears (67% of cases), cases
with one day of arrears had 2.4 percentage points less risk, and
cases with 31 or more days of arrears in the previous loan had 1.6
percentage points more risk in the current loan.
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Table 2. Scorecard weights for arrears in the previous loan
Mean

Weight

p value

0.674
0.127
0.054
0.034
0.028
0.012
0.009
0.016
0.007
0.004
0.014
0.009
0.003
0.007

0.000
–0.024
–0.018
–0.018
–0.013
–0.008
0.003
0.001
0.017
0.016
0.012
0.028
0.020
0.016

N/A
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.28
0.63
0.85
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.03

0.761
0.062
0.044
0.032
0.041
0.059

0.000
0.009
0.011
0.015
0.008
0.006

N/A
0.08
0.05
0.01
0.16
0.27

Arrears in Previous Loans
Longest Spell in Days
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10–14
15–23
24–30
31 or more

Number of Spells
0–1
2
3
4
5 or 6
7 or more

This result is new: for this microlender, repeat borrowers with
shorter spells in the previous loan were less likely to go bad than
those with no arrears in the previous loan. This is surprising;
common sense suggests that more past arrears would always mean
more risk. Why would a short spell be better than no spell?
Perhaps some arrears are due to random shocks, and perhaps
borrowers who have had some arrears but who worked to get back
on track in just a few days are, on average, less likely to have long
spells than those who have not yet fallen into arrears but who
might not be so robust once they do hit an unlucky stretch.
Number of spells
The number of spells of arrears in the previous loan is strongly
linked with risk (Table 2). Compared with 0 –1 spells, risk increases
for 2 – 4 spells and then starts to decrease. This may reflect traders
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who make frequent installments but who are often a day or two
late, not from negligence but because they wait to combine the trip
to pay the installment at the branch with other errands. For them,
the number of spells of arrears reveals little about the risk of long
spells of arrears.
Gender of the Borrower
Probably the best-known stylized fact in microfinance is that
women are safer bets for loans than men. The Bolivian lender made
most (58%) of its loans to women (Table 3). All else constant,
women were indeed less risky, but only by 0.2 percentage points
(the p value is 0.35, so the difference in risk between men and
women may very well be nil).
Does this disprove the stylized fact? Without controlling for
other factors, women are almost half as risky as men; the loans of
3.6% of women in the sample went bad versus 6.9% of loans to
men. But after controlling for other factors—many of them correlated with gender—most of the gender gap in risk vanishes. At least
for this lender, gender per se is not strongly linked with risk.
Rather, gender is associated with other factors that do cause
risk. For example, Bolivian women are more likely than Bolivian
men to be traders than manufacturers, and Bolivian women are more
likely to have smaller businesses and to take smaller, shorter loans.
So if the lender observes only gender, then gender is strongly
linked with risk, but if the lender observes many characteristics
and accounts for their linkages with risk, then gender is much
less predictive.
Sector
About 53% of loans went to traders, and their risk was 4 percentage
points less than manufacturers. This is a large weight; average risk
in the sample was 5%, so manufacturers were almost twice as risky
as traders. (More finely grained classes of sectors—for example,
agriculture and services as well as manufacture and trade—would
improve prediction, but the data for this lender lack this level
of detail.)
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Table 3. Scorecard weights for gender, sector, amount disbursed,
and guarantee
Mean

Weight

p value

Characteristic
Gender
Male
Female

0.422
0.578

0.000
–0.002

N/A
0.35

0.473
0.527

0.000
–0.040

N/A
0.01

0.006

0.005

0.52

Sector
Manufacturing
Trade

Changed Sector
Amount Distributed
Level
Increase
Decrease

676
140
25

0.0000023
–0.0000003
–0.0000123

0.03
0.89
0.01

0.029
0.475
0.248
0.248

0.000
0.002
–0.009
–0.004

N/A
0.55
0.01
0.29

0.100

0.001

0.76

Guarantee
Other
Personal
No Guarantee
Multiple

Changed Guarantee

Changing sectors between consecutive loans was associated with
0.5 percentage points more risk, but the p value is high, and few
borrowers switched sectors.
Amount Disbursed
The link between risk and the amount disbursed is weak. In 1998
dollars, each $100 disbursed was linked with an increase in risk of
0.02 percentage points (Table 3).
In terms of changes in amount disbursed between consecutive
loans, a $100 increase had virtually no link with risk, but a $100
decrease was associated with a decrease of 0.1 percentage points.
Apparently, this lender successfully rations borrowers suspected as
high risks.
In this case, the link between risk and the amount disbursed is
so weak that the microlender has little scope to affect arrears via
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changes in amount disbursed. The average loan is already small
($680), and the average increases ($140) and decreases ($25) are
even smaller. If the amount disbursed were reduced by $100, risk as
predicted by the scorecard would change by 0.8 percentage points.
In any case, the scorecard is properly used only after the microlender has provisionally approved the loan under its traditional
evaluation process and has set the terms and conditions of the
loan contract.
Guarantees
Of the four types of guarantees, the only one with a large effect and
a small p value is “no guarantee” (Table 3). Here, the lack of a
guarantee does not cause risk, but it does reveal risk as judged by
the loan officer. Most likely, only borrowers judged as very low risks
in the normal evaluation process had the privilege of borrowing
without a guarantee. Changes in the guarantee between consecutive loans are not linked with risk.
Branches
All branches are not equal (Table 4). Compared with “other” (the
central office and four small branches), the safest branch was associated with 1.3 percentage points less risk. The few borrowers who
switched branches were less risky by 0.8 percentage points. Such
results are useful to microlenders because branch performance is
susceptible to policy, for example through bonuses or training.
Loan Officers
This microlender bases its normal evaluation on the subjective
judgment of loan officers. Of course, officers differ in their ability
to “smell” high-risk cases, and they may also take time to learn the
ropes and to sharpen their “sixth sense.”
Perhaps surprisingly, risk increases as loan officers gain experience (Table 4). For example, cases handled by a new loan officer
with 0–6 months of experience are 3.2 percentage points less risky
than cases handled by an old hand with 148 months of experience.
Although loan officers learn to work smarter with time, the
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Table 4. Scorecard weights for the branch and the experience of
the loan officer
Mean

Weight

p value

0.438
0.114
0.072
0.161
0.044
0.053
0.078
0.040

0.000
–0.013
–0.012
–0.010
–0.008
–0.007
–0.003
0.000

N/A
0.23
0.12
0.13
0.29
0.51
0.56
0.98

0.024

–0.008

0.10

0.062
0.204
0.322
0.335
0.078

0.000
0.006
0.009
0.020
0.032

N/A
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.01

Characteristic
Branch
Other
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Changed Branch
Experience of Loan
Officer in Months
0–6
7–19
20–53
54–147
148 or more

amount of work that they must do also grows as their portfolios
expand. Furthermore, the quality of new borrowers may degrade
as loan officers get past the “cream” in the neighborhoods where they
work and start to recruit more “typical” borrowers.
Beyond experience, loan officers differ in their ability to sense
high-risk cases (Table 5). Compared with “other” officers (those
with less than 300 loans paid off ) the safest officer was linked with
4.8 percentage points less risk, and the riskiest officer was linked
with 2.1 percentage points more risk. Loan officers are not interchangeable parts; microfinance rests on personal relationships, so
who the person is is important. This matters because lender policy
influences loan officers more directly than borrowers.
The 12% of borrowers who changed loan officers—usually
because the loan officer quit—were 0.5 percentage points more
risky (Table 5). Thus, decreased staff turnover may lead to
decreased arrears.
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Table 5. Scorecard weights for specific loan officers
Mean

Weight

0.116
0.008
0.067
0.019
0.009
0.037
0.025
0.038
0.045
0.059
0.048
0.016
0.015
0.017
0.014
0.031
0.027
0.035
0.024
0.010
0.016
0.019
0.031
0.019
0.011
0.016
0.022
0.016
0.015
0.010
0.010
0.035
0.010
0.009
0.041
0.016
0.014
0.011
0.116

0.000
–0.048
–0.038
–0.037
–0.037
–0.033
–0.025
–0.024
–0.024
–0.023
–0.020
–0.019
–0.018
–0.017
–0.016
–0.015
–0.014
–0.013
–0.012
–0.007
–0.006
–0.005
–0.004
–0.002
–0.001
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.021
0.021
0.005

p value

Loan Officer
Other
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
Changed Officer

N/A
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.09
0.10
0.17
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.31
0.30
0.57
0.71
0.81
0.95
0.88
0.84
0.79
0.58
0.54
0.49
0.55
0.31
0.52
0.40
0.44
0.01
0.01
0.05
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Date of Disbursement
To control for seasonal or once-off changes in the market or
lender policy, the scorecard controls for the year and month of
disbursement. Loans disbursed in the months before Christmas
when business is heaviest are more risky (Table 6). Compared
with 1988–1991, risk increased in 1992–1993 before falling in
1994–1996.
In sum, risk depends on gender, sector, arrears in the previous
loan, the experience of the borrower, the experience of the loan
officer, the specific loan officer, and the specific branch.
Seasonality and changes in policy and in the market also matter.

Predictive Power
Scoring uses what is known from the past to forecast what will take
place in the future. This section checks how well the scorecard
Table 6. Scorecard weights for year and month of disbursement
Mean

Weight

p value

0.083
0.086
0.131
0.198
0.353
0.150

0.000
0.040
0.068
0.059
0.056
0.050

N/A
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

0.056
0.064
0.088
0.091
0.102
0.096
0.081
0.081
0.087
0.086
0.089
0.079

0.000
0.006
0.004
0.002
0.003
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.009
0.008
0.009
0.010

N/A
0.13
0.28
0.65
0.48
0.12
0.16
0.13
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.02

Characteristic
Year of Disbursement
1988–1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

Month of Disbursement
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
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built on data from 1988–1996 classifies loans repaid in the first
nine months of 1997.
By most measures, the scorecard does indeed have some predictive power. Still, it is less powerful than most scorecards for
credit cards. This reflects the challenge of microfinance to judge
risk without reference to credit bureaux or formal wage jobs. Risk
is correlated with inexpensive-to-observe characteristics, and lenders
can use this fact to reduce arrears, but the link is too weak for
scoring to replace loan officers completely.
In 1988–1996, 5% of the Bolivian microlender’s loans went
bad. In 1997, 8.6% went bad. A naïve model would predict that
5% of loans would go bad in 1997, but the scoring model predicted 6.4 %. Thus, about one-third of the increase in problematic
loans was due to changes in characteristics that appear in the scorecard, while two-thirds of the increase was due to other factors such
as changes in competition and in the macroeconomy.
Scoring also predicts the risk of each loan. For example, if the
Bolivian lender had used the scorecard in 1997 with a rejection
threshold of 0.10 (that is, if it had rejected all provisionally
approved applicants with a risk of 10% or higher, and approved all
others), then the share of bad loans would have decreased from
8.6% to 6.9%. With a threshold of 0.05, the share of bads would
have fallen to 4.8%.
As the threshold approaches zero, fewer bad loans sneak
through but more good loans are mistakenly rejected. Scoring gives
estimates of risk, but lenders must choose how to balance risk
against the cost to reduce risk and against other goals.
If estimated risk exceeds a threshold, then—for the purposes of
the historical test—a loan is rejected; otherwise, it is approved.
Given knowledge of what would have happened had the case
been approved (because, in reality, the cases in the historical test
were approved), scoring has four possible outcomes:
• “Good” approved: a “good” with predicted risk below the
threshold
• “Bad” rejected: a “bad” with predicted risk above the threshold
• “Bad” approved: a “bad” with predicted risk below the threshold
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• “Good” rejected: a “good” with predicted risk above the
threshold
For thresholds from 0–0.30 and for 1, the outcomes for the
historical test with 1997 data for the Bolivian lender are in Table 7.
In the test sample, 913 (8.6%) of loans were bads, and 9,642
(91.4%) were goods. As the threshold increases, goods approved
increase and goods rejected decrease; however, bads rejected
decrease, and bads approved increase. Lenders choose a threshold based on the trade-offs among the four outcomes, their goals,
and the benefits and costs of each outcome.
The all-bad threshold is so low (0.00) that all loans are
rejected. The all-good threshold is so high (1.00) that all loans
are approved. The all-bad model is a straw person, but the allgood model is not; it is equivalent to policy that the Bolivian
lender used once it had approved a borrower through its normal
evaluation when it did not have a scorecard.
Good/Bad Separation
The most basic test of a scorecard is how well it separates
goods from bads. The cumulative distributions of estimated risk
for goods and bads (Figure 1) show that the scorecard achieves
some separation. The distribution of goods (mean 0.062, median
0.042) is always left of the distribution of bads (mean 0.098,
median 0.077).
“Hit” Rates
To what extent does the scorecard separate goods from bads? The
proper measure of the sharpness of separation depends on the goals
of the lender (Hand, 1994; Kennedy, 1998). “Hit” rates are best if
a lender wants to optimize the share of goods approved and/or bads
rejected. Table 7 shows the share of goods approved, the share of
bads rejected, and the total hit rate (goods approved and bads
rejected as a share of all cases).
In terms of the share of goods approved, the all-good threshold
of 100% beats the scorecard at all possible thresholds. On the
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GA/(GA+GR)
BR/(BR+BA)
(GA+BR)/N

Share of Good Approved
Share of Bads Rejected
Total Hit Rate

0.00
1.00
0.09

0
0
9,642
913
0.55
0.71
0.57

5,343
267
4,299
646

0.05

0.81
0.37
0.77

7,791
578
1,851
335

0.10

0.93
0.19
0.87

8,976
740
666
173

0.15

0.97
0.11
0.89

9,330
815
312
98

0.20

Threshold

Note. There are 10,555 cases, 9,642 goods and 913 bads. The good rate is 0.914, and the bad rate is 0.086.

GA
BA
GR
BR

Formula

Goods Approved
Bads Approved
Goods Rejected
Bads Rejected

Measure

All bad
0.00

Table 7. Power to predict with historical data

0.98
0.06
0.90

9,491
861
151
52

0.25

0.99
0.03
0.91

9,561
886
81
27

0.30

1.00
0.00
0.91

9,642
913
0
0

All good
1.00
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other hand, the share of “bads” rejected for the scorecard beats the
all-good model at all possible thresholds.
An all-bad model would have approved none of the goods and
rejected all of the bads. Thus, the scorecard always does better than
Figure 1. Cumulative distributions of predicted risk for bads and
goods

the all-bad model in terms of goods approved but always does
worse in terms of bads rejected.
The total hit rate for the scorecard never beats the highest
naïve hit rate (0.914) that is achieved by simply predicting that all
cases will be good. If the Bolivian lender only wanted to maximize
the hit rate, then it would predict that all loans would be good.
In practice, however, the loss from a bad approved exceeds the
benefit from a good approved. Likewise, the cost avoided due to a
bad rejected exceeds the benefit missed due to a good rejected.
Because lenders do not weigh all outcomes the same, they generally
will do better with a scorecard than with their current (implicit)
naïve all-good threshold.
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Figure 2 shows the trade-off between the share of goods
approved and the share of bads rejected. The diagonal represents a
policy that rejects loans at random. Scoring has more power as its
curve bends away from the diagonal; a perfect scorecard would
trace the upper border and then the right border, forming an
upside-down reversed L.
The scorecard is near the upper border for shares of bads
rejected above 0.8 and near the right border for shares of goods
approved near 0.8. This suggests that the scorecard would work
well as a “super-pass” or “super-fail” filter. The lender could use the
scorecard to approve very low risks (super-passes) without further
ado and to flag high risks (super-fails) for more review.
In sum, the scorecard predicts risk well. It separates goods
from bads imperfectly (no scorecard is perfect), but, on average, it
assigns higher risk to bads than to goods. If the lender puts
more weight on successfully rejecting a bad than on successfully
approving a good, then scoring beats the all-good naïve model
Figure 2. Trade-off between the share of goods approved and
the share of bads rejected
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currently used once a borrower is approved by the traditional
evaluation process.

Conclusion
Both credit-card lenders in high-income countries and
microfinance lenders in low-income countries make massive
numbers of small, short, unsecured loans. Unlike credit-card
lenders, however, microfinance lenders do not use scorecards.
Can scoring help microfinance? A scoring model for arrears at
a microlender in Bolivia suggests that it can. The model pinpoints
characteristics that are associated with risk and, more importantly,
it predicts risk better than the all-good naïve model currently used
by the lender in which all loans approved by the traditional evaluation process are disbursed. Still, scoring for microfinance is less
powerful than scoring for credit cards, so scoring and knowledge of
quantitative characteristics will not replace loan officers and their
knowledge of qualitative character anytime soon.
How should scoring be used? As usual, the math is the easy
part. The difficult work is to collect the data and then to use the
risk forecasts. The scorecard here is not powerful enough to accept
or to reject applicants without a standard evaluation; risk is linked
with the characteristics in the scorecard, but it still depends
strongly on factors that only the loan officer can observe. Also, the
scorecard starts from the premise that an applicant has already
been provisionally approved under the normal evaluation.
The scorecard is probably most appropriately used as a superfail filter that flags high-risk cases that deserve more careful review.
Thus, scoring channels effort to borderline cases where rewards
are greatest.
Even lenders who do not score each borrower can still use
knowledge of the weights in scorecards to inform policy choices.
For example, the Bolivian lender might try to attract more traders
because they are safer than manufacturers. Likewise, the lender
might refer to a special credit committee all loans to borrowers who
had a spell of arrears in their most recent loan of more than 15 days.
Finally, the scorecard isolates the risk associated with individual
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branches and individual loan officers. This allows the lender to
target training and incentives to those who need it the most.
In the end, the greatest challenge to scoring for microfinance
is not technical but managerial. After all, predictive power can be
tested with historical data, so no microlender should have to use a
scorecard that does not forecast risk well. But some microlenders—
especially those whose mission focuses more on service to the
poorest than on profitability—fear that scoring will overstate the risk
of the poor and fear that knowing the risk of the poor will lead to
mission drift.
Both fears are valid, and both may be addressed with proper
management. Scoring will not overstate the risk of the poor as long
as scorecards are based on historical data for loans commonly used
by the poor. For example, suppose that a poor person applies for a
microloan and is run through two scorecards, one constructed
from data for mortgage loans to middle-class, salaried civil servants
and one constructed from data for microloans for poor people.
The civil-servant scorecard will likely overstate the risk of the
self-employed poor (because they will appear to be very belowaverage civil servants), but the microloan scorecard will, on average,
give an accurate estimate of the risk of the poor. Thus, the key to
avoiding shortchanging the poor is not to blindly apply scorecards
constructed with data from one type of loan and one type of population to a different product and population.
But what if the data show that the poor are indeed worse risks,
even for loans tailored to their demands? This knowledge need not
automatically lead to mission drift; what kind of mission-driven
organization would abandon its mission just because it learns that
success is more difficult than expected? No, knowledge is better
than ignorance. If the poor are riskier, then managers can use that
knowledge to make better decisions about how to make trade-offs
between cost and depth of outreach. Even the most mission-driven
poverty lender has a limit; a loan made to one poor person with an
80% risk of default is a loan not made to another less-risky poor
person (or, through time, several loans not made to other lessrisky poor people). So while poverty-focused lenders are willing to
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accept more risk, they (and their borrowers) benefit from greater
knowledge of risk. After all, arrears harm borrowers at least as
much as lenders, as borrowers suffer worry and humiliation and may
end up selling assets to repay debts (Mosley, 2001). Scoring gives
managers better knowledge of repayment risk; whether managers use
that knowledge for good or ill is up to them. The best way to
improve the odds of good use is not to suppress scoring but to educate managers about what scoring can and cannot do and when
scoring is appropriate.

Note
I am grateful for support from the anonymous microfinance lender in Bolivia and
for funding from the Division of Asset Building and Community Development of the
Ford Foundation. I am also thankful for comments from the anonymous referees
and from John Adams, Jonathan Conning, Guillermo Rabiela, Loïc Sadoulet, Laura
Viganò, and participants in the Third Annual Seminar on New Development Finance.
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Microfinance Sector in India
Experiences, Options, and Future

M. S. Sriram
Rajesh S. Upadhyayula
Abstract: This paper discusses the growth and transformation of microfinance
organizations (MFO) in India. Issues that have triggered transformation include
size, diversity, sustainability, focus, and taxation. Transformation experiences in
India are few. To move to the mainstream, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) choose from three popular forms of organizations: non-banking finance
companies (NBFCs), banks, and cooperatives. It appears that there is no ideal
path for spin-off. Regulatory changes are needed to allow MFOs to graduate to
other legal forms as they grow organically. NGOs must be permitted to invest in
the equity of MFOs, as is the case in Bolivia and Africa. Norms for setting up
MFOs under current legal forms should not be eased. Regulations should ensure
that they help genuine MFOs and not others masquerading as MFOs.

M

icrofinance in India started in the early 1980s with
small efforts at forming informal self-help groups
(SHG) to provide access to much-needed savings and
credit services. From this small beginning, the microfinance sector
has grown significantly in the past decades. National bodies like
the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and the
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(NABARD) are devoting significant time and financial resources to

Journal of Microfinance

microfinance. This points to the growing importance of the sector.
The strength of the microfinance organizations (MFOs) in India is
in the diversity of approaches and forms that have evolved over
time. In addition to the home-grown models of SHGs and mutually aided cooperative societies (MACS), the country has learned
from other microfinance experiments across the world, particularly
those in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, and Bolivia, in terms of
delivery of microfinancial services. Indian organizations could also
learn from the transformation experiences of these microfinance
initiatives. This paper examines transformation in the Indian context.

Understanding Microfinance
Robinson (2001) defines microfinance as “small-scale financial
services—primarily credit and savings—provided to people who
farm, fish or herd” and adds that it “refers to all types of financial
services provided to low-income households and enterprises.”
In India, microfinance is generally understood but not clearly
defined. For instance, if an SHG gives a loan for an economic
activity, it is seen as microfinance. But if a commercial bank gives
a similar loan, it is unlikely that it would be treated as microfinance. In the Indian context there are some value attributes of
microfinance:
1. Microfinance is an activity undertaken by the alternate
sector (NGOs). Therefore, a loan given by a market
intermediary to a small borrower is not seen as microfinance. However when an NGO gives a similar loan it is
treated as microfinance. It is assumed that microfinance is
given with a laudable intention and has institutional and
nonexploitative connotations. Therefore, we define microfinance not by form but by the intent of the lender.
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2. Second, microfinance is something done predominantly
with the poor. Banks usually do not qualify to be MFOs
because they do not predominantly cater to the poor.
However, there is ambivalence about the regional rural
banks (RRBs) and the new local area banks (LABs).
3. Third, microfinance grows out of developmental roots.
This can be termed the “alternative commercial sector.”
MFOs classified under this head are promoted by the
alternative sector and target the poor. However these
MFOs need not necessarily be developmental in incorporation. There are MFOs that are offshoots of NGOs
and are run commercially. There are commercial MFOs
promoted by people who have developmental credentials.
We do not find commercial organizations having “microfinance business.”
4. Last, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has defined microfinance by specifying criteria for exempting MFOs from
its registration guidelines. This definition is limited to
not-for-profit companies and only two MFOs in India
qualify to be classified as microfinance companies.

Microfinance in India
In India, microfinance is done by organizations having diverse
orientations, as shown in Figure 1.
NGOs in India perform a range of developmental activities;
microfinance usually is a sub-component. Some of these NGOs
organize groups and link them to an existing provider of financial
services. In some cases NGOs have a “revolving fund” that is used
for lending. But in either of these cases, microfinance is not a core
activity for these NGOs. An example is the Aga Khan Rural
Support Programme India (AKRSP-I). For AKRSP-I, the microfinance component is incidental to its work in natural resource
management.
Examples like MYRADA and the Self-Employed Women’s
Association (SEWA) fall in the same category. However, as their
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Figure 1. Defining the microfinance egg
Overall objectives of the
NGO include welfare
activities, economic activities.
Example: Lupin—Health, Education,
Agriculture, and Microfinance
Spin-off microfinance
units: MYRADA υ
Sanghamithra Rural
and Urban

Spin-off: SEWA υ
Sewa Bank—
Urban and Rural

Overall objective of the MFO is
predominantly economic activities.
Example: SIFFS—Economic
activities for fishfolk, microfinance
services are also provided

Exclusive microfinance
institutions. Commercial
funding for lending
operations

Sustainability oriented:
BASIX

Poverty focused:
SHARE/CFTS

Developmental funding for capacity building;
some initial capital for pump priming

Other sources of funding for
nonmicrofinance economic
activities
Other sources of funding for
welfare activities

microfinance portfolios grew, both organizations decided to form
separate entities for microfinance. MYRADA set up an MFO
called Sanghamitra Rural Financial Services (SRFS), while SEWA
set up the SEWA Cooperative Bank.
At the next level, we find NGOs helping the poor in economic
activities. Their purpose is developmental. They see microfinance
as an activity that feeds into economic activities. For instance, the
South Indian Federation of Fishermen’s Societies (SIFFS) started as
a support organization for fishermen, providing technical and marketing support. It then arranged for loans to its members through
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banks. When the arrangement was not effective, it started providing loans itself.
At the third level, we have organizations with microfinance at
the core. They have developmental roots, but are diverse in their
operational details, orientation, and form of incorporation.
This paper focuses on organizations that have microfinance at
the core. It also examines NGOs that have created new MFOs to
deal with the specialized function of microfinance. It deals with
issues of transformation of these organizations, moving from a
developmental root to a commercial sprout.

Issues That Trigger Transformation
We examine five significant issues that trigger the transformation
of NGOs into MFOs.

Size
The most significant issue that triggers a transformation is growth.
This affects the promoters as well as the providers of microfinance.1
With organizations like MYRADA and SIFFS that promoted credit
groups, banks were unwilling to provide loans at the pace at which
microfinance customers needed them. It was not easy for
MYRADA or SIFFS to deal with the attitudes of people manning
these organizations. In several instances it was an enthusiastic bank
manager who made the difference; but this was not institutionalized. In such situations, NGOs tend to get into action by opening
a microfinance division or by setting up a separate MFO. The origins of several Indian MFOs are rooted in the failure of banks to
meet the needs of the poor.
Diversity
Another trigger for transformation is the diversity of financial services that an MFO wants to offer. In most cases, NGOs start with
credit but soon realize the need to provide other support services.
While MFOs have reduced their own lending risks through group
guarantees and addressed the issue of willful default, they have not
been able to grapple with the situation where the underlying economic activity fails and the borrower faces a genuine problem. This
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can be tackled with a combination of savings and risk mitigation
products. But, MFOs realize that the NGO format is not suited ro
carrying out these activities, owing to stringent regulations. They
necessarily have to look at transformation options.

Sustainability
Sustainability is closely linked to growth. Beyond a certain level,
MFOs have to seek external funds for keeping the credit activity
going. When MFOs seek funds from financial institutions, issues
like ownership structure and capital adequacy become critical. For
an MFO to survive in the long run, it has to transform itself into
an institution with transparent systems and accountability. In most
cases the promoters of MFOs do not have sufficient capital to
invest and therefore the main constraint is that they are dealing
with “other people’s money.” NGOs have no clear-cut ownership
structure, and making people liable under this format is a problem.
If they wish to be sustainable, the only option is to deal with mainstream institutions (Rhyne, 2001).
Focus
NGOs need to maintain focus on their original mandate.
Undertaking microfinance is transaction intensive and requires
distinct orientation and skills. For NGOs, there is always a conflict between microfinance, which earns returns and is therefore
“commercial,” and other activities that are “developmental.” This
is one reason for NGOs to spin off their microfinance activities.
The entity that emerges to carry out microfinance should be
understood by the mainstream and therefore it should have an
appropriate institutional form.
Taxation
When an NGO carries out commercial activities (microfinance) on
a large scale, it could lose its “tax free” status, and this might jeopardize other activities. Even grants may become taxable. This is a
major concern for NGO-MFOs. This also triggers a search for an
alternative where microfinance could be kept isolated.
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Transformation Experiences: International
Three different approaches to transformation are apparent in the
following three examples. The Bolivian experience indicates transformation of an NGO to an MFO-Bank. In Indonesia, banks have
adopted MFO methods to provide financial services to the poor.
The Bangladesh experience involves the transformation of a project
into a MFO.

Bolivia: Mainstreaming Microfinance
As in many parts of the world, NGOs triggered the microfinance
revolution in Bolivia. The economic turmoil in the mid-1980s
seeded the microfinance initiatives there. The sector grew rapidly
and now Bolivia has an array of MFOs including banks, NGOs,
and Fondos Financieros Privados (FFPs). Among the banks, the
most celebrated is BancoSol, an offshoot of an NGO called
Prodem. Most NGOs operating microfinance programs in Bolivia
tend to become FFPs when they reach a critical stage. Very few get
to the level of full-scale commercial banks like BancoSol. Prodem,
while it promoted BancoSol, also continued as an NGO to address
the developmental needs of its rural customers. Recently Prodem
converted itself into an FFP. Apart from BancoSol, another
Bolivian bank that has a significant microfinance portfolio is a relatively young one, Banco Economico (Rhyne, 2001).
FFP is an innovative institutional structure for microfinance,
as it allows NGOs to take an equity position in a commercial activity. The Indian microfinance sector has been arguing for policy
reforms on the lines of FFP. For instance, Sa-Dhan, the association
of community development finance institutions, argues that there
should be a new category of companies with a lower level of
capitalization and providing a limited range of banking services
(Sa-Dhan, 2002). Sa-Dhan argues that such companies could limit
their savings services to borrowers. This is similar to the FFPs of
Bolivia, which have lower capital requirements and are restricted
from providing certain services that banks provide. In Bolivia,
many large NGOs have converted themselves to FFPs. In addition,
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there were organizations such as Fassil and Acceso that came from
the commercial world. While Fassil survived, Acceso quickly closed
shop as it went overboard on consumer credit. Accesso’s collapse
has lessons for evolving regulatory norms to suit the MFO needs
and has implications for future entrants to the market.
Gabriel Schor (quoted in Rhyne, 2001) says that this transformation in Bolivia has revealed the concept of an “ideal capitalist.”
It brought four key elements to the ownership of MFOs: NGOs
came in through developmental mission; private investors who
came in were motivated by recognition with returns; public sector
investors came for safe investment and prestige; and international
technical partners came to disseminate the best practices (Rhyne,
2001).

Indonesia: Transformation of the Mainstream
While most microfinance initiatives worldwide have taken the
“supply” route, in Indonesia, the initiative took the “demand”
route. It is, therefore, useful to understand this perspective.
In Indonesia, microfinance did not begin from organizing people
into groups and training them. Neither did it emerge from selfhelp groups. The pioneering institutions in microfinance did not
have any of the value attributes discussed earlier. Of the two most
well known institutions, Bank Dagang Bali (BDB) was established
in 1970 as a private bank. The promoters of BDB were two enterprising people with first-hand experience of small enterprise and
finance (M-Cril, 2002). The bank grew and survived through
innovation of products, seizing the opportunity for arbitrage
between low interest on savings and high interest on loans.
BDB became a model for the state-owned Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (BRI). It set the mainstream to move downwards
towards the poor. The move was to provide banking and not just
credit or savings to the poor. The trigger provided by BDB attained
nationwide coverage in 1984 with the restructuring of the unit
desa (local banking) system of the state-owned BRI (Wardhana,
2001).
This has lessons for embedding microfinance in the general
financial system. Under the old system the state channeled
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resources for the poor through the banking system, offering a line
of credit at subsidized interest. However, the banking system soon
realized that this was not sustainable. The state accepted the challenge to move from subsidized credit to sustainable microbanking.
By moving towards the packaging of credit to meet the needs of the
poor, the system sorted out problems of arbitrage between the cost
of credit available from the institutions that were sponsored by the
state and the local players. The problem of improper identification
of the “beneficiary” leading to leakage was solved. The question of
continuing access to the services was, therefore, successfully
addressed by embracing microfinance methods. After a conscious
shift towards microbanking, the banks now offer complete financial services to the poor and people who transact in small amounts.

Bangladesh: Transformation of a Project
The Bangladesh experience is widely discussed and well quoted in
the literature on microfinance. Here there are no issues pertaining
to transformation, because microfinance did not branch out from
developmental activities, but was a core. Microfinance emerged in
response to the inability of commercial banks, the Bangladesh
Krishi Bank, and other financial institutions to meet the banking
needs of the poor. In the 1970s loan recovery of these institutions
averaged 65% of the dues. During that period, political parties
offered to waive the loans of the farmers (Montgomery,
Bhattacharya, & Hulme, 1996). Around this time, Professor Yunus
started action research on effective delivery of credit to rural
poor—which later grew into a large microcredit program, known as
the Grameen Bank. The program was successful, and in 1983 the
project was converted to an independent bank through legislation.
Unlike the experiences of other countries, the Bangladesh
experience looks at legitimizing a successful experiment and not
allowing it to drift into other forms of inappropriate incorporation. The Bangladesh experiment gained overall approval in as
much as it has become a universal standard in microfinance. This
is one of the most replicated models of microfinance in the world.
Following Grameen, other institutions in Bangladesh also
entered the field. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
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(BRAC), set up in 1970, got into organizing groups under two
pilot programs in the first half of the 1980s. BRAC’s methodology
shared similarities with Grameen. With Grameen being a worldwide fable, it was not difficult for other institutions in Bangladesh
to get regulatory support. BRAC eventually did spin off a banking
company in 2001. In the case of the Association for Social
Advancement (ASA), the metamorphosis was even more stark.
Though ASA was established in 1978 as an organization of social
and political activists, it changed its focus to social and economic
upliftment of the poor in 1985. By 1991 it was a fully focused
organization using microfinance as a singular tool for achieving its
objectives (www.asabd.org).
However, with institutions like Grameen Bank, BRAC, and
ASA pioneering microfinance and providing models for other
countries to follow, microfinance organizations in Bangladesh did
not have a need to transform. They could grow at their own pace
without transformation. One reason why they had no regulatory
problems was that they were focused exclusively on credit. It was
only after they reached a very large size and sophistication that
they wanted to offer other banking services. It was only recently
that Professor Yunus of Grameen Bank raised the issue of the need
for an appropriate legislation for microfinance banks (Yunus,
2003). In Bangladesh we have a dual example of something that
started off as an MFO entering other areas of development, and
NGOs following the example of Grameen and launching their own
successful microcredit programs. The transformation was two way.
Unlike Indonesia, MFOs in Bangladesh also carry the value attributes listed earlier in the paper—dealing predominantly with the
poor and having developmental roots.

Transformation Experiences of India
We have reviewed literature pertaining to experiences in the world
to understand the approaches used to get an identity for microfinance. Indian MFOs employ a scattering of similar approaches.
We examine the types of transformation that have taken place in
India and highlight the implications for the growth of the sector.
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We look at the transformation experiences of the Indian microfinance sector from two viewpoints. First we discuss the responses
for the issues raised earlier in the paper. We then discuss the transformation processes of a few Indian MFOs.

Challenges Posed by Issues That Trigger
Transformation
Size
NGOs have multiple developmental objectives and microfinance
meets a subset of these. The microfinance activity is visible and has
scope for rapid growth. However, the incorporation of an NGO as
a not-for-profit entity (trust, public society) is not ideal for lending activities. When the activity is small, it would be possible to
work within this framework, but growth means documentation,
regulation, follow-up, and money management (Sriram, 2002). To
ensure that there is a clear demarcation between the charitable and
commercial activities of an organization, it is necessary to keep
microfinance as a distinct activity or division. Growth needs the
infusion of funds for microfinance operations. A not-for-profit
entity does not help scaling up borrowings or attract investments
from outsiders. Because there is no capital base in an NGO, leveraging is difficult. If microfinance activities form the biggest chunk
of the surplus earning activities of an NGO, taxability of its operations is a concern.
Share illustrates the transformation of an NGO to a non-banking
finance company because of growth in size and focus on financial services. The specifics of this transformation are discussed later.
Diversity
Although diversity is closely linked to size, it need not necessarily
be so. Apart from loans, MFOs would want to offer savings services
to customers. This is an essential service. It is also a source to help
the loaning services grow. Some MFOs also want to offer insurance
and other services. For instance, when SEWA wanted to work with
poor women a few decades ago, an important gap that they saw was
that women did not have savings and products that addressed the
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needs of social security. For meeting these needs it was necessary to
open a bank. In most cases the first step in diversity is offering savings services. Unlike microcredit which is not as closely regulated,
savings is very closely regulated and monitored. Not all forms of
organizations are permitted to offer savings products. Therefore
any foray into savings will trigger an NGO to examine options of
transformation.

Sustainability
The trigger for sustainability could come from within or from outside. For instance, donors may be prime movers by granting seed
money. However, they may want the activity to be ongoing without further investments. In the case of BASIX in India, the Sir
Ratan Tata Trust (SRTT) was willing to extend a returnable grant
for BASIX for a year to start pilot operations, with an understanding that the grant would not be renewed or enhanced. BASIX
started its operations as an NGO, pilot tested some products and
delivery channels, and in the meantime got the commercial arm
incorporated. The operations, which were field-tested, could be
carried out in a sustainable manner. There are donors who grant
revolving funds for starting microfinance activities. However, if the
activities were to continue, a transformation would be necessary.
Focus
Some NGOs have an exclusive entity to manage microfinance.
NGOs may want to continue other activities and microfinance diffuses the focus. There are two instances of such a spin-off in the
Indian context. The first is SEWA Bank set up by SEWA. The bank
focused on financial services and provided a diverse range of financial services—savings, risk management, and credit. As its insurance portfolio grew, the bank recognized that this was a specialized
function. It has decided to offer risk products through a new organization, Vimo Sewa.
Another instance is the setting up of the Sanghamithra Rural
Financial Services (SRFS) by MYRADA to address the needs of the
self-help groups promoted by it. Before SRFS, MYRADA was
donning the role of a “promoter” of microfinance, i.e., facilitating
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credit through promoting and linking groups with banks. When it
realized that the linking of the groups with banks was not happening at the planned pace, it decided to assume the role of a
“provider.” This involved specialized systems and procedures and
a change in the orientation of staff members. Besides, MYRADA
also wanted to make SRFS an example that could commercially
provide financial services to the poor. Thus, MYRADA decided to
build an arm’s length relationship between the developmental work
of promotion and the commercial work of the provision of credit
related services. It can be seen in this case that one of the subprocesses of transformation is spin-off of new organizations.

Transformation of Institutions
The transformation process in India is still at a nascent stage.
Microfinance has not grown to the size that warrants a full-scale
study on the transformation processes. There are a large number of
small initiatives being carried out at various places. The estimated
number of microfinance institutions that have requested finances
from SIDBI; have contracted rating agencies like M-Cril, Planet
Finance, and CRISIL for rating; or are MACS promoted by the
Co-operative Development Foundation (CDF) are indicated in
Table 1.
The figures are only indicative. The number of public societies
and trusts is likely to be an underestimate, whereas the figures for
other forms are more realistic. We discuss the transformation
options under each regulatory category.

Option 1: In Good Company
If we treat setting up “for-profit companies” to mean transformation, not much has happened in the field. We examine a few
examples of transformation from the limited experiences that the
Indian microfinance sector has had.
Let us look at instances of MFOs that have registered as
NBFCs. Here, there are two approaches: one taken by Share and
Cashpor Financial and Technical Services (CFTS), and the other
by BASIX.
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Table 1. Estimated number of MFI under different organizational forms
Legal Status

Estimated
Number

Not-for-Profit Company
For-Profit Company (NBFC)

2
6

Local Area Banks
Cooperatives:
Coop Society

1

Cooperative bank
Mutually Aided
Cooperative Society

6
1
250

Public Society/Trust a

400

Estimated Number

666

Important Institutions
IASC, Sanghamithra
Samruddhi, SHARE Microfin,
CFTS, Sarvodaya Nano Finance,
Kosh, Asmitha
KBS Lab, Andhra Pradesh
AMCCS, JMSSM, Bhuttico, VYCCU,
ICNW, Pushtikar, Samiti
SEWA Bank
SWDMACTS, Sneha MACS,
PWDMACS, APDSFLMACS, Share
India MACS and others including
mens’ and womens’ thrift co-ops
promoted by CDF—All in Andhra
Pradesh
Assist, SKS, RASS, ASA, FWWB,
GDS, Outreach, RGVN, SIFFS, WWF,
VWS, YCO.

Note. From SFMC Database, M-Cril Database, C-Gap Rating Fund Database, and
CDF Annual Report.
a. From Sinha, S. (2001). (This is one of the estimates.)

Share and CFTS are similar in orientation and focus. Both are
inspired by Grameen and focus on reaching the poorest. Share
operated as a public society for a long time before setting up a
NBFC. CFTS started as an NBFC and is still trying to grapple
with the norms applicable to NBFCs. When Share set up an
NBFC, it transferred a portion of grants received from C-Gap to
poor customers and encouraged them to reinvest those grants as
equity in the new NBFC. This ensured adequate capital for Share
to start an NBFC. This was similar to the Bolivian approach.
However, an important difference is that it was possible for
the Bolivian NGO to invest in an FFP (a similar arrangement was
with K-Rep, Kenya). In the case of Share, it had to transfer all
the clients to a new legal entity, slowly and gradually winding
down the operations in the NGO and transferring the clients to
the NBFC branch by branch (Sriram, 2001). This posed some
problems for Share. First, being governed by the prudential norms,
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an NBFC is prohibited from accepting savings till it gets an investment grade rating. Even if Share gets the rating, its flexibility of
offering savings services to clients will be very restricted. Share
found an innovative solution where it also promoted a cooperative
(Share India MACS) to collect savings. This cooperative in turn
would lend to the NBFC. But this has limitations, as both entities
are incorporated under different laws and have different governance structures.
In the case of CFTS, the incorporation itself was a process
of transformation. Cashpor is an NGO operating in multiple
countries. When CFTS set up its operations in India, it was registered as a company. However, unlike Share it did not have prior
operations in India as an NGO. It was, therefore, difficult to raise
the start-up capital. Local laws make it difficult for small international investments to come in the form of equity in the financial
sector. For a long time, CFTS did not have adequate domestic capital to be registered as an NBFC. CFTS had to go through the
process of raising capital, by finding donor money that could go to
the clients and then be re-invested in the company to reach a size
that gained economies of scale and recognition. The Activists for
Social Alternatives is another organization that follows the
Grameen model and is trying to transform itself as a company. It is
attempting an innovative route of forming private mutual benefit
trusts of clients. The trusts would seek donor grants and in turn
hold equity in the NBFC. However, the scheme has yet to take a
concrete shape.
The path followed by BASIX was different. BASIX had a
design that looked at mainstreaming microfinance right from
inception. The structuring of BASIX was complicated. BASIX
sought a mix of developmental and commercial funding for its
operations and had a separate vehicle through which the operating
entity was adequately capitalized. This involved setting up a holding company that had large external borrowings from donor organizations. The holding company was heavily leveraged. As the
formality of getting clearances for setting up an NBFC was going
on, BASIX carried on its operations for a year through an existing
Volume 6 Number 2
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NGO-Indian Grameen Services. BASIX represents a mix of developmental capital flowing in on the promise of sustainability and
commercial capital flowing in from the developmental windows of
large financial institutions.
While Share and BASIX have similar institutional investors,
the shareholding in BASIX is not spread as widely as in Share. The
laws have become more stringent since BASIX was established and
it is now impossible to replicate that model of financing.
All three institutions have faced barriers in incorporation and
operation. The major constraints pertain to regulations, as listed
below:
• Steep entry norms to register NBFCs. If the promoters have a
development background, it is difficult for them to raise commercial capital to start an NBFC. Routing donor money into
commercial organizations is not easy, though BASIX did it
with a lot of innovative thinking.
• Restrictions placed on the type of activity that can be undertaken by these companies—especially on accepting savings
from clients and on the financial services that can be provided.
• Restrictions on accessing finance from outside the country.
These restrictions mostly take the form of requiring clearances
and permissions, and they have eased over time. However matters get complicated if domestically raised capital is insufficient.

Option 2: Let Us Cooperate
As debates continue in the microfinance world on issues of mainstreaming, initial capital norms, and incorporation, there is silent
revolution in parts of Andhra Pradesh, particularly in the districts
of Karimnagar and Warangal. There are nearly 250 small thrift
cooperatives, each with an average membership of around 500, carrying on successfully and offering all the services offered by MFOs
for more than a decade. While there are a good number of women’s
cooperatives, there have been an equally large number of men’s
cooperatives, all promoted by CDF.
The microfinance world usually does not recognize traditional
banking or credit union movement as “microfinance,” unless it has
adopted some of the symbolisms. Even by that note, these thrift
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cooperatives qualify to be called MFOs. About a decade ago, CDF
was working exclusively with agricultural finance cooperatives.
State interference in cooperatives was one of the major problems.
The interference culminated in the nation-wide loan pardon
scheme of 1989, resulting in the impairment of the portfolio of
many a cooperative. At that point CDF thought it was time to spin
off the thrift and credit activity out of the cooperative fold and
actively started promoting informal mutual benefit groups.
Simultaneously, CDF also lobbied for a change in legislation, seeking greater autonomy for cooperatives in the state. This culminated
in the Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies (MACS) Act. This
act gives ample autonomy for cooperatives, provided they do not
seek state funding. After the legislation was passed, the mutual
benefit groups promoted by CDF were registered under the new
act. Simultaneously other NGOs encouraged their groups to be
formally registered as MACS.
The transformation of small groups to cooperatives has been
painless. The advantage of a cooperative is that it can access various types of savings from its members besides providing credit like
other MFOs. It can also easily get its stakeholders in the
governance structure by the use of democratic processes. Besides,
cooperatives can grow organically by setting up federations as and
when they have a need to wield clout and negotiate on matters of
policy. However, until now, the federations have played a limited
role in the context of CDF cooperatives.
One major drawback of cooperatives is the geographic limitation. State and not federal legislation governs cooperation, and
even within that, usually the area of operations of a cooperative is
demarcated. Cooperatives also experience problems in accessing
mainstream finance, because of their poor image. Nevertheless,
they seem to be a good mechanism to get the informal groups into
a formal incorporation when the groups reach the limit of size. But
it is also important to note that no single cooperative has grown
big enough to cross Rs. 10 million in outstanding loans.
The success of the new generation of cooperatives is limited to
Andhra Pradesh, even though other states have passed similar
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legislation. The only exception to this is the SEWA Cooperative
Bank based in Ahmedabad. SEWA Bank is increasingly being recognized as one of the oldest MFOs in India—having been in existence for over 25 years. While there have been several urban
cooperative banks across the country, none is recognized as an
MFO. SEWA Bank did not go through the pains of transformation, because the moment its parent, SEWA, decided that the poor
women of Ahmedabad needed a financial service institution of
their own, SEWA lost no time in promoting a women’s bank independent of the NGO. SEWA proves the point that if the client
group and geographical focus exist, there is no need to go through
the painful process of starting as an NGO and moving towards
mainstream. However, under current norms, an urban cooperative
bank can only be set up with a start-up capital of Rs. 5 million
(Sinha, 2001). Though this is less than the amount needed for setting up a commercial bank, it is still a steep amount if it were to be
contributed by poor women to run as a self-governed institution.

Option 3: Banking on Innovation
The third alternative is setting up a local area bank (LAB). We have
only one instance that can be classified as “microfinance”—the case
of BASIX. The setting up of this bank was not a transformation
but was part of the design of the BASIX group. BASIX started the
Krishna Bhima Samruddhi LAB (KBSLAB) in 2001 and is the only
instance of how microfinance principles can be adopted by the
banking sector. The entry norms for LABs are more stringent than
for NBFCs. While NBFCs are expected to bring in a start-up
capital of Rs. 20 million, LABs are expected to start with an
initial capital of Rs. 50 million. There are further restrictions on
LABs—they can only operate in a geographical area limited to
three contiguous districts. Every branch of the LAB has to be
opened with the permission and license of the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI). This is stifling. While there is tremendous flexibility
in launching savings products, it comes with inflexibility in expansion and growth. Recently, RBI has decided not to issue further
LAB licenses (Business Line, 2003).
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Other possibilities include RRBs contributing for the promotion of microfinance and setting up cooperative banks. Some RRBs
are doing an excellent job of linking SHGs and thereby bringing
them to the mainstream banking sector. Harper (2002) has studied
the case of a commercial bank active in microfinance. If commercial banks and RRBs do adopt some microfinance methods, it is
possible to replicate the Indonesian experience in India.
The other area where microfinance could happen is in the
cooperative banking sector. Cooperative banks in India have lower
entry norms compared to mainstream banks and LABs (see Table 2
for details). SEWA Bank is one example of how an NGO promoted
a cooperative bank to offer an array of services. However, we do
not have many other examples. A possible reason for the banking
option not gaining popularity is the urban focus. While there are
several cooperative societies in rural areas, banking has been
restricted to the urban sector. However, recently there have been a
series of bankruptcies in urban cooperative banking and therefore
it is likely that there might be regulatory tightening.

Table 2. Entry point norms for urban cooperative banks (other
than unit banks)
Category of Center

Capital (Rs. million) Membership (No.)

A—population over 1.5 million

50

3000

B—population over 1 million but not
exceeding 1.5 million

25

2500

C—population over 0.5 million but not
exceeding 1 million

20

2000

D—population over 0.2 million but not
exceeding 0.5 million

10

1500

E—population not exceeding 0.2 million

5

1000

Entry point capital for LAB
Entry point for Commercial Bank

Rs. 50 million (area of operation
restricted to 3 contiguous districts
Rs. 1,000 million (area of operation
open across the country)

Source: Report of the High Power Committee on Urban Cooperative Banks. RBI Bulletin.
14 January 2002. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India.
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Transformation Options and Their Implications
If we consider the view taken by Robinson (2001) on what should
be treated as MFOs, we will address the issue head on. She has
classified the institutions that are “expected” to operate in the
microfinance realm under the following categories:
• Institutions that provide microcredit but are not permitted to
mobilize savings from the public (most institutions that are
not regulated and publicly supervised)
• Institutions that do well in lending but poorly in mobilizing
savings (such as Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank)
• Institutions that do well in savings but poorly in lending
(India’s RRB and China’s Rural Credit Cooperatives)
• Institutions that fail in both (most microfinance institutions
that provide subsidized credit are permitted to raise public savings, particularly state-owned banks).
Considering this view, microfinance could happen not only by
the transformation of small NGOs into bigger institutions, but
also by the transformation of larger financial institutions embracing the microfinance methodology and microfinance clients.
The options available for transformation within India and their
implications are detailed in Table 3. In brief, we do not have an
optimal route for the transformation of NGOs into mainstream
MFOs. NBFCs that could operate across the country will have to
go through a steep entry hurdle and registration process. LABs have
a double disadvantage of steep entry norms and limited operational
area. This option is also not available with the recent decision of RBI.
With the concerns that most MFOs have for community
involvement and with the existing legislation in India, the obvious
choice for microfinance initiatives is a cooperative. This involves
the clients in governance because of its democratic nature. Even
though cooperatives seem to be an obvious alternative, they are not
so across the country because only a few states have passed liberal
cooperative legislation. Besides, the major disadvantage of cooperatives is their geographic limitations. Further, the cooperative
institutions, owing to historical baggage, do not make glamorous
MFOs. The credit union movement represents more of an individual
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Table 3. Transformation options and their implications
Form

Options

Organizational
incorporation

Implications

NGO

Option 1:
Spin off mF
as a separate
activity

Not for Profit MFI—
a special vehicle only
for purposes of demonstration at scale (SRFS)

Cannot grow beyond a point. While
sustainability can be demonstrated, the
organization will have to be roving—
withdraw from one location and move to
another—or grow organically and gradually.

For-profit Company
(NBFC)—Transfer
clients, investments,
and portfolio
independently (SHARE,
CFTS)

Issue of ownership and control. Initial
capital contribution can come from the
communities. Recapitalization is complex.
Diversification to savings and risk products
is not simple under current regulation.
Even when permitted, the bouquet of
products offered will be limited.

For-profit cooperative
either under the MACS
Act or as a Co-op Bank

Can grow organically, but will have geographical limitations to growth. The
geographic area of operation is demarcated.
However, there is flexibility to offer savings
products. Initial capitalization requirement
is not daunting.

Promote (informal)
Self-Help Groups
(Pradan, Myrada),
encourage them to
form federations
(Dhan Foundation)

Can grow organically. However, scaling up
and infusion of large amounts of external
funds are not simple, as the movement is
scattered across several independent informal or legal entities. Embedding in the
banking system is a solution, but there are
limits to growth. There are chances of
withering away if the NGO withdraws
support.

Promote (formal)
mutually aided
cooperatives and
encourage them to

Problems are similar to SHGs mentioned
above. However, since each of these is an
independent entity, dealing with banking
institutions is likely to be simpler. Chances
of withering away are low if systems are
established.

Promote NBFCs—
seek developmental
and commercial
investments through
complex mechanisms
—private mutual
benefit trusts, debt
in holding company
(CFTS, BASIX)

Problem in raising initial capital. Other limitations applicable to NBFCs discussed
above also apply. It is difficult to pull off a
complex structure of mutual benefit trusts
and holding company structures.

Promote LABs, find
equity for start up

A difficult proposition for two reasons: steep
initial capital requirements and complexity
in licensing procedure of RBI and limitation
in geographical area to three contiguous dis
tricts. Tremendous amount of flexibility in
offering diverse products and services and
great scope for customization.

Option 2:
Promote
independent
MFOs

Development Option 1
Professionals
with NGO
background

Option 2
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banking model in India with formal systems, while microfinance
focuses on groups, social collateral, and social capital.
Few cooperatives use the microfinance methodology in providing
financial services.

Implications for Regualtion
The transformation experiences of NGOs have implications for the
regulatory framework. The microfinance sector represented by
Sa-Dhan has been advocating the easing of entry point capitalization norms for microfinance “companies.”
While this would help a large number of NGOs to hive
[intended word?] off their commercial operations and help operations to grow organically, it does not prevent other individuals or
institutions masquerading as MFOs. The recent experiences of a
series of urban cooperative bank failures in Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh are an indication of what happens when the easier entry
norm is misused. For instance, the easier entry norm for cooperative banks was introduced because these were democratic institutions, member-owned, and member-driven. However, over a
period of time, all these banks started transacting heavily with
nonmembers. The institutions lost the cooperative nature for
which the entry norms were eased and turned out to be in the
hands of a handful of investors. In proposing regulatory reform, we
need to be wary of the potential misuse of the easing of entry hurdles.
There are also a good number of residuary NBFCs that collect
savings from the poor and the unorganized sector. While these are
closely regulated, their leeway in providing credit is cramped, as
they have to invest a major portion of the savings in safe government securities. Therefore, MFOs have not considered residuary
NBFCs as a viable option. The microfinance sector does not treat
residuary NBFCs as MFOs because they do not have the “value
attributes” discussed earlier.
When entry norms are eased, there may be several other
institutions—without the value attributes—claiming to be MFOs,
and the microfinance sector will encounter a credibility crisis. In
Bolivia, FFPs were seen as an intermediary step for NGOs to enter
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the mainstream. The entry norms were steep, but they allowed an
NGO to invest in a bank or FFP. In this scenario, it is possible for
an NGO to convert the donor money received for pump-priming
as equity in a new and proper banking entity. In the case of K-Rep
in Kenya, the NGO is registered as a company limited by guarantee, and resources are held in a charitable trust that is invested in
the bank. In both cases some norms were relaxed, but the new
institutions were treated as proper financial institutions.
Graduating from an NGO to an NBFC to a LAB to a commercial bank is impossible in India because the laws do not provide
for transformation. It is also not possible because the steps between
these stages are steep. A LAB can never hope to go beyond its area
of operation. It would be useful if MFOs would argue for legislation that would allow them to graduate to bigger institutions—one
on cooperative lines and another on corporate lines.
Another route that the microfinance sector can advocate is to
adhere to the current norms of entry and capitalization for NBFCs
and LABs but seek permission for NGOs to invest in such forprofit entities without prejudice to the tax status of NGOs. This
would mean that only NGOs that can raise enough funds from
various sources could actually set up a mainstream-type NBFC.
This gives no shortcuts for entrants from the non-NGO sector,
since if they have to bring in substantial capital, it does not make
matters simpler if they can adopt the not-for-profit entity route.
After all, they will have to find somebody to put money into the
not-for-profit entity in the first place.

Notes
This paper was presented at the SIDBI workshop on “key Dimensions in
Transformation: From NGOs to Formal Institutions,” at the Indian School of
Business, Hyderabad, December 12–14, 2002. The authors acknowledge the editorial
support provided by Mr. P.S. Seshadri of the Indian Institute of Management,
Ahmedabad.
1 Promoters of microfinance are those who help in the formation of groups,
invest in building the capacities of customers, and link them to a financial institution.
Providers are those who involve themselves in direct financial transactions with
clients. For a good discussion, see Rutherford (2001).
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The Experience of Financial
Institutions in the Delivery of
Microcredit in the Philippines
Maria Abigail Carpio
Abstract: This paper identifies the characteristic features of the different financial market players involved in the delivery of microcredit in the Philippines
and looks into their experiences in addressing the credit demand of the smallborrower market segment, particularly the microenterprise sector. This paper
argues that each group of lenders, specifically commercial banks, rural banks,
credit-granting NGOs, and an apex financial institution, allocates its funds by
establishing its own criteria for assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers and
its own mechanisms to avoid borrower default. The delivery of microcredit takes
place within an environment where the different financial market players face
their own set of constraints in supplying credit to small-scale borrowers. This is
made evident in the experiences of the different institutions in adopting the
approaches of downgrading, upgrading, and financial linkage building.

T

he goals of developing countries to attain increased employment,
equitable income levels, and self-sustained economic growth
are integrally related to the opportunity of low-income
entrepreneurs who have the potential to contribute to overall productivity. Although access to financial services by small and
microenterprises is identified as a key requisite in supporting enterprise

Journal of Microfinance

growth and development, this is yet to be fully realized in many
developing economies. In the Asia-Pacific region, less than 5% of poor
households have financial service access, according to the Asia
Pacific Development Center (Getubig, Remenyi, & Quinonez,
1997).
This paper looks into the experience of financial institutions in
the Philippines in addressing the demand for credit of small-scale
borrowers, specifically of microenterprises. It begins with a discussion on the significant role played by the microenterprise sector in
the Philippines as an important source of income among poor
households. This is followed by a description of the Philippine
financial sector, with emphasis on the asymmetry in the allocation
of credit among the main financial market players. Within this
context of asymmetric credit allocation, the experiences of financial institutions involved in delivering financial services to the lowincome market segment is presented in the fourth section,
highlighting the institutional approaches of downgrading,
upgrading, and linkage building.

The Microenterprise Sector in the Philippines
In the Philippines, microenterprises consist of business activities
in industry, agriculture, and/or services, whether by single proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations that have asset sizes
amounting to P150,000 ($2,800) or below and a total workforce of
one to nine people. These enterprises are lumped together under
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), based on the Magna Carta
for Small Enterprises (Republic Act No. 8289, Philippine
Department of Trade & Industry, 1997). According to the 1993
Integrated Survey of Households Bulletin in the Philippines, half
of the persons employed in this sector are wage and salary workers
rather than owner-operators or members of the entrepreneur’s
family (Philippine National Statistics Office, 1993).
Maria Abigail Carpio is an independent consultant and is currently pursuing doctoral studiees at the
Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany. Her most recent research work covers cases of microfinance banks
operating in the Phillipines, Bolivia, and Uganda. Email: Maria.Carpio@rub.de.
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Many poor Filipino families derive their income from multiple
sources. Data from the 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
(APIS) reveal that, of the more than l4.4 million families
surveyed, 67% received income in the form of wages, 61%
received income from entrepreneurial activities, and 50% augmented their family income by engaging in family sustenance
activities (Philippine National Statistics Office, 1998).1 Among the
poorest 40% of the respondents, 70% depended on entrepreneurial activities rather than on wages or salaries for their income.
In 1999 , the reported share of wages and salaries as a source of
income continued to decrease by 0.8%, and entrepreneurial activities ranked third in the distribution of sources of income among
families surveyed. Among the families belonging to the first to the
third deciles, most of the income came from entrepreneurial activities, while those who belonged to the higher-income strata
obtained a bigger share of their income from wages and salaries.
Approximately 70.4% of the families in the lowest 40% income
group were reported to have businesses, compared to only 54.5% of
the families in the higher 60% of income strata.
Table 1. Total income derived and sources, 1998
(in Philippine pesos)
Economic Activities
TOTAL

Wages and Salaries
Family Sustenance

Net Share of Crops, etc.

Entrepreneurial Activities

Other Sources of Income

All Families

Income Strata
Lowest 40%
Highest 60%

868,860,662

92,233,275

10,587,079

5,810,681

419,549,518
5,472,832

214,547,668
218,703,565

%

776,627,389

89.38%

6.30%

4,776,398

0.62%

30,269,768

32.82%

1,210,318

1.31%

34,483,708
19,458,801

%

10.62%

38.47%

21.10%

389,279,751
4,262,517

179,063,959
199,244,764

50.12%

0.55%

23.06%

25.66%

Note. Total percentages are computed as a percentage of all families. Percentages for
other economic activities (wages, family sustenance, net share of crops, entrepreneurial
activities and others) are computed as a percentage of families in the respective income strata.
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The 1998 APIS also reveals that out of the 8.5 million surveyed families with businesses, only 25% had the chance to avail
themselves of credit to finance their entrepreneurial activities.
High interest rates, lack of collateral, and lack of information
about where to get loans were among the top three reasons cited by
families in the lower 40% income group for their inability to avail
themselves of credit for their businesses. In fact, the scarcity of
working capital and investment credit has been identified by small
and microentrepreneurs as the single greatest difficulty encountered
by the SME sector (ADB/OECD, 2000).
As of 2000, the total number of enterprises operating in the
Philippines was estimated at 820,960, generating employment of
about six million (Philippine National Statistics Office, 2000).
Microenterprises dominated this number (91.1%), followed by
small enterprises (8.2%). Among the establishments under the
wholesale and retail trade sector, 95.2% were microenterprises. On
the other hand, while enterprises in the manufacturing sector
showed a tendency to be relatively larger in size compared to the
wholesale and retail trade sector, microenterprises still dominated
the manufacturing sector with a share of 86.9%.
In terms of employment generation, micro, small, and medium
enterprises absorbed 69.6% of the workers in the formal sector.
Since enterprises in the wholesale and retail trade sector were primarily micro in size, the sector absorbed only 30.3% of the total,
62.2% of which were working in microenterprises. On the other
hand, the manufacturing sector employed a total of 1.6 million
workers (26.9% of the total), 45.9% of which were working for
large enterprises.
The available data in the Philippines on the growth in the
number of microenterprises show that these enterprises tend to multiply faster than any other type of enterprise. While small enterprises
doubled over the period of 1983 –1994, and medium and large
enterprises grew by 4% and 27%, respectively, the number of
microenterprises grew by as much as 62% (Small & Medium
Enterprise Development Council, 1998, cited in Berry, Rodriguez,
& Sandee, 1999).
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17,328

31,185

137,340

80,595

9,675

158,341

Source: Philippine National Statistics Office, 2000.

189,501

820,960 5,902,186

41,254

TOTAL

Other Services

28,414

272,202

430,884

262,165

301,035

Health & Social Work

40,477

Education

Real Estate

24,118

485,098

15,267

89,472

Financial Intermediation

Hotels & Restaurants

Transp’n & Comm’n

161,487

437,325 1,785,811

3,154

1,318

125,467 1,589,214

376

1,252

3,391

no. of
employees

TOTAL

no. of
enterprises

Wholesale & Retail Trade

Construction

Electricity, Gas & Water

Manufacturing

Mining

Fishing

Agriculture

INDUSTRY

7,602

2,746

354,025

1,209

2,227

6,478

no. of
employees

106,858

60,243

21,469

106,399

75,325

42,105

267,731

747,740 2,165,100

38,751

26,795

5,127

35,483

18,129

11,302

81,879

416,519 1,110,683

1,724

660

108,998

239

523

1,611

no. of
enterprises

MICRO

38,724

49,018

36,597

109,216

107,146

106,606

85,209

167,152

403,033

33,429

14,451

354,328

2,972
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Microenterprises, given their characteristically small size of
operations, have very low start-up capital requirements. Although
they operate on short-term planning cycles, sometimes daily or
weekly, their requirements for working capital are relatively large,
covering the cost of raw materials and inventory. Their credit
requirements, apart from assuming characteristics which differ
fromthose of large, more established firms, also vary widely according to the developmental stage of the enterprise.2 Therefore,
supplying credit to microenterprises is an undertaking that many
financial institutions in the Philippines, especially those in the formal sector, still consider as unfamiliar territory.

The Challenge of Supplying Credit to
Microenterprises in the Philippines
An Overview of the Philippine Financial Sector
The Philippine financial sector consists of a relatively large network
of banking and nonbanking organizations performing various
financial intermediation services. The country’s financial system may
be classified into the following: (1) a formal sector under the
regulation and supervision of the Central Bank (Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas [BSP]) and the Insurance Commission; (2) a semiformal sector
composed of organizations under the supervision of the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), and non-government organizations
(NGOs) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) but not subject to any regulation of their financial operations by any government agency; and (3) a purely informal sector
composed of unregistered individual operators or organizations
neither supervised nor regulated by any government entity.
The formal sector is composed of commercial banks, thrift
banks, rural banks, and nonbank financial institutions. In the
Philippines, the formal sector lies at the center of the general banking system, accounting for 81% of the entire assets, as of the end of
1998 (Llanto, 2000). According to Llanto (2000), within the banking system, more than 50 commercial banks account for the bulk
of the volume of finance, including as much as 90% of the sector’s
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assets, while the resources of the 117 thrift banks and more than
800 rural banks make up only 7.7% and 2% of the banking system, respectively. The semiformal sector is composed of credit
unions, cooperatives, and a number of NGOs. The informal sector,
on the other hand, is composed of individual operators such as
money lenders and traders. The unregistered local rotating savings and
credit associations (ROSCAs), which are referred to in the localities
as the paluwagan, also form part of the informal sector.
Asymmetry in the Allocation of Credit
The credit requirements of microenterprises in the Philippines
are met by a variety of organizations belonging to the formal,
semiformal, and informal financial sectors. The institutions that
cater to the needs of microenterprises include rural banks, cooperatives, credit unions, and an estimated 500 – 600 credit-granting
NGOs (Llanto, Garcia, & Callanta, 1996). Within this roster of
organizations, the main institutions engaged in the delivery of microcredit are the NGOs operating as retail microfinance institutions.
While comparatively small in terms of size and outreach, NGOs tend
to concentrate their services on the needs of marginalized groups
in the country. On the other hand, the small rural banks serve
a cross section of small-scale borrowers and savers at the local level.
As in the corporate sector, the banking system is highly concentrated, with the six largest banks controlling close to 60% of
the assets of the banking system (World Bank, 2000). They are
owned and controlled by large domestic groups. The other 40%
are highly fragmented across the remaining 47 commercial banks,
117 thrift banks, and about 800 rural banks. Vos and Yap (1996)
point out that the structural problems in the Philippine financial
system are caused in part by the wide-ranging interlocking directorates and ownership patterns of the banking industry.
Furthermore, the distribution of bank offices is skewed towards the
National Capital Region, making banking services less accessible
to those in less-developed regions.
The unincorporated businesses and cooperatives are among
the types of borrowers that the commercial banking sector is not
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able to extend loans to (Vos & Yap, 1996, p. 99). In contrast, private corporations in the Philippines, on average, receive 68–70% of
the loans coming from commercial bank establishments. This
asymmetry in the allocation of credit by the commercial banking
sector in the Philippines means that the credit needs of low-income
households must be supplied by other types of lenders. Thus,
within this financial environment, different institutional
approaches are adopted by various financial institutions designed
to better address the needs of this unserved market segment.

Institutional Approaches Adopted by Financial
Institutions in the Delivery of Microcredit
The Downgrading Approach: The Experience of Commercial
and Rural Banks
The notable increase in the involvement of formal financial institutions in the delivery of microfinance services comes as a result of
the expansion of the scope of formal institutions through downscaling and developing linkage programs with the different
organizations in the semiformal sector. This setup allows formal
financial players to get acquainted with the practices of those
directly involved in lending to small-scale borrowers. The perceived presence of competition among these banks has forced a
number of them to diversify into new markets. Some have sought
a new public image, while others, who have heard of the profits of
successful microfinance institutions, have developed an interest in
this unexplored market. In the last five years, the exploration of this
new market has been facilitated by donor-funded loan guarantees, central bank rediscount lines, and specialized technical assistance.
In the Philippines, the government exerts pressure on banks to
pay attention to the credit requirements of specific unserved sections of the economy through such instruments as the Magna
Carta for Small and Medium Enterprises, which mandates the
banking system to allocate 6% of its loans to small enterprises and
another 2% to medium enterprises.3 In March 2001, the Central
Bank (BSP) reported that the banking system as a whole complied
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with both the 6% and 2% mandatory credit allocation requirement. Table 3 shows that commercial banks accounted for 81% of
the total credit allocation for SMEs, illustrating the impact of its
size of operations. However, the banks’ response to small borrowers’ demand for financial services was limited to granting
wholesale funds retailed to NGOs and other MFIs operating under
the semiformal sector, or to purchasing government securities as an
alternative compliance with the loan quota (G. Aquino, personal
communication, 6 September 2001). The commercial banks allocated as much as ten times the mandated amount for medium
enterprises, while thrift banks posted even higher percentages of
credit allocation (21.39%) to the same sector. These figures help
illustrate which groups of enterprises within the SME sector are
preferred to be serviced by the different banks.
Table 3. Distribution of mandated credit allocation by bank
category
6% ALLOCATION
SMALL ENT.

FOR

Amount
Commercial Banks 102.7
(incl. foreign banks)
Thrift Banks
17.4
Rural Banks
7.7
TOTAL BANKING
127.8
SYSTEM

2% ALLOCATION
MEDIUM ENT.

FOR

% Dist.

Amount

80.4

82.7

13.6
6.0
100.0

15.9
2.4
101.0

% Dist.
81.9

15.7
2.4
100.0

PERCENTAGE
COMPLIANCE

OF

Allocation
6%
2%

11.34

23.35
28.69
12.69

9.12

21.39
9.03
10.03

Note. Mandated 8% credit allocation requirement for the SME Sector. From Bangko
Sentral ng Philipinas (BSP), 2001.

The size of the banks and their specialization heavily determine
how they cater to the financial needs of the low-income market
segment and their ability to resolve the key constraints encountered in dealing with this market. The Rizal Banking Corporation
(RCBC), one of the top five commercial banks in the Philippines,
for example, offers a minimum savings account balance of P5,000
($91) and a minimum loanable amount of P500,000 ($9,100). Its
asset writing policy is very strict with collateral, and it requires a
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20% – 30% nominal return on investments. It has a small and
medium business unit within the bank office, which is, however, not
very profitable and is only maintained in order to meet the government credit-allocation requirement. Without this mandate, RCBC
acknowledges that it would not even think of lending to small
business, much less to microenterprises (Goodwin-Groen, 1998).
Another example is the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (PCIB), which initiated the PCIB Moneyshop in 1973. The
moneyshop was put up among the many stalls in public markets
and offered working capital to different market vendors. It provided
easy access to established on-site banking facilities where money
could be borrowed conveniently. The operations were adjusted to the
business patterns in the market place, such as ensuring that the
moneyshop’s operations began in the early hours of the morning.
Collectors went to the individual borrowers instead of waiting for
payment at the moneyshop window. Despite the daily collection
system adopted, however, a significant percentage of loans in
arrears incurred or held in litigation remained considerably high,
higher at any rate than the levels usually tolerated by the banking
system. Moreover, it was not as successful as the credit unions in
attracting savings among its clientele. 4 While PCIB may have
deviated from its traditional banking procedures in order to meet
client demands, it was not able to establish with its clients a kind
of “personalistic relationship,” 5 which is characteristic of the ties
that exist among different actors in the informal financial sector.
In this case, moneyshop collectors may have gone to the individual
borrowers to collect payment and still faced borrower-default partly
because they are still perceived as “outsiders.”
The experience of large commercial banks directly involved
with microfinance activities generally tends to show that (1) there is
still a strong perception among commercial bank managers that
banking with small-scale clients is not a viable venture to undertake and (2) large commercial banks are not equipped with the
skills and technology necessary to profitably engage in providing microcredit and other microfinance services. Although the BSP
is pushing the banking sector to get more involved in microfinance
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activities, it is aware of the difficulties and limitations faced by large
commercial banks in serving this market.
On the other hand, the rural banks in the Philippines have been
traditionally more involved in microlending than their counterparts in the commercial banking sector. The relative size of their
operations and the location of their offices and branches in the
municipalities help minimize the operational constraints and the
physical limitations encountered by other commercial banks. A
number of rural banks, for example, accepted deposits as small as
P100 ($1.90) and provided loans as low as P1,000 ($19) (Llanto,
Garcia, & Callanta, 1996). 6 With reference to the SME credit
allocation requirement, the rural banks posted a higher share
(28.69%) in allocating credit to small enterprises, compared to
what the commercial banking sector contributed (11.34%).
Rural banks show a greater propensity to serve low-income borrowers. However, even given these figures, a considerable number
of rural banks are still adamant about positively responding to the
BSP’s call for increased lending to microenterprises and SMEs. This
is born out of a group-banking trauma that the rural banking sector
suffered from its experience in the late 1970s and 1980s with the
targeted credit schemes of the government, most notably the
Masagana ’99. 7 The medium-term effect of this experience was a
strong negative sentiment against group lending and a conservative, risk-averse lending practice by rural banks.
The successful experience of credit-granting NGOs and credit
cooperatives, however, has drawn attention to the profit potential
from serving the low-income market segment. This success has
encouraged many rural bankers, especially those faced with less
opportunity to tap into the higher end of the credit market in the
localities where they operate, to reconsider their involvement in
microlending. With encouragement from the government and technical support from international donors, the number of rural banks
involved in microfinance is reported to be gradually increasing.8
Microcredit delivery among rural banks is being vigorously
supported by both government and donors in view of the rural
banks’ comparative advantage over other players in the financial
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sector. Their location in the municipalities and smaller towns
affords them the opportunity of personally knowing the target
clientele. Besides, small-scale borrowers may find it more comfortable to deal with rural banks, as poor clients have a tendency to
perceive commercial banks to be more oriented towards the higher
end of the credit market. The existing physical infrastructure
of rural banks also provides them with an advantage over other
microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as cooperatives and creditgranting NGOs, making it more practicable for rural banks to
expand and reach out to a substantial number of small-scale clients.
Moreover, rural banks also have the legal capacity to mobilize
deposits, which does not make them dependent on donor
resources in capitalizing their lending operations.
However, many rural bankers agree that doing microfinance
takes more than just opening a special microlending window or unit
within the bank. The experience of the New Rural Bank of San
Leonardo (NRBSL) in Nueva Ecija shows that getting into microfinance successfully was very much a matter of building the right
image among its target clients. Its CEO and owner had to join his
staff in launching a massive small deposit campaign within the
town by going from door to door of every household. This helped
establish the bank’s image of being friendly to the low-end market
(A. Panganiban, NRBSL CEO, personal communication, 25
September 2001).
The experience of rural banks in serving the low-income market segment shows the following: (1) Microlending by rural banks
necessitates having a “champion” who will ensure the success of the
microlending operation. In the case of the NRBSL, the personal
commitment of the owner and managers of the bank to help
introduce and sustain its microlending operations was pivotal in
establishing credibility among their targeted clientele. (2) The
rural banks also have the opportunity to treat their microlending
operations as an adjunct to their other banking functions. This
means that these banks are not solely dependent on the gains from
its microfinance operations. Initially, they may experience high
transaction costs associated with dealing with low-income clients,
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and thus the return on their microlending programs will require a
certain volume to achieve economies of scale. Within this phase of
building up their pool of clients, rural banks may also benefit
from the gains realized from their other operations. (3) Another
ingredient in the success of microlending by rural banks is the
environment where they operate. The presence, for example, of
an existing sizeable group of microentrepreneurs within the locality, as in the case of NRBSL, provides banks with the necessary
demand requirement. The Microenterprise Access to Banking
Services (MABS) Program reports that rural banks applying for
training in microfinance have been those concentrated in areas
where a growing number of businesses may be found, such as the
more densely populated provinces of Laguna in central Luzon
and Cebu in the southern part of the Philippines. While many
banks must still face a number of constraints in dealing with the
low-income market segment, the comparative advantage that
comes with their status as banks lures a number of credit-granting
NGOs to explore the prospects of transforming into regulated
financial institutions.
The Upgrading of Credit-Granting NGOs into Banks
The upgrading of credit-granting NGOs provides a promising
means by which many of these organizations are able to mobilize
savings or refinance their lending operations directly on the market.
According to a monitoring study conducted by the Philippine
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), as of
1996, there were already as many as 600 NGOs involved in microfinance throughout the country, with combined total assets of P45. 5
million (equivalent to almost $1 million). Their loan portfolio was
estimated at approximately P920 million (approximately $17 million), which is equivalent to 2.5% of that of rural banks.
Notwithstanding this, mature credit-granting NGOs in the
Philippines are still observed to suffer from limited outreach. Llanto
and Chua (1998) point out that these NGOs have an outreach
capacity of only 1,000 on average. Moreover, NGOs are hampered by
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their weak institutional capacity, especially in the areas of financial
management, resource mobilization, and product development.
The marked increase in the capitalization requirement for the
establishment of banks clearly makes it harder for credit-granting
NGOs to transform themselves even into small banks. By 1996, two
of the best-performing credit-granting NGOs in the country were
already applying for rural banking licenses with the BSP.
However, when the BSP raised the minimum capital requirement,
one of the applicants was forced to withdraw. The remaining
applicant, the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development
(CARD), was the only NGO able to meet the said capitalization
requirement and received its license to operate as a rural bank in
December 1996. 9 Given this constraint, credit-granting NGOs
either turn to international donors for capitalization support or
merge with other NGOs in order to raise the necessary capital to
put up a bank. The Alliance of Philippine Partners in Enterprise
Development (APPEND), a group of six NGOs, recognized that
it had to capitalize on the collective strength of their networks
and establish a partnership with a foreign donor, Opportunity
International, in order to open up a microfinance bank in
Antipolo City (north of the capital) called the Opportunity
Microfinance Bank (OMB) in August 2001.
The impact of transforming credit-granting NGOs into formal
financial institutions can be felt in many areas of the organizations’
microfinance operations. The case of CARD shows that its transformation into a bank helped facilitate its growth in outreach,
which soared to 10,868 in 1997 and more than doubled (26,369)
by June 1999 (Seibel & Torres, 1999). The transformation subjects
MFIs to certain performance standards imposed upon them by the
regulatory agency for the maintenance of their license. The discipline that develops from their obligation to meet these standards
strengthens their drive towards sustainability and supports their
determination to broaden and deepen their outreach. As observed
by the proponents of CARD Rural Bank, such performance standards were missing prior to their transformation, as they were not
always enforced by the donors from whom their lending funds
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were sourced. This is affirmed by Tulay sa Pag-unlad Development
Corporation (TSPI), the leading credit-granting NGO in the
country, which is planning to set up the TSPI Thrift Bank soon. Its
executive director considers the regulation and supervision of the
BSP as a safeguard against funds-mismanagement and evidence of
the credibility of an NGO as a viable credit-granting institution
(R. De Lara, TSPI Executive Director, personal communication,
26 September 2001).
While transformation presents many MFIs the opportunity to
mobilize cheaper sources of finance through deposits and may help
strengthen their credibility as viable financial players, transforming
into regulated financial institutions may not be every MFI’s cup of
tea. As transformation into banks may be deemed cumbersome
for some NGOs, a number of them opt for establishing linkage relationships with bigger commercial banks. This approach, as we will
see in the succeeding section, allows credit-granting NGOs and
formal financial institutions to capitalize on each other’s strength
and specialization in the delivery of financial services.

Linking Credit-Granting NGOs and
the Formal Financial Sector
The linkage model used in the Philippines utilizes credit-granting
NGOs to fulfill a financial intermediary function between the
bank or a wholesale financial institution and organized self-help
groups or individual borrowers. This role requires NGOs to
accept the contractual responsibility for the repayment of the line
of credit extended to it by the bank. The final lending to end borrowers is done through the use of self-help groups or on an individual borrower basis. In many cases, the NGO also assumes the
responsibility for the extension of consultancy services to and the
training of the different groups of end clients.
Such a linkage model is illustrated in the case of the People’s
Credit and Finance Corporation (PCFC) which was established
by the Philippine government to wholesale resources to creditgranting NGOs following the Grameen model. As an apex financial institution, PCFC works with a number of retailers and
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conduits such as credit-granting NGOs, cooperatives, and rural
banks. By August 2001, its number of retailers had hit 185, 100 of
which were banks. PCFC sources its funds mainly from local and
international agencies at concessional rates and lends these funds
out to its retailers effectively at 12%, with a 1% fee for processing.
No collateral is required on the part of its conduits, although security is established through the assignment of promissory notes
from the conduit’s end borrowers. PCFC has no direct linkage with
the end borrowers of its conduits and only specifies that loanable
amounts to end clients should not exceed P25,000 ($460).
Figure 1. The linkage model adopted by the People’s Credit &
Financial Corporation (PCFC)
Thrift Banks
Rural Banks
Multilateral
Devlopment
Banks

Government
Agencies

People’s
Credit & Finance
Corporation (PCFC)

Cooperative
Banks

End
Borrowers

Cooperatives
NGOs
Lending
Investors

Another example of financial linkages established is that
between the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), a commercial
bank, and the Project Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups
(PLBS), an initiative conceived in 1987 with the support of the
German Office for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The PLBS was
an initiative covering four project phases, linking NGOs, cooperatives, and self-help groups to credit and savings facilities established by the Landbank of the Philippines (LBP) and a number
of participating rural banks.
Through the BPI Foundation, BPI has provided TSPI with a
line of credit initially amounting to P1.5 million ($28,000) at 8%
per annum, and two other lines of credit to be further on-lent to
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Figure 2. The linkage model adopted by the project “Linking Banks
& Self-Help Groups”
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of the
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(LBP)
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Figure 3. The linkage model adopted by the Bank of the Philippine
Islands
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Association
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two other NGOs which TSPI collaborates with. BPI’s initial total
engagement as of 1997 reached P3.5million ($64,000), forming
part of its pilot program of banking with the poor (GoodwinGroen, 1998). The credit lines are provided for an original term of
12 months but are renewable annually subject to credit review and
evaluation. For security and collateral, BPI requires promissory
notes executed by the microentrepreneur clients of the creditgranting NGOs, or promissory notes executed by the primary
NGO (TSPI), which acts as an agent between BPI and its two
other partner-NGOs on a with-recourse basis. The NGOs are
expected to submit quarterly reports on the status of the assigned
notes and charges 2% per month on the overdue and defaulted
amounts. By early 1997, BPI had accumulated 11 loans outstanding to MFIs for a total value of P11.1million ($202,000).
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By establishing links with formal financial institutions which are
constrained in directly dealing with the small-borrower market
segment, NGOs have the opportunity to increase their capital
base. The advantage of mobilizing NGOs as credit-conduits is
that many of them have been organized primarily to serve the poor
sectors of society. The experience of NGOs in dealing with the
small-borrower segment over the years has endowed them with the
capacity to know the target clientele and become familiar with
their needs. Thus, given their practical experience and their social
orientation, which put them on good standing among the many
end borrowers they serve, NGOs play a vital role as intermediaries between the banks and the end borrowers.
The problem that arises from this financial linkage approach,
however, is that many formal financial institutions engaged in this
approach already observe that a saturation level is being reached
on the number of possible NGO candidate conduits. PCFC, for
example, observed that among its roster of partners, many were
already showing signs of organizational deficiency (J. Medina,
personal communication, 26 September 2001). Moreover, among
the 54 members of the Philippine Microfinance Coalition and the
approximately 500 existing credit-granting NGOs in the country,
only a handful of NGOs are able to meet the requirements of the
leading commercial banks in the establishment of linkage relationships (E. Garcia, personal communication, 13 September 2001). In
the experience of PLBS, it was recognized during the early stages of
the project that the institutional capacity of many NGOs was
keeping them from effectively linking with banks (A. Almendral, personal communication, 19 September 2001). Hence, the team
endeavored to reorient the direction of the project during the latter phases and explored working with the cooperative sector
instead. More importantly, unlike PCFC and LBP, which are
partly government-owned entities, commercial banks are not in a
position to assist these organizations in building their institutional capacities for more effective engagement in financial intermediation. In contrast, PCFC and LBP are in a more advantageous
position to make use of the support extended by international
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donors to assist partner NGOs in building up the latter’s institutional capacity.
Building Specialized Institutions from Scratch
Apart from the institutional approaches of downgrading, upgrading, and financial linkage-building, the approach of introducing
new types of institutions from scratch or hybrids of more traditional types of organizations like commercial banks, such as the
newly-established microfinance or microenterprise banks, certainly
presents the opportunity to look at how these new institutions differ from their counterparts in the general banking sector. Whether
these new institutions are able to effectively overcome the constraints in dealing with the lower-income market segment while at
the same time provide financial services to the target clientele on a
sustainable basis is an area of study that will be of interest to many
researchers. In the Philippines, the introduction of such
specialized institutions is evidenced by the launching of the
Micro-Enterprise Bank (MEB) in Mindanao (the southern part of
the Philippines) in late 2001. MEB is a joint venture among international investors and a local counterpart, the Planter’s
Development Bank group. Recently, other similar developments
have also taken place in Batangas (south of Manila) with the
creation of Bangko ng Masa (Bank of the Poor), a private local
undertaking.

Concluding Remarks
The characteristics of the different players in the Philippine
financial sector outlined in this paper underscore the available opportunities and the constraints that may be dealt with in designing
approaches to help address the credit needs of microenterprises. It
should not, however, escape the reader that given the oligopolistic
nature of the Philippine financial system, the expectation that
current bank restructuring will result in improved access of smaller
enterprises to bank credit is very much clouded with skepticism
(Vos & Yap, 1996).
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In the Philippines, the commercialization of microfinance
activities has led to the emergence of new types of institutions and
has helped define some approaches markedly different from those
which were used when microfinance was dominantly viewed as a
purely social activity. This is a continuing process which requires
changes in perception among the different players in the financial
market. New methods and approaches need to be continuously
introduced in the provision of services and in mobilizing resources.
As has been shown, the appropriate strategies needed in widening
and deepening the credit reach of the various players in the financial
sector are those which recognize the market specialization of
each group of lenders and at the same time provide incentives for
institutions to be able to effectively transform and develop into
institutions more capable of addressing the credit needs of the
small-borrower market segment.

Notes
1. The Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) is a series of nationwide surveys
conducted by the Philippine National Statistics Office in 1998, 1999, and 2002.
Only preliminary results of the 2002 APIS are available.
2. Alfonso, Borton, and Castello (1994) note that there are considerable differences
in the financial services demanded and the constraints that different microenterprises face in gaining access to sources of finance, depending on the size of the
enterprise. See also Lapar (1991). For more in-depth discussion on the nature of credit
transactions involving microenterprises, please see Rhyne and Otero (1994), p. 12;
Reed and Befus (1994), pp. 186–188; and Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), pp.
265–269.
3. RA 8289 serves as an amendment to RA 6977, which was enacted in 1991,
mandating all financial institutions to set aside certain portions of their loan portfolio for small enterprises. The portion mandated for allocation to SMEs based on RA
6977 was at least 5% by the end of 1991, raised to 10% by the end of 1992 until
1995, and 5% by the end of 1996. In 1997, RA 6977 was amended through RA 8289,
which extended the mandatory allocation feature of the law for another ten years,
from 1997 to 2007. Allocation requirements were adjusted to 6% and 2% for small
and medium enterprises, respectively. (Philippine Department of Trade & Industry,
1997.)
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4. Further information on this case can be found at http://gdrc.org/icm/
inspire/inspire.html.
5. This term was used by Floro & Yotopolous (1991).
6. These include the Cooperative Rural Bank of Aklan, the Davao Cooperative
Bank, and other cooperative banks in Mindanao (southern part of the Philippines).
7. In the early 1980s, the rural banks, along with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), a state-owned bank, were pushed to implement Masagana ’99 and various
subsidized lending programs primarily to farmer groups. The funds were provided by
the Central Bank, but liability resided with the rural banks. These programs resulted
in poor loan performance partly brought about by the fact that borrowers immediately perceived the funds as government aid. Hence, credit discipline in the repayment of loans was not maintained. Also, as a supply-driven approach, the lending
programs failed to consider the benefits of the savings-mobilization component
among the targeted groups. When what seemed to be a steady inflow of cheap money
dried up in the early 1980s, many rural banks failed. While the government bailed
PNB out, it was not able to do the same for participating rural banks. About 450 from
a total of 1,250 rural banks collapsed during this crisis (GTZ, 1997, pp. 4–5).
8. The Microenterprise Access to Banking Services Program (MABS), an initiative co-sponsored by USAID Philippines and the Rural Bankers Association of the
Philippines (RBAP), shows that as of April 2001, the number of rural bank branches
involved in the program reached a total of 57, more than the targeted goal of 48. This
number had further gone up to 66 by the end of July 2001. No capitalization assistance is given and loans are funded from the deposit base of the participating rural
banks.
9. For more in-depth discussion on the transformation process of CARD Rural
Bank, see Seibel and Torres (1999). As of 2003, there were three transformed MFIs
operating as banks with microfinance functions in the Philippines, namely, (1) CARD
Rural Bank in Laguna (rural bank), (2) Opportunity Microfinance Bank in Rizal
Province (thrift bank), and (3) Vision Bank in Catanduanes (rural bank).
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Microleasing
The Grameen Bank Experience
Asif Ud Dowla
Abstract: Grameen Bank was the first microfinance institution (MFI) to introduce microleasing on a large scale. This paper provides a preliminary evaluation
of Grameen's leasing program. Instead of providing a full-fledged impact assessment study, we examine the terms and conditions of the leasing program and
evaluate its success in terms of outreach, repayment rate, and asset ownership.
Analysis of program level data shows that the program is successful in terms of
outreach and repayment performance. Through the program, poor men and
women have become owners of power tillers, power looms, shallow machines,
cellular phones, and even computers. The success of leasing suggests some
important lessons for MFIs. It shows that poor people have diverse credit needs
and that to help the poor borrowers to graduate out of poverty, MFIs have to
provide different and flexible products.

I

n 1992 Grameen Bank started its experimental leasing program
by leasing power looms to weavers in Ariahazar, near Dhaka,
the capital city of Bangladesh. Many of the borrowers in this
area were weavers who produced fabrics using handlooms. The
borrowers noticed that many of their competitors were using power
looms and wanted to know if the bank would help them to gain
access to power looms. Initially, the bank bought the power loom
and rented it out to the borrowers. However, the bank manager
realized that the borrowers would be better served through an
arrangement where the machines could be leased to the borrowers,
who could then pay off the cost of the machines by using the earnings from them. Based on this experience, in 1993 Grameen Bank
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piloted leasing power tillers in the Dinajpur and the Rangpur Zone
of the Bank.
In the 1994 zonal manager’s conference, a decision was
adopted to expand leasing to all zones. At the end of year 1997,
Grameen Bank leased 8,411 items in 111 different categories. The
program has enabled 96 male and 1118 female members to complete the leasing contract and own assets in the process. As of
December 1997, the leasing program has booked Tk. 237.67 million ($5.29 million) worth of leases, or an average of Tk 28,000
($623) per lease. The leasing program is in operation in all areas of
the bank; however, not all branches have a leasing program.1 The
total disbursement of all products of Grameen Bank was Tk
6240.70 million at the end of December 1997. This makes the
share of leasing close to 4% of the total portfolio of the bank.
The objective of this paper is to critically examine the leasing
program. Since the program is relatively new, the exercise will
entail a preliminary evaluation of the program. Instead of a fullfledged impact assessment study, we will examine the terms and
conditions of the leasing program and evaluate its success in terms
of outreach, repayment rate, and asset ownership.
The paper is based on data for the period 1994–1997 because
the bank partially suspended the leasing program during
1998–2001, while the bank redesigned its financial delivery mechanism. Leasing is now relabeled as a special project loan under the
rubric of Grameen II (Yunus, 2002). Even though the data is a bit
old, Grameen Bank is the first microfinance institution (MFI) to
introduce microleasing on a large scale and thus its experience with
leasing will be relevant for other MFIs that have introduced leasing
or are on the verge of introducing such a product.2
The plan of the paper is as follows. First we will examine some
studies that deal with the types of activities funded by the leasing
program. Then we will discuss the operational aspect of the
Grameen Bank’s microleasing. Next we will examine the leasing
Asif Ud Dowla is a Professor of Economics at St. Mary’s College of Maryland. E-mail:
audowla@smcm.edu
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program and evaluate its successes and failures. Finally, the conclusion includes suggestions to improve the efficacy of the leasing
program.

The Financial Landscape of Leasing
“Financial leasing is a contractual arrangement between two parties, which allows one party (the lessee) to use an asset owned by
the other (the lessor) in exchange for specified periodic payments.
The lessee uses the asset and pays rental to the lessor, who legally
owns it” (Gallardo, 1997). The owner of the leased item expects
the lessee to make lease payments by generating sufficient cash
flow. This feature of leasing enables borrowers without credit
history and collateral to access the use of capital equipment
or other items. Leasing can be of three types; financial leasing,
hire-purchase, and operating lease. Grameen Bank uses the hirepurchase version of leasing.
Most of the activities funded by the leasing program are related
to small rural manufacturing and service industries. There were
two major studies that explored the workings of the small manufacturing and service industries in Bangladesh. The first one was
the Rural Industrialization Survey Project (RISP) by Bangladesh
Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), and the other one is a
book, Small Firms Informally Financed, edited by Islam, Von
Pischke and de Waard (1994). The later source deals mostly with
urban-based small manufacturing and service industries, yet its
findings are relevant for the microleasing industry. The BIDS study
shows that small firms, especially in the rural areas, face tremendous hurdles in setting up businesses and financing their working
capital needs. The study by Islam et al. shows that businesses in
this sector rarely borrow from the formal banking sector. Many of
the entrepreneurs surveyed are aware of credit facilities from the
commercial banks, but few try to use them. The major source of
funds for them is the informal sector, consisting of friends and relatives or the moneylenders. Depending on the funding source, the
cost of capital to the producers varies from 10% to 120% per
annum simple interest rate for initial investment, and up to 240%
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for working capital financing. The interest rate charged by moneylenders is in the range of 60 to 120 per cent per annum. The study
further shows that even friends and relatives may charge interest on
informal loans (30% to 96% interest per annum).
The BIDS study shows that, with a few exceptions, for the
majority of units, personal savings contributed from 50% to 100%
of the funds needed for establishing a Small Cottage Industry
(SCI). Some of the units used external sources for financing initial
capital and among them slightly fewer than 80% borrowed from
noninstitutional sources. One of the investigators (Ahmed 1984)
examined the problems encountered by microenterpreneurs in raising funds from the formal credit market. The main problem was
the stringent collateral requirements. The value of security offered
in terms of items like land, buildings and other fixed assets by the
borrowers as a proportion of loan was quite high (275%). For a
loan from commercial banks, this figure rose above 400%.
The next obstacle was the cumbersome documentation
requirements necessary to obtain formal credit. Through a special
survey, Ahmed (1984) found that borrowers have to meet as many
as ten different types of paper requirements, e.g., submission of
nationality certificate, solvency certificate, personal guarantee,
business registration and license, plant layout, and balance sheet
statement to receive a loan. The author of the study notes, “given
that nearly 60 percent of the owners of SCI’s are illiterate, 95 percent of them self-managed and a mere 6 to 7 percent of them keep
records of their operations, these excessive documentation requirements are likely to pose almost insurmountable difficulties to the
small borrowers in getting an institutional loan.”
Moreover, he found that the transaction costs of borrowing
from institutional sources are quite high. These costs include official fees, unofficial payments and bribes, and miscellaneous
expenses incurred by the borrowers in taking loans. The latter costs
constitute on average 3.45% of the amount borrowed, rising up to
nearly 6% of loans taken from government lending agencies.
Longer waiting times as well as a considerable number of working
days are lost in securing an institutional loan; on average it takes
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slightly less than three months to get a loan and about 12 working
days are lost while getting the loan approved. A recent village level
study shows that the transaction costs are even higher, averaging
67.66% and 52% in the two study villages (Banik, 1993).
These studies, however, failed to expose the gendered nature of
the problem. Women have a negligible presence in the rural industry. The RISP study shows that 32.3% of the workers are female in
rural industries whereas only 3.3% of the proprietors are female.
The credit constraint faced by women entrepreneurs is even more
confining than that faced by men; they may not get any loan at all.
Islam et al. (1994) report a rate of 120% to 240% per annum simple interest rate on loans to the women’s tailoring trade. These
studies also suggest that there is a huge demand for credit to
finance these activities. However, due to lack of funds, or because
of the stringent conditions that have to be met to obtain funds,
many potential enterprises never take off resulting in jobs not
being created and lost opportunity to achieve economic upliftment
for a significant number of people—especially women.
These studies show that the financial landscape faced by firms
in small manufacturing and service industries is rather bleak. They
have to borrow from the informal market at an exorbitant interest
rate or deplete personal savings to start a business. For the expansion of business, they have to rely on internal financing through
reinvestment of profits. However, the majority of the sample SCI
consume a significant portion of profit, to the tune of 85% on
average. Ahmed (1984) argues, “with insignificant retained earnings resulting from higher consumption of profits, considerable
credit selling, and the consequent repayment delays and lack of
facilities for private financing through hire-purchase arrangements
and subcontracting systems, is bound to make the growth and
expansion of these industries extremely difficult in the country
unless suitable arrangements are made to ensure adequate flow of
formal credit to them.”
The above review deals only with short-term credit needs
of small enterprises that could benefit from the leasing program. Leasing is usually medium- to long-term and the banks are
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reluctant to undertake term lending. Such needs have to be satisfied by borrowing from moneylenders, friends, and relatives or by
using personal savings and the reinvestment of profits. Grameen
Bank’s microleasing program has to be evaluated against this backdrop of ground realities faced by microentrepreneurs where they
have limited opportunity to borrow for a period longer than one
year. Moreover, the majority of Grameen Bank’s members are
women who are unlikely to get credit even for short-term needs
from formal and informal sources, not to mention term lending
needs.

Procedures for Grameen Bank Leasing Program
Terms and Conditions
The leasing fee (annual interest rate) is set at 20%. The principle
for calculating the interest includes the purchase price of the
item, transportation, and other expenses, such as insurance premiums. The maximum time for paying off the lease contract is three
years. However, in the case of animals, the maximum is set at
two years. The lessee has to pay off the contract amount through
weekly installments. A member has to start the installment payment within a month (in the case of animals, 15 days) of receiving
the leased item. The lessee could either pay off the amount by making equal installment payments or, after consulting with the
branch manager, paying no less than Tk. 100 during the off-peak
period and more than the installment amount during peak-period.3
However, the time limit for the off-peak period is three months.
The lessee could also pay off the full or a partial amount of the
lease value anytime. The lessee is liable to keep the leased item in
good working condition and to fix any mechanical defects. As a
result, the lessee carries the risk of obsolescence. 4 Further, the
lessee has to insure the item if insurance is available. For example,
all transportation related items and cellular phones are insured
with commercial providers and the lessee bears the expenses.
The bank will repossess the leased item if the lessee fails to
pay the full amount during the stipulated time. If necessary, the
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repossessed item could be released to another member. The area
manager/program officer and the branch manager, in consultation
with the new lessee and the defaulting lessee or his or her representative, will reassess the value of the leased item. If the reassessed
value is greater than the remaining payment on the leased item, the
surplus will be first used to pay off any remaining lease payment.
If there is still money left, that will be given to the defaulting lessee
as cash. If the reassessed value is less than the remaining rent on
the leased item, the defaulting lessee will be liable to meet the
shortfall.

Selection of Leasing
• A member will be given a lease on an individual basis. A
group or a center cannot get a lease on the basis of a collective ownership.
• There will be no prespecified list for leasing items. The zonal
manager by his or her own discretion can give any item for
leasing. However, the item should be such that it could be
transferred later, if necessary, without any major wear and
tear.
• Leasing will not be given for any business where there is daily
sale and purchase, e.g., grocery shops, variety shops, or
pharmacies. 5
• Livestock could be leased under the leasing regulation.
However, goods that could be financed under the ceiling of
general/seasonal loan would not be leased.
Qualification
To be eligible for a lease contract, members and centers have to fulfill the following criteria. Branches do not have to meet any specific condition to initiate a leasing program.
Members
• A member must be at least a three-time loanee.
• A member must have an additional source of income so that
installments can be paid.
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• The lessee or a member of the family must have prior experience in managing the leased item; and in the latter case, the
member of the family must oversee the item.
• In the case of transport items, the lessee or a member of the
family must be an experienced and licensed driver.
• Leased item must be used properly and the repayment rate
must be satisfactory.
• A member must have or create an appropriate space to store
the leased item.

Center
• A center must be at least two years old.
• A center should not have any trouble loanee. The zonal
manager could initiate a leasing program with good members
of an irregular center if he or she thinks that by adopting
such program the overall performance of the center could be
improved. However, this cannot be done indiscriminately.
Lease Proposal and Approval
The bank assistant as well as the branch manager will provisionally
select members and centers to initiate a leasing program, provided
they meet the conditions mentioned in the qualification section.
Once the selection is completed, the branch manager will invite
the area manager/program officer to visit the center. He or she will
visit the center during the regular weekly meeting, or a special
meeting, and then evaluate the lessee’s income, prior experience
in managing the leased item, and the venture’s potential. He or she
will further inform the member about the risk involved in the venture and the method of payment, and will visit the member’s
house. Once the visiting team is convinced that everything is satisfactory, it will finally approve the member for the leasing contract.
According to the current practice, the branch manager will forward
the leasing proposal to the area manager. After examining the proposal, the area manager can approve leasing with a ceiling of Tk.
50,000 ($1111). All proposals exceeding the ceiling of Tk. 50,000
require the zonal manager’s approval. The zonal manager can
approve proposals up to Tk. 300,000. If the proposal is for more
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than Tk. 300,000 ($6666.67), it would need the approval of the
Technology and Development unit housed at the Headquarters.6

Buying of the Lease Item
Depending on the value of the lease item, bank staff7 may be
involved in the purchase of the lease item. A representative of the
bank monitors the buying and usage of the leased item. Whenever
appropriate, the staff will take spot quotes from at least three vendors and will buy the item from the vendor with the lowest price.
Some of the preconditions of leasing, such as a perfect credit
record, prior experience with the activity to be financed, licensing
requirement for operator of transport items, existence of an additional income, and availability of space to store the leased items,
make leasing very close to a collaterized loan. These preconditions
suggest that the bank is looking for relatively better-off borrowers,
and the conditions will lead to self-selection by the borrowers.
Leasing is a relatively new product in Grameen’s portfolio;
however, it is different from other loan products in many ways.
Firstly, there is no group tax in leasing. Group tax is a contentious
issue with Grameen borrowers, and many of them perceive it as
hidden levy that effectively increases the cost of borrowing. 8
Secondly, loan for leasing is not fungible. The members are given a
product instead of cash. For example, in the case of general loans,
members will sometimes borrow money to pay for paddy husking,
but instead use it to lease land (Todd, 1996). This is not possible
in case of leasing, because the item is bought in the presence of
bank workers through a competitive bidding process. This ensures
that the item is used strictly for productive purposes and thus
reduces the probability of default of the lease contract. Thirdly,
candidates for lease are chosen who have other sources of income
and have the ability to store the leased item. These conditions are
not used, at least formally, for many other loan products. Fourthly,
except for housing loans and types of seasonal loans, all other loans
are given for a short term, i.e., one year, whereas the leasing term
is for more than a year. Fifthly, the grace period for a lease item is
one month (in the case of livestock lease, the grace period is 15
days); for other loan products, the installment payment has to start
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in the second week after the disbursement of the loan. Sixthly, a
lessee could pay off the loan amount prior to the expiry of the loan
contract, and the installments could be fixed as well as variable
depending on the season. Since the installment is calculated on a
declining balance, prepayment will entitle the lessees to a rebate on
interest payments. Seventhly, unlike other products, some leased
items can be insured, which protects both the lessee and the lessor
from undue risk. Lastly, the most significant difference is the
absence of “joint liability” in the case of leasing. Even though the
center and the groups are involved in appraising lease proposals,
and the group chairperson signs the contract as a witness, they are
not held liable for the repayment in case of default. Through leasing, Grameen Bank is experimenting with pseudoindividual, collateralized loans.
As we mentioned earlier, Grameen’s leasing program is similar
to hire-purchase arrangements. However, it is even different from
pure hire-purchase leasing. For example, the borrowers do not have
to pay any down payment to initiate the contract. Unlike the true
“lease-to-buy” contract, the borrowers do not have to pay the residual value that the asset has at the end of the lease period, if it is
greater than zero. This more than compensates the borrower for
bearing the risk of obsolescence. Also, in contrast to a rent-to-own
agreement, the borrower in a leasing agreement cannot terminate
the contract and return the item.

Evaluation of the Leasing Program
In a short period, leasing has become a very popular program with
Grameen borrowers. The following two tables show the annual disbursement of leasing by zone, along with the gender of the lessee.
Table 1 shows the number of lease contracts and Table 2 shows the
value of lease contracts.
Table 1 illustrates the remarkable growth achieved by the leasing program. Since its inception in 1994, leasing has grown exponentially. The cumulative growth rate for male leaseholders is
580%, for female leaseholders it is 1370%, and the overall growth
rate is an impressive 1297%. The same trend is captured in Table
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Table 1. Annual number of lease contracts across zones and
according to the gender of the borrower
Zones

Chittagong
Tangail
Rangpur
Dhaka
Patuakhali
Bogra
Sylhet
Rajshahi
Dinajpur
Faridpur
Comilla
Mymensingh
Naraynganj
Khulna
Total

1994

1995

1996

M

F

T

M

F

T

M

F

0
5
35
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
56

46
0
158
117
9
15
0
6
186
5
4
0
0
0
546

46
5
193
133
9
15
0
6
186
5
4
0
0
0
602

34
4
19
4
1
4
2
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
81

129
3
57
19
1
31
19
84
458
40
9
19
0
0
869

163
7
76
23
2
35
21
84
471
40
9
19
0
0
950

8
11
5
0
3
1
0
1
3
2
0
0
4
0
38

47
4
33
5
5
2
4
203
106
15
1
62
173
103
763

1997
T

M

55 17
15 83
38 24
5
38
8
22
3
4
4
0
204 5
109 4
17
2
1
0
62
5
177 3
103 1
801 208

F

Cumulative total as
of December 1997
T
M F
T

81 98
59 303 362
172 255 103 179 282
70 94
83 318 401
286 324 58 427 485
269 291 26 284 310
84 88
9 132 141
14 14
2 37
39
764 769
6 1057 1063
199 203 20 949 969
299 301
4 359 363
1563 1563 0 1577 1577
1672 1677 5 1753 1758
87 90
7 260 267
290 291
1 393 394
5850 6058 383 8028 8411

Note. M= Male, F=Female, and T=Total. From Monitoring and Evaluation Department of

Grameen Bank

2. The rates are unusually high because the program started from a
low base. Both tables show that the majority of leaseholders are
women—95% in terms of numbers and 91% in terms of values.
We have already shown that leasing is very popular with
Grameen borrowers. However, one of the most important indicators of success is the repayment rate. Table 3 shows the repayment
rate of the leasing program by zone and by the gender of the borrower, at the end of each year.
In some of the zones, the repayment rate declined over time
from a perfect repayment record attained in the beginning of the
program. Even though some of the zones have more than 100%
repayment rate, 9 the slight declining trend in repayment performance is carried over to the overall repayment rate. The overall
repayment rate is still very high—98% in terms of value and
97.6% (8209 leases out of 8411) in terms of the number of lease
contracts. These figures are well within the repayment rates of
other products of Grameen Bank. The repayment rate data
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T

0.00 2.50 2.50
0.31 0.00 0.3
1.0
3.97 4.97
0.72 5.08 5.80
0.00 0.32 0.32
0.00 0.85 0.85
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.21 0.21
0.00 4.21 4.21
0.00 0.22 0.22
0.00 0.19 0.19
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
2.03 17.56 19.59

F

F

T

2.0
7.48 9.48
0.39 0.3
0.69
0.59 1.99 2.58
0.31 1.91 2.22
0.08 0.04 0.12
0.15 0.55 0.70
0.12 1.42 1.54
0.00 1.53 1.53
0.25 7.29 7.54
0.00 2.01 2.01
0.00 0.53 0.53
0.00 0.95 0.95
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
3.89 26.05 29.95

M

F

0.59 2.55
0.72 0.11
0.55 0.39
0.00 0.39
0.10 0.13
0.02 0.03
0.00 0.41
0.09 4.71
0.08 1.94
0.11 0.81
0.00 0.05
0.00 0.81
0.49 8.96
0.00 3.28
2.76 24.62

M
3.14
0.84
0.94
0.39
0.23
0.05
0.41
4.80
2.02
0.92
0.05
0.81
9.45
3.28
27.38

T
0.67
5.18
5.61
3.39
0.89
0.20
0.00
0.07
0.06
0.12
0.00
0.15
0.55
0.06
16.97

M
3.02
10.07
2.92
23.65
11.98
2.53
0.80
11.76
4.23
8.88
28.54
21.40
4.24
9.69
143.76

F
3.69
15.25
8.54
27.04
12.87
2.73
0.80
11.83
4.29
9.00
28.54
21.55
4.79
9.75
160.74

T

F

T

3.26 15.57 18.83
6.61 10.49 17.10
3.43
9.29 12.72
5.42 33.39 38.81
1.07 13.48 14.55
0.37
3.97
4.34
0.11
2.64
2.76
0.16 18.20 18.36
0.39 17.68 18.07
.23 11.93 12.16
0.00 29.32 29.32
0.15 23.16 23.32
1.04 13.21 14.25
0.06 12.98 13.04
22.34 215.33 237.67

M

Note. M= Male, F=Female and T=Total, 1 million Taka=$22,222.22 at the exchange rate $1= 45 Taka. From Monitoring and
Evaluation Department of Grameen Bank

Chittagong
Tangail
Rangpur
Dhaka
Patuakhali
Bogra
Sylhet
Rajshahi
Dinajpur
Faridpur
Comilla
Mymensingh
Naraynganj
Khulna
Total

M

Table 2: Annual amount (in million Takas) of lease distribution across Zones and according to the gender
of the borrower
Zones
1994
1995
1996
1997
Cumulative total as
of December 1997

Table 3: Annual (at the end of each year) repayment rates
across Zones and according to the gender of the borrower
Zones

Repayment Rates
Up to Dec 94 Up to Dec 95 Up to Dec 96
M

F

T

M

F

T

M

F

T

Up to Dec 97
M

F

T

Chittagong

--- 100 100

--- 100 100

99 100 100

98 99 99
(5) (8) (13)

Tangail

100 100 100

98 100 100

97 100 97
(2)

102 101 102

Rangpur

100 100 100

98 99 99

85 90 89
(19) (58) (77)

85 87 86
(19) (56) (75)

Dhaka

100 100 100

97 98 95

72 73
(1)

95 95 95
(1) (15) (16)

Patuakhali

100 100 100

100 90 84

100 88 89
(3) (3)

100 98
(3)

99
(3)

Bogra

100 100 10

100 100 100

101 98 99
(1) (4) (5)

100 99
(5)

99
(5)

Sylhet

100 100 100

100 98 98

100 97

100 98
(4)

98
(4)

73
(1)

97

Rajshahi

--- 100 100

--- 103 103

100 101 101

100 100 100

Dinajpur

100 100 100

100 97 97

100 98 98
(24) (24)

100 96 96
(69) (69)

Faridpur

--- 100 100

--- 100 98

100 98 98
(3) (3)

100 103 103
(2) (2)

Comilla

--- 100 100

--- 100 100

--- 100 100

--- 102 102

Mymensingh --- 100 100

--- 99 99

--- 82

41 98
(1) (8)

Naraynganj

--- --- ---

--- --- ---

82 101 100
(7) (7)

75 100 99
(1) (5) (6)

Khulna

--- --- ---

--- --- ---

--- 100 100

--- 101 101
(1) (1)

Total

100 100 100

98 98 98

82

98
(9)

92 96 96
95 98 98
(23) (99) (122) (27) (176) (203)

Note. Figures in parenthesis represents the number of defaulting lessees. No
lease was repaid in 1994 and no information was available on default in 1995.
Because of prepayment, repayment rate could be more than 100 per cent.
From Monitoring and Evaluation Department of Grameen Bank
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reported here includes prepayments and late payments in addition
to timely payments. Including prepayment and arrears overstates
the actual repayment rate. A better gauge of repayment status
would be to add prepayers and timely payers and express that as a
percentage of total outstanding leases. Another option would be to
record loans by cohort (year of award and length of award),
because a two-year lease will have more problems than a one-year
lease and a new lease rarely has problems. The way repayment is
calculated, it pools experience, which in a growing program allows
defaults to be hidden by good loans. 10
Another indicator of success is to determine how many borrowers have fully repaid the lease contract and in the process
attained full ownership of assets. Tables 4 and 5 show the status of
asset ownership through the leasing program. Table 4 demonstrates
the distribution of asset ownership across gender and zones. Out of
the 383 items leased to male members, 96 are now owned after full
repayment. This makes the
Table 4: Distribution of asset
ownership ratio an impressive
ownership across zone and
according to the gender of
25%; out of the 4 leased items
the borrower
outstanding to male members
Zones
Cumulative total as of
so far, one of the items is
December 1997
M
F
T
already owned by the member.
Chittagong
26
127
153
The female ownership ratio is
Tangail
13
17
30
14% (1118 out of 8028 items
Rangpur
33
140
173
Dhaka
0
4
4
leased). The overall ownership
Patuakhali
0
12
12
ratio is 14.5% (1214 out
Bogra
4
34
38
of 8411 total items leased). 11
Sylhet
2
14
16
Rajshahi
1
118
119
The lower female ownership
Dinajpur
13
476
489
ratio can be explained by the
Faridpur
2
23
25
Comilla
0
13
13
recent nature of the female
Mymensingh
0
38
38
lease contracts. Table 5 shows
Naraynganj
0
64
64
Khulna
0
25
25
asset ownership by male and
Total
96
1118
1214
female borrowers in the top 15
Note. M= Male, F=Female, and T=Total.
activities funded by the leasing
From Monitoring and Evaluation
program.
Department of Grameen Bank.
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Women face credit constraints in obtaining loans from institutional sources. Commercial Banks don’t maintain records on the
gender of the loanee; however, a review of the types of activities
financed and the nature of collateral requirements would reveal the
gender bias of the loans by
Table 5: Ownership of asset as
formal sources. Grameen
of December 1997 according
Bank was a pioneer in opento the gender of the borrower
ing up women’s access to
in top fifteen activities funded
by the leasing program
credit. Through the leasing
Leased Item Number of borrowers
program, the bank is continuM
F
T
ing that tradition. In this case
Shallow
35
687
722
the leasing program is
machine
(4.9) (95.1)
Power Tiller
19
132
151
enabling poor women to have
(12.6) (87.4)
access to medium-term loans.
Power loom
0
58
58
(0.0) (100.0)
A review of the leasing
Cow
4
45
49
program shows that women
(12.2) (91.8)
are given lease contracts for
Rice Mill
4
25
29
(13.8) (86.2)
activities that are not considBaby Taxi
9
12
21
ered typical female activities.
(42.9) (57.1)
Dairy Farm
3
17
20
It is true that women may end
(15.0) (85.0)
up using a man to run many
Power Pump
5
14
19
(26.3) (73.7)
of these activities. This, howBuffalo cart
0
19
19
ever, is more of a reflection of
(0.0) (100.0)
the social realities faced by
Poultry Farm
3
15
18
(16.7) (83.3)
women in rural Bangladesh
Nursery
0
16
16
rather than men capturing the
(0.0) (100.0)
Fridge
2
7
9
businesses of their wives. A
(22.2) (77.3)
woman can own a power
Tempo
2
6
8
(25.0) (75.0)
tiller, but she is not expected
Shallow boat
1
6
7
to operate it in the field. This
(14.3) (85.7)
Fish Farms
0
5
5
is true for all activities that
(0.0) (100.0)
entail women going outside
Note. M= Male, F=Female, and T=Total;
of their homes and coming
figures in parentheses are the percentage
of the total number of item in each
in contact with males who
activity. From Monitoring and Evaluation
are not family members. But
Department of Grameen Bank.
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it is highly unlikely that any commercial bank in Bangladesh will
ever approve loans to poor woman for dairy farms, welding
machines, mini garments, washing machines, dish antenna, computers, or cellular phones, even if they are accompanied by their
husbands. Through the leasing program, the bank is trying to
break the gendered nature of activities financed by financial institutions (Hossain and Afsar, 1989).
Research shows that whenever a borrower creates a surplus
fund through income generating activities, they almost always like
to convert it to an asset, e.g., livestock or equipment. Leasing has
caught the imagination of the borrowers as it allows them to own
assets without delay. In the case of a traditional loan product, the
borrowers have to use several rounds of loans to generate enough
surplus to buy any livestock or equipment.
The success of the leasing program can be attributed to the
flexibility of its design. As we mentioned earlier, a lessee can make
partial or full payment of the leased amount at any time without
any penalty. This allows the borrowers to take advantage of
improved market conditions. If they have a windfall they can easily
pay off the balance on the contract and in the process become
owners of an asset much more quickly than in the stipulated time.
The introduction of installment payments for peak and offpeak periods is also an excellent innovation and this further adds
to the flexibility. For example, the most sought-after item in the
leasing program is the power tiller. Power tillers are in peak
demand during the early part of each crop season because they are
required to prepare the land; after that, they are most likely to stay
idle. During the monsoon season, the roads can be impassable and,
as a result, income from many transportation items, e.g., baby taxis,
bullock carts, or rickshaw van, could be low. The ability to make
variable installments enhances the debt capacity of the borrowers
because it allows them to synchronize payment with income flow.
In many of Grameen’s other loan products, there is no grace
period and repayments have to start almost immediately. Because
of this, many borrowers are known to withhold a part of their loan
to cover the early repayments. This would mean that return from
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the investment has to be substantial to pay off the principle and
the interest payments. The less-than-full use of the loan could
adversely affect the return from investment and the eventual repayment. In leasing, as there is a grace period of one month, and
lessees are selected who have other sources of income, and the loan
is given in kind rather than in cash; there is little possibility of a
less-than-full investment of the approved amount.
Leasing appears to be more conducive to enhance borrowers’
sustainability. It could solve the problem of low rates of graduation
of successful borrowers. In group lending, members of the group
differ in ability and entrepreneurship. In these situations, it is difficult for a creditor to separate entrepreneurial borrowers from
ordinary borrowers in order to reward them with large scale and
flexible loans. The lessee, on the other hand, is self-selected and
belongs to the group of relatively well-off borrowers, as implied by
the rules of the program. Through the leasing program, the bank is
able to reward members who are capable and who have a good
repayment record, and leasing can be used to reward successful
centers as well. Recent developments in group lending theory suggest that, if the limited liability constraint binds and borrowers are
risk averse, the relatively wealthier among the poor borrower may
prefer loans based on individual incentives (Madajewicz, 1997).
This is because as the wealth of the borrower increases, their incentive to monitor others in the group decreases.
Introducing leasing as a separate product of the bank instead
of opening a new company for leasing was a sensible option. This
allowed the bank to take advantage of its vast network and existing
infrastructures to expand the leasing program. Unlike the commercial leasing companies, Grameen could market and expand the
product easily and cheaply. Besides, through the leasing program,
the bank is able to take advantage of the economies of scope—the
ability to provide many products at the same cost. “In economic
terms, financial intermediaries enjoy economies of scope. These
arise from providing a large numbers of products that can be
produced jointly, such as checking accounts and savings accounts
and loans. By offering clients a broader array of services they can
Volume 6 Number 2
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economize on overhead costs and increase profits” (Von Pischke,
1991, p. 230).
As mentioned earlier, there is no preset list of activities that
can be funded through the leasing program. The area office, in
consultation with the branch, can approve any item for lease. This
type of decentralized decision making based on each staff ’s knowledge of their borrowers operations and local market conditions
also increases the debt capacity of the borrowers and empowers the
staff. Besides this, leasing is a loan in kind is that is not fungible
which minimizes auditing costs for the bank.
Even though the probability of default is similar between pure
loans and leasing loans, leasing provides a special advantage over
lending in that it offers the ability to seize and sell the leased item
if the borrower defaults on the loan (Westley, 2003). On the contrary, if a borrower defaults on a loan, MFIs have very few options
to recover the loan. 12 In this way, pure loans are more risky than a
lease contract. Most MFIs provide a one-year loan because the
probability of default increases with time. MFIs use the promise of
enhanced credit limit after a successful completion of a one-year
loan to minimize the probability of default. Leasing allows the
MFIs to provide mutli-year loans without the same risk entailed in
giving mid-term business loans.
Earlier we saw that the leasing program has a good repayment
record. What is not clear is the incentive mechanism that keeps the
repayment rate so high. One explanation is that the possibility of
further lease contracts, as well as access to other Grameen loan
products, induces the lessee to make timely payments. It is fair to
assume that a subsequent lease would be larger than the current
lease amount. An indirect way of finding that out is by examining
the average size of the leases over time. Table 6 shows that the average size of the lease for male members is increasing over time. For
female members, however, the average size of the lease is declining
over time. There are several tentative explanations for this trend.
First, male members usually lease big-ticket items, because they
have access to the markets and greater social mobility compared to
female borrowers. Second, many of the male members are repeat
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Table 6: Size of the average lease across years and according to
the gender of the borrower
Gender

1994

1995

1996

1997

Cumulative as of
December 1997

Female

32,161
($715)

29,985
($666)

32,276
($717)

24,375
($542)

26,822
($596)

Male

36,285
($806)

48,123
($1,069)

72,684
($1,615)

81,625
($1,814)

58, 345
($1,289)

Total

32,544
($ 723)

31,531
($ 701)

34,193
($ 760)

26,534
($ 590)

28,257
($ 628)

Note. Figures in parentheses represent approximate US $ value at the rate of
$1=Tk 45.00.

lessees and it is likely that the size of a repeat lease would be bigger than the original lease, which would explain the increasing size
of their average lease. Most of the female lessees are relatively new
to the program, and the large number of female leases could
explain the smaller average size of their lease contracts. Third, even
though female lessees can and do use male relatives for the operation of their leased items, they still might not feel secure about
borrowing money for big-ticket items. Male borrowers on the
other hand can tolerate more risk than female borrowers and do
not feel inhibited by borrowing larger amounts.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many members of MFIs borrow from multiple organizations—a phenomenon know as overlapping. The MFIs find overlapping problematic, as it could lead
to a loan-pyramiding scheme that could collapse. However,
another way to view overlapping is that it is an indicator of credit
rationing, i.e., the amount supplied is less than the amount
demanded. Since multiple memberships entail costs, the tendency
to borrow from multiple organizations could also imply that the
borrowers are looking for products that meet their special and
diverse needs. Leasing, being a much more flexible product, will be
likely to reduce the problem of overlapping. Further, leasing will
allow the bank to retain a good borrower who assumes larger loans,
of which the cost per unit is very low. Since giving larger loans is
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more profitable, these clients will allow the banks to crosssubsidize poorer borrowers.
The most exciting application of the program has been the
leasing of cellular mobile phones to successful women borrowers in
rural Bangladesh. Research by Bayes, von Braun, and Akhter
(1999) suggests that the availability of phones has benefited the
whole village both economically and socially. Phone ownership has
increased the income of the women and increased their mobility
inside and outside their villages. More importantly, access to phone
service increased villagers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis middlemen
who would otherwise enjoy information advantage.
Despite the remarkable success, the program faces certain
problems. Most of these problems originate from the failure of the
staff to follow the rules and procedures of the program as outlined
in the official circulars of the bank. The standard problem faced by
the program is default. However, this is a problem not unique to
leasing. Another problem includes leased transportation items that
were involved in accidents. In many of these instances, the bank
was unable to collect insurance money when the vehicles lacked
necessary papers, such as a valid driving license for the operator, an
up-to-date insurance certificate, or a road permit and fitness certificate. In some cases, the borrower sold the leased item prior to
the full payment of lease value, and in others, the lessee used nonfamily members to operate the leased item instead of limiting use
to self and a family member. In some zones, several items were
leased that could not be repossessed and released to other members, e.g., poultry farms, pharmacies, sweetmeat shops, or grocery
shops. An analysis of the problem cases suggests that the lessee
could benefit from some training on how to do market analysis and
how to operate the item safely.

Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to evaluate the leasing program of the
Grameen Bank. We have not attempted a full-fledged impact
assessment of the leasing program. It is not clear whether a complete impact assessment of leasing can be done. It will be difficult
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to isolate the effect of leasing from the effect of Grameen’s other
products. Analysis of program level data and a case study show that
the program is successful in terms of outreach and repayment performance. Through the program, poor men and women have
become owners of power tillers, power looms, shallow machines,
and even computers. The program is facing some problems, mostly
caused by failure of the lessee or staff to abide by the rules.
The success of leasing suggests some important lessons for
MFIs. It shows that poor people have diverse credit needs. To help
the poor borrowers to graduate out of poverty, MFIs have to provide different and flexible products. The success of leasing shows
that if an MFI has a good institutional setup in place and it can
carefully design a product that is flexible, members will use the
product to their advantage. Despite the success of the group lending methodology of credit delivery, members within a group vary
in entrepreneurial ability. New products such as leasing can be used
to reward a good member within a group.
Some of the commercial leasing programs in Bangladesh are
having repayment problems. Most of these programs have leased
items to business houses and the average size of their lease contract
is much higher than Grameen’s lease contract. Compared to
Grameen, however, they are at a disadvantage—they don’t have
access to a pool of borrowers with a detailed credit history. Von
Pischke notes, “Experience accumulated through lending on different terms provides information that makes it possible for the
lender to have greater confidence in borrowers and more information about their use of finances” (1991, p. 309). In addition,
the commercial leasing programs have to incur costs to market
their products. The success of Grameen leasing program shows that
it is possible to issue medium-term loans to small borrowers
without incurring a high cost of marketing or a large down payment. The key to success is constant supervision, monitoring, and
knowing one’s clients well.
The RISP surveyed the proprietors of cottage industries and
asked them to rank the top three things they need for developing
the enterprise. Eighty-five percent of the proprietors ranked credit
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for working capital as the top priority. Grameen Bank might think
of up-scaling some of the leasing activities by introducing working
capital finance through a “sale and leaseback,” in which the client
sells an existing asset to the bank and then leases it back from
them, thus releasing the funds for working capital. In the future,
the bank might want to consider leasing complementary items,
for example, a trolley along with a power tiller. This will enable
the power tiller owner to use it throughout the year and reduce the
variability of income from this item. The bank could have a bulk
contract with one insurance company to provide insurance for
transport items. By doing so, the bank could get a discount on the
rate for the borrowers. The bank may reap the benefit of economies
of scale in purchasing popular assets such as power tillers and
irrigation pumps, and thus may get a discount for purchasing
in bulk. This will benefit the borrowers by lowering the price of
these items.

Notes
This paper was written while the author was spending his sabbatical leave as a
Visiting Scholar at the Program for Research on Poverty Alleviation of Grameen Trust
(PRPA). American Institute of Bangladesh Studies (AIBS) and Grameen Trust's sabbatical program provided funding for the project. The author is grateful to Professor
Syed Hashemi, Director, PRPA, and Mr. Dipal Barua, General Manager of Grameen
Bank, and his staff for their help. David Cracknell, Erik Nelson, J. D. Von Pischke,
Mark Schreiner, J. Morduch, Klaas Kupier, and Katie Claire provided helpful comments on the earlier version of the paper. All views and any errors are mine solely.
1. Leasing is only available for centers that do not have any problem loanee. So,
if a branch has many centers with problem loanees, it is unlikely that leasing will be
introduced there. Moreover, leasing is unlikely to be introduced in branches that are
relatively young (only few years in existence) as these units are dealing with learning
and getting comfortable with the well-established product of the Bank.
2. For a recent review of microleasing in Latin America, see Westley (2003).
3. In the leasing literature this is known as step-up/step-down lease (Carter,
1996).
4. However, most of items that Grameen leases have useful lives of more than
three years.
5. These types of activities are excluded because they cannot be released in intact
condition. Suppose the bank leased out a pharmacy and the lessee defaulted on the
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lease contract. By regulation the bank will have to repossess the item and try to release
to another member. However, when the bank repossesses the pharmacy, the inventory
of medicine might be less than the amount remaining on the lease.
6. For a lease contract worth up to Tk. 50,000, the processing time would be a
week to ten days. A lease proposal with value exceeding Tk. 50,000 may need two
weeks processing time.
7. For items worth up to Tk. 50,000, the branch manager will be present at the
time of the purchase. For items that are worth more than Tk. 50,000, in addition to
the branch manager, area manager or program officer from the area office will be present at the time of the purchase. In all cases, the lessee or a representative of the lessee
and a co-signor from the Center will be present.
8. Group tax entailed 5% of the loan amount that was set aside as group fund.
Borrowers had access to these funds with the approval of the whole group.
9. If the borrowers make advance payments, the repayment rate can be more than
100%.
10. I am grateful to Klaas Kupier and Erik Nelson for these recommendations.
Data limitations, however, preclude me from following up on these suggestions.
11. This measures the number of leases that are already owned as a proportion of
total number of lease contract signed to date. The actual ownership ratio is close to
100%—lease contracts that matured were fully repaid and the lessee owned the asset.
12. Grameen Bank's charter allows it to take the borrowers to court and confiscate their property in case of a default. As a policy, however, the bank has never used
the legal recourse to recover a loan. In case of seizure and sale of leased equipment the
bank rarely involves the law enforcement authority.
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